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Malware programs (e.g., viruses, worms, Trojans, etc.) are a worldwide epidemic.
Studies and statistics show that the impact of malware is getting worse. Malware
detectors are the primary tools in the defence against malware. Most commer-
cial anti-malware scanners maintain a database of malware patterns and heuristic
signatures for detecting malicious programs within a computer system. Malware
writers use semantic-preserving code transformation (obfuscation) techniques to
produce new stealth variants of their malware programs. Malware variants are
hard to detect with today’s detection technologies as these tools rely mostly on
syntactic properties and ignore the semantics of malicious executable programs.
A robust malware detection technique is required to handle this emerging security
threat.
In this thesis, we propose a new methodology that overcomes the drawback of ex-
isting malware detection methods by analysing the semantics of known malicious
code. The methodology consists of three major analysis techniques: the develop-
ment of a semantic signature, slicing analysis and test data generation analysis.
The core element in this approach is to specify an approximation for malware
code semantics and to produce signatures for identifying, possibly obfuscated but
semantically equivalent, variants of a sample of malware. A semantic signature
consists of a program test input and semantic traces of a known malware code.
The key challenge in developing our semantics-based approach to malware variant
detection is to achieve a balance between improving the detection rate (i.e. match-
ing semantic traces) and performance, with or without the effects of obfuscation
on malware variants. We develop slicing analysis to improve the construction of
semantic signatures. We back our trace-slicing method with a theoretical result
that shows the notion of correctness of the slicer. A proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of our malware detector demonstrates that the semantics-based analysis
approach could improve current detection tools and make the task more difficult
for malware authors. Another important part of this thesis is exploring program
semantics for the selection of a suitable part of the semantic signature, for which
we provide two new theoretical results. In particular, this dissertation includes a
test data generation method that works for binary executables and the notion of
correctness of the method.
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Nowadays a large number of personal computers, which are used by businesses,
government agencies and individuals, are connected to the Internet. Most of these
personal computers run commercial operating systems, such as Microsoft Win-
dows and Mac OS, and free operating systems, such as Linux; studies have shown
that these systems are an attractive target for computer hackers and criminals
who develop malware [Sym03]. Malware is a generic term that describes all types
of malicious executable programs (e.g. viruses, spyware, Trojans and worms).
Malicious software poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of personal
data and computer systems. Unfortunately, malware has turned into a profitable
business for malware authors and their customers. Malware authors often sell ma-
licious software toolkits to their inexperienced customers, who can quickly create
new customised malicious code variants. For instance, in 2009, nearly 90,000 ma-
licious files were identified to be unique variants of malicious files produced by the
Zeus family toolkit [Sym10]. These tens of thousands of new malicious variants
are then used to launch attacks, where each variant may only be targeted at a
single machine. Thus, the problem of the wide spread of malicious software is
likely to continue to grow in the future, as malware writers use new techniques to
create more variants of their malicious software.
Many organisations around the globe suffer significant financial losses due to the
rise in malware distribution and the weakness of security tools in place. A new
study of 45 business corporations revealed that the cost of coping with malware
15
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attacks ranges from $1 million to $52 million per year per company [Pan10]. Ac-
cording to Sophos [Sop11], the “Stuxnet” worm, which targeted Iran’s sensitive
nuclear program computers, was one of the most advanced pieces of malware code.
Before it performed its malicious functionality, Stuxnet was able to copy its own
code into the machine’s system and to hide itself from Anti-virus (AV) scanners
by making code alterations. Variants of the Stuxnet malware could be a possible
threat to other nations’ infrastructure, as stated by the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) [KRT10]:
“A successful broad-based attack on the US, using new variants of
the Stuxnet weapon, could do enough widespread damage to critical
infrastructure.”
Malware detectors use a combination of anti-malware techniques, such as virus sig-
nature scanners and heuristic methods, to defend against malicious software. Most
current commercial AV tools rely on a database of syntactical patterns or regular
expressions that characterise known malware variants. Anti-virus companies very
often update their databases whenever an unknown malware variant is encountered
in the wild. From 2006 to 2009, the number of signatures created for new malware
variants doubled every year [Sym10]. This figure is consistent with the overall ob-
servation that new malware variants are created using techniques that change the
appearance but preserve the underlying functionality or behaviour of each mal-
ware variant. Recent studies conducted by AV companies [Pan10], demonstrate
that current commercial AV products using traditional approaches such as pattern
or heuristic-based detection are no longer effective in defending against malware
threats. Thus, extracting and using semantic features that are preserved across
variants of malware is the key to a robust malware detector.
In the next section (Section 1.2), we present the research problem we attempt to
tackle in this thesis and discuss the research challenges we face. In Section 1.3,
we present the proposed solution for the research challenges. In Section 1.4, we
present our contributions. In Section 1.5, we discuss the scope and limitations of
our solution. In Section 1.6, we outline the structure of this thesis.
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1.2 Problem Definition and Challenges
Recent AV security reports [Sym10, Sop10, Sop11] show that malware continues to
grow and replicate at alarming rates. AV lab experiments [Pan10] demonstrate the
weakness of commercial anti-malware software in detecting new variants of known
malware programs. Existing countermeasures that use pattern signatures, be-
havioural heuristics or the reputation approach, analyse known malware instances
and extract properties such as syntactical and usage patterns. The extracted prop-
erties are used as signatures for detection. For instance, Norton examines captured
malware variants and includes byte sequences of malicious instructions in its huge
database of malicious programs [Nac10]. Each signature represents the variant
code of a single malware class. Thus, most new variants with a different appear-
ance (fingerprint) are undetected by current detection tools until new signatures
are developed for them.
Malware writers improve their tactics in circumventing commercial security prod-
ucts with advanced variants of malicious programs. In the last few years, it is
evident that after a new malware family is created and distributed for infection,
many different variants of the same family are generated by applying syntactic code
transformations such as packing and obfuscation techniques. Program transforma-
tion involves transforming program statements or instructions into semantically
equivalent code with different syntax [Mor01, Nac97, SF01]. Therefore, malware
writers with the aid of code transformation techniques are able to produce sev-
eral new instances of malicious software, which are undetectable by most current
detection methods. Therefore, major improvements in current malware detec-
tion techniques are required to tackle new transformed variants of malware. One
new tactic to improve malware detection is to capture a semantic property of the
malware and to detect different malware variants using that property.
In this thesis, we attempt to develop a new method to automatically detect (possi-
bly) obfuscated variants of a malware using properties of code semantics as signa-
tures from the known malware sample. The advantage of using a semantics-based
detection approach is that semantic signatures are more generic and, thus, a sin-
gle signature can be used to detect multiple variants, manually or automatically
produced from the same malware program.
To tackle the detection of malware variants using a semantics-based approach, we
face the following challenges:
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• The first fundamental challenge is that the correct selection of a semantic
signature for describing the behaviour of a malicious program has a great
impact on the strength and efficiency of a semantics-based malware detec-
tor. Current techniques for malware signature generation extract syntac-
tical patterns from the malware code as features to look for in suspicious
files. Anti-malware detectors that incorporate these techniques have a fast
detection phase but they suffer from high numbers of false positives – iden-
tifying benign programs as malicious – and as new malware variants alter
their syntax these detectors are prone to higher false negative rates.
• The second challenge is the construction of a semantics-based detector that
is resilient to code obfuscation. Because most new variants are created using
various common code obfuscating techniques, a detector must be robust
in dealing with a possibly obfuscated malware variant. Dealing with code
obfuscations, by using de-obfuscation methods for handling different effects
of obfuscations on code variants, may lower the performance of a detector
and strengthen malware writers’ evasion techniques. A more generic method
is required in which a detector focuses on the core semantics of a malicious
program that are not associated with obfuscation effects.
• The third fundamental challenge is the automation and the effectiveness of
a semantics-based detector. A detector that relies on semantic signatures of
code as its main form of detection of unknown instances of a malware class,
has to be automatic and fast in creating semantic signatures and in identi-
fying and classifying unknown variants of the malicious code with minimal
false alarms (i.e., false positive and false negative rates).
1.3 Proposed Solution
In an attempt to deal with the above mentioned research challenges for developing
a semantics-based approach, our solution tackles each challenge and takes the
following form.
• Challenge 1: In an attempt to address the first challenge, we select a seman-
tic signature of a known malware program that doesn’t depend on irrelevant
details in the program syntax (which may be introduced by code obfuscat-
ing transformations). A semantic signature of a malware class must contain
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the necessary semantic features that allow a detector to identify and clas-
sify syntactically transformed variants of the malware. That is, a semantic
signature has to describe unique semantic characteristics that exist across
variants of a malware class. In Chapter 5 we propose a novel type of mal-
ware semantic signature, which is created based on the information of the
code evaluation. A semantic signature of a malware program represents the
approximate behaviour of the malware, which may be similar across seman-
tically equivalent variants of the same malware. Moreover, we introduce test
data generation for malware executables as a technique to identify the ap-
proximate behaviour from a known malware sample and to extract semantic
signatures. Our technique works for executables and it explores the con-
trol flow graph of a program to identify a set of test inputs that guarantees
to traverse a particular set of program execution paths, called feasible pro-
gram paths. The test inputs can then be used to improve the construction
of semantic signatures. Our conjecture is that no matter how new variants
of a malware program alter their code, as long as they behave in a similar
way, their semantic signatures do not change. Chapter 6 presents the tech-
nique and the developed algorithms backed by the correctness proof of the
technique.
• Challenge 2: Our idea is for a semantics-based detector that can use the
existing semantic signatures of known malware samples to perform its anal-
ysis of a suspicious executable program regardless of whether the program
is obfuscated or not. To this end, we extract a test input for a known ma-
licious code using a random test input generator, which may describe the
malicious functionality of the code. Then, during the detection phase, the
semantics-based detector simulates the execution of the candidate malware
variant, using a random test input from the semantic signature, to capture
the semantic details, i.e. trace semantics, and determine whether the seman-
tic details of the code contain a known semantic signature. This approach
is generic in the sense that it can handle any variant of a known malware
program as long as it preserves the code semantics. Chapter 5 presents our
semantic simulator for evaluating code variants using the semantic signature
of known malware. Using experimental results, the chapter further illus-
trates that our approach is resilient to a common set of malware obfuscating
transformations.
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• Challenge 3: In an attempt to tackle the challenge of the automation and the
effectiveness of a malware detector, we introduce a method that may improve
both the generation of semantic signatures and the detection of new malicious
code variants in the presence of code obfuscations. In Chapter 4 we introduce
trace slicing as an automated method for extracting fine-grained sub-traces
(semantic characteristics) from the simulation traces of malware code as part
of the signature. Chapter 4 also presents a trace-slicing algorithm and its
correctness proof. This step may produce smaller traces, closer to traces of
the original (or unobfuscated) malware, improving both the speed and rate
of the detection phase as the experimental results of Chapter 5 demonstrate.
Moreover, to have a practical detector, we implement the detection phase as a
separate step from the signature generation phase, which deals with malware
variant candidates and implements a mapping algorithm. Chapter 5 presents
our method of matching semantic signatures. The chapter further presents a
proof-of-concept prototype system for the semantics-based approach backed
by results that highlight its performance and detection rates.
By tackling the three challenges for semantics-based malware detection, this dis-
sertation takes an important step in developing a robust and effective approach
for malware variant detection.
1.4 Contributions
We introduce methods to improve the automatic detection and analysis of mali-
cious program variants via the semantic analysis of code. Towards this goal, we
make the following contributions in this dissertation:
1. Specification of a semantic signature for malware. We define an ab-
stract machine language and its syntax as a target language for malware
code. We present a definition of trace semantics for malware programs
(Chapter 4). This specification allows the construction of semantic signa-
tures and the automatic detection of malware variants (Chapter 5).
2. Trace-slicing algorithm. We describe and prove an algorithm for comput-
ing correct sub-traces from an executable program trace (Chapter 4). Trace
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slices may improve the construction of semantic signatures of a malware vari-
ant by handling a class of malware code obfuscating transformations. We
set up an implementation to show its practical use as a trace slicer for Intel
x86 binaries. Then we incorporate an implementation of the algorithm into
our semantics-based detector prototype (Chapter 5).
3. Semantics-based malware variant detection algorithm. We present
a general architecture for detecting variants of a known malware sample
(Chapter 5). It consists of a static analyser, trace slicer and a semantic
trace-matching algorithm. The static analyser, called Semantic Simulator,
is developed to construct semantic signatures for known malware and to
capture semantic traces for candidate malware variants. The matching al-
gorithm compares semantic signatures to detect subsequent malware vari-
ants. An experimental evaluation of the prototype on a collection of mal-
ware samples (in the presence of obfuscated code) shows the effectiveness of
our approach in detecting variants of a malware sample. The experimental
results confirm that automatically generated semantic signatures using the
trace-slicing method may enhance the performance of the detection phase in
terms of speed and accuracy. Also, the results highlight the capabilities of
our detector as a classification tool for malware samples.
4. Test data generation method. We present a general testing method for
extracting a set of test inputs in executable programs (Chapter 6). An al-
gorithm, developed for an abstract machine language code, approximates a
program by identifying a set of feasible program paths with program inputs
that can be used to generate semantic signatures for program variant detec-
tion. A correctness proof is presented for the algorithm, which guarantees
that a given feasible program path is traversed via the computed program
test input.
1.5 Scope and Limitations
Since malware attacks are targeted at many different types of computer systems,
a single panacea that can handle all malware threats in every environment may
be impossible. We develop an approach, presented in this dissertation, under the
following limitations:
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• New malware variants on personal computers. Our approach for de-
tecting malware programs cannot be the solution to the malware detection
problem, as this problem is undecidable and malware writers increasingly
armour their new malware generations with stronger evasion techniques.
However, our approach focuses on handling the problem of detecting new,
zero-day variants of already analysed malware programs. Also, this research
aims to develop a detection system that examines suspicious files on one
important environment, a personal (local) computer.
• Dynamic code generation techniques. Our approach cannot handle
malicious programs that incorporate dynamic code generation techniques.
If a malicious binary, for example, contains encrypted commands within its
data segment or commands received at runtime via network communication
with the malware master (e.g. a command-and-control server), our tool
would fail to capture its semantics and, hence, would be unable to identify
correctly its semantic signature.
• Current static analysis tools. Our approach operates under the assump-
tion that most malicious executables can be handled by off-the-shelf static
tools (e.g. packers and disassemblers) to unpack and disassemble the code
and extract an approximate control flow graph. The robustness and effi-
ciency of our approach directly depends on the static analysis techniques
that are integrated into it [MKK07b]. In other words, our semantics-based
technique to extract and detect malware signatures is as effective as the
static analysis methods it is developed upon.
1.6 Thesis Overview and Structure
The core idea of the proposed method of malware variant detection is that the
semantic signature reflects the unique characteristic of a known malware. A se-
mantic signature is a pair consisting of a program input and a set of semantic
traces. A semantic trace represents a sequence of execution contexts (i.e. register
and memory states). The program input of a known malware can be used to simu-
late the execution of a program and to generate a simulation trace. The approach
attempts to identify malware variants by reasoning about their behaviour during
the simulation rather than how the syntactic structure of the code is represented.
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We implemented a semantics-based detector exploiting the semantic signature to
justify this idea. The goal of the detector is to see if the set of semantic traces
in the malware signature is contained within the generated semantic traces of the
program under test. The first phase of the detector produces a random input
and generates a simulation trace for a known malware. With respect to different
program registers and memory locations that have been defined in the trace, a
set of backward slices of the trace is produced at the end of the trace. As code
obfuscation may introduce some irrelevant operations before the malware performs
its intended operations, all the registers and memory locations that are defined in
the trace are selected as the slicing criteria at the end of trace. Two abstraction
steps are implemented on the trace to produce a set of semantic traces. The
first abstraction removes states that contain duplicate execution contexts and the
second abstraction discards information about the command syntax. The second
phase of the detector simulates a suspicious code with the same input as a known
malware to produce a semantic trace. The detector searches, through a trace-
matching step, the semantic trace of the suspicious code to see if these semantic
slices can be found. That is, for each slice in the signature, the matching step
measures the similarity between the slice and the semantic trace.
Note that our technique only generates trace slices for a known malware sample and
compares them against the semantic trace of a suspicious program. This may be
computationally more efficient than producing and comparing dependence graphs
as exact graph or subgraph matching, i.e., graph or subgraph isomorphism, is
computationally expensive when comparing a large number of graphs; both graph
and subgraph isomorphism are NP problems (and subgraph isomorphism has been
proven to be NP-complete)[GJ90].
Finally, with our test data generation algorithm, a set of test data can be produced
for an executable code. The idea behind this method is that a set of test inputs may
represent different program paths through a malware sample and hence, produce
a more representative malware signature.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows.
• Chapter 2. We present the malware problem and its definitions. We present
code obfuscation theory, recalling several code obfuscation techniques used in
generating malware variants. Also, the theoretical limitation of the malware
detection problem is discussed.
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• Chapter 3. We discuss related work in the areas of malware detection and
analysis. The chapter provides the background from which this thesis is
developed.
• Chapter 4. We present our abstract machine language (AAPL) and de-
fine trace semantics. Also, we describe the design, the correctness proof
and implementation of the trace-slicing algorithm. We discuss the strengths
and limitations of the trace slicer with respect to malware code obfuscating
techniques.
• Chapter 5. We present our matching algorithm for identifying similar se-
mantic details for (possibly obfuscated) malware variants using semantic sig-
natures. We present our architecture for a semantics-based detector, which
incorporates a semantic simulator (SemSim). SemSim takes an abstract ma-
chine code (AAPL), evaluates its commands using a given test input and
collects program traces. As a proof-of-concept malware detection tool, we
implement a malware variant detector and conduct four different experiments
to evaluate our approach. The experiments are based on the construction of
semantic signatures for a single test input of each malware sample.
• Chapter 6. We describe our testing method for exploring program be-
haviour through identifying program inputs (test data) for feasible program
paths within the control flow graph of a program. We extend an existing
test data generation method, called the dynamic domain reduction tech-
nique. The extended method automatically identifies test data for input
variables of AAPL programs. We prove that our algorithm for computing
test data for executables is correct.




In this chapter, we introduce the basic terms and definitions of the malware prob-
lem that we address in the thesis. In Section 2.1 we introduce the malware terms
that are used in the research community. Section 2.2 gives the definitions of code
obfuscation, recalling several malware obfuscation techniques used in generating
new malware variants. In Section 2.3 we discuss the theoretical limitation of the
malware variant detection problem.
2.1 The Malware Problem
2.1.1 Basic Terms
The term malware refers to any malicious software that could intentionally perform
malicious tasks on a computer system or on networked systems. The following
covers some basic definitions of the malware problem:
• A virus is a program that is designed to replicate itself and to spread from
one machine to another using an infected (carrier) host program. That is
a malicious program copies itself into a benign program. Once an infected
program is executed, the virus starts its functionality, infects and damages
the machine. Thus, viruses attempt to spread and infect within the infected
machine.
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• A Trojan horse is a program that is believed to be useful but which has a
harmful intention towards the host machine. Some hidden part of this type
of malware contain a malicious payload that may exploit or damage the
host system. Also, Trojan horses can be spyware because of their malicious
actions such as the unauthorised collection of a user’s data.
• A worm is another type of malware that uses malicious code to propagate
from one host to another in a networked system without user intervention
– other malware types require external actions. A worm may have greater
impact; it can execute harmful actions such as a denial of service attack
on a network of computer systems or can use system resources for illegal
purposes. A comprehensive description of these malware and other types
can be found in [Szo¨05].
• Malvertising is the use of a malicious advertising program that targets a
website by placing an advertisement alongside the standard set of ads in
the website. A malvertising program conceals the malicious activities of
its ads to evade detection. Malware writers use malvertising programs to
scam website visitors into buying fake anti-virus software in order to resolve
non-existent malware infections on victims’ machines [Sop11].
• A bot is a malicious program that controls an infected machine; usually a
bot is connected through the Internet with a large-scale botnet (i.e. a bot
network). A botnet of infected machines can be easily controlled by a single
attacker (bot master), who can send malicious commands to launch attacks
to other machines or websites connected to the Internet.
• A False Positive is generated when a benign file is identified as malware
because a match is found.
• A False Negative is generated when a scanned file is a malware file because
no match is found.
• A Malware detector is a program that analyses a file (an executable binary
object or a source code) and identifies whether the file is malicious. Thus,
a malware detector is a function F that takes a program file as an input p
and returns either yes if the input is believed to be malicious, or no if the
input file is believed to be benign, i.e. F : P → {yes, no}. Current detectors,
including commercial detection tools, use features of malicious programs as
signatures to identify malware. Malware features are extracted either from
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the byte sequences in the case of malware executable binary files or from
the instruction (program command) sequences in the case of malware source
code files. The byte signature is constructed from the machine code repre-
sentation, i.e. a sequence of hexadecimal code. The instruction signature is
composed of heuristic information (e.g. the frequency of a sequence of sys-
tem calls or instructions found in the code) about the malicious operations
contained in the analysed code. In Chapter 3 we discuss several approaches
proposed for constructing and detecting malware signatures. The main ob-
jective of deploying a malware detector is to prevent malware attacks on
(local) computer machines by inspecting incoming files before they execute.
The main drawbacks of current detection programs are that they are not
resilient to malware obfuscation because they are prone to generating false
positives and false negatives when tackling obfuscated malware variants. In
the remainder of this chapter we present a partial list of common malware
obfuscation techniques used for generating new hard-to-detect variants.
2.1.2 Malware Categories and Behaviour
Most malware families have similar behaviour and properties, which the majority
of scanners use as signatures to detect malware variants. For instance, one of the
properties of a worm is self-replication – a worm tries to spread by simply copying
itself to a host machine through the communication channels of other infected
machines. On the other hand, a virus will attempt to spread by a carrier such as
an infected file or a media drive. In the following we will examine some common
environments and the behaviour of malware.
Malware Environments. In order for malware to perform its malicious func-
tionality and to infect other victims, some components or resources should exist.
Malware writers usually develop their code for a particular operating system. For
instance, Win32 viruses are effective against Microsoft Windows and may not
work on other operating systems. Moreover, a malware may require that some
particular applications are running on the victim system in order to be effective.
For example, some virus attacks are only effective if a scripting language such as
Microsoft VB script or JavaScript (.vbs, .js, etc.) files can execute on the local
machine.
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Means of Infection. Malware uses common methods of transmission between
computer systems. One of the traditional methods, and the easiest, of transmit-
ting malicious programs is via external media such as USB devices and memory
disks; however, the rate of spreading malware using this method is considered low
compared to other methods such as through networked systems. Malware writers
find networked computer systems an excellent environment to replicate and spread
their viruses and worms; therefore, inadequate security on a network means that
a large number of systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Another means of
malware infection between computer systems is electronic mail (e-mail). Malicious
code can spread easily as a file attachment sent with an e-mail message to as many
as possible e-mail users. This type of spreading mechanism requires only a little
effort from malware writers to make successful attacks. E-mail-based malware
falls into two categories: mailer and mass mailer malware. The first category uses
mail software such as Microsoft Outlook; the list of e-mail addresses on the host
machine is used by the virus to e-mail itself to other users. The second category
uses its own SMTP engine to send malicious code to many e-mail addresses.
Malicious Behaviour. Each malware type has its own malicious intention or
behaviour towards the infected machine. This behaviour is developed as program
code and embedded within the malware payload. Thus, by examining a virus pay-
load we can determine its malicious behaviour and the threat it poses to computer
systems. Some common payload types are: Denial of Service (DoS), information
theft and bandwidth flooding. DoS attacks make various services on a computer
system unavailable for some period of time. The second type of payload compro-
mises the security of the infected machine by stealing sensitive information such
as user keystrokes and passing it to its master. Bandwidth flooding attacks occur
when a malware payload contains commands to generate a large volume of traffic,
which stop the machine from utilising its network bandwidth.
2.2 Background on Code Obfuscation
Obfuscation techniques transform a program into a variant that is hard and time-
consuming to understand and reverse engineer with current analysis tools. In
general, a code obfuscation technique consists of a set of transformation functions
that aims to maximise the obscurity of the new program but preserves the seman-
tics of the original program. In the malware world, there are several transformation
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functions that can be applied to obfuscate malicious programs, including dead and
irrelevant code insertions, equivalent code replacements and data encodings, etc.
Section 2.2.1 covers the general notion of code obfuscation and Section 2.2.2 inves-
tigates several existing techniques used by malware writers to produce obfuscated
malware variants with some examples.
2.2.1 The Notion of Code Obfuscation
Collberg et al. [CTL97, CTL98] presented the first formal definition of the obfus-
cation problem. They stated that a transformation function T maps a program P
to a new program P ′ such that P ′ is resilient to deobfuscation and P ′ contains the
same behaviour as P . Collberg et al. put obfuscation transformations into three
categories:
• Lexical Transformations modify information that is related to the struc-
ture of the program, e.g. by renaming identifiers, changing or removing de-
bugging information and comments. This type of obfuscation transformation
can also be used to protect the intellectual property rights of software.
• Control-flow Transformations make changes to the control flow of the
program, e.g. through code reordering and jump insertion, and through the
insertion of opaque predicates. The results of these transformations are hard
for a deobfuscator to compute.
• Data Transformations obfuscate data and data structures in the program,
e.g. variable-splitting transformations that split a single variable into two or
more variables with new operations to produce an equivalent result to the
original variable.
2.2.2 Common Malware Obfuscating Techniques
Malware writers develop their malicious code in such a way that a malware detector
may not be able to detect it. Since many commercial anti-virus scanners look
for common malicious behaviour and syntactic characteristics, malware authors
deploy new evasive techniques to hide the true intentions of their malicious code
and to generate new instances of their malicious programs. Each new variant of
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a particular malware can be produced automatically (or manually) by applying
obfuscating transformation techniques to the current malware code. A survey of
malware obfuscation techniques is presented in [YY10]. We first present the types
of obfuscated malware and then we discusses common techniques used to generate
new malicious variants.
Stealth. The malware hides the actual changes it made to the system and
shows clean data to the scanner. For instance, when an anti-virus program scans
for infected areas of a disk, the virus provides an ideal state of the system without
any infection.
Encryption. This evasion method is used to hide the presence of malware
by encrypting the payload. This type of malware usually consists of a constant
decryptor, an encryption key and the encrypted payload. Since the actual malware
behaviour or functionality is encrypted, malware detectors find it difficult to detect
the malicious code. The malware creates a copy of itself by encrypting its payload
with a new encryption key, so that the new payload looks different to the original
malware payload. However, encrypting malware always uses the same decryptor
to create malware variants; malware detectors may use this as a signature to detect
this type of malware.
Oligomorphic. A malware that uses this evasion technique encrypts its pay-
load in the same way as encrypting malware but the malware can change its
decryptor to create different copies of itself [Szo¨05]. The detection of oligomorphic
malware is very hard when using the decryptor as a signature and it requires a
close analysis of the malware decryptor generator.
Polymorphic. Malware of this type is equipped with the same evasion tech-
nique as the other malware discussed previously; however, it contains an encrypted
body with several copies of the decryptor (polymorphic decryptor). When creating
new instances, the malware uses different encryption keys in different instances so
in each instance the malware body looks completely different from other variants.
For example, some viruses such as Win32/Coke variants contain a polymorphic
decryptor, which implements multiple layers of encryption over the body. Other
viruses such as Win32/Crypto variants use random encryption techniques to get
different versions of the decryptor [SF01]. Also, some polymorphic viruses apply
obfuscation techniques to only their decryptor to evade detection. For instance,
the decryptor code may be reordered by placing jump instructions or inserting
garbage code to change the malware signature whilst preserving its semantics.
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1 : push eax
2 : dec esi
3 : add [eax],al
4 : or al,[eax]
5 : add [eax],al
6 : push 0x0
7 : cmp al,[eax]
8 : pop esp
9 : add bl,dh
10 : xchg edi,eax
(a)
1 : dec esi
2 : push eax
3 : jmp 7
4 : cmp al,[eax]
5 : pop esp
6 : jmp 12
7 : add [eax],al
8 : push 0x0
9 : or al,[eax]
10 : add [eax],al
11 : jmp 4
12 : xchg edi,eax
13 : add bl,dh
(b)
Figure 2.1: x86 assembly language code fragment of the Mobler worm, de-
veloped for Win32 operating systems (a). Code reorder obfuscation applied to
a code variant of Mobler (b).
The detection of this malware type requires emulating the polymorphic decryptor
(PD) behaviour and then generating PD signatures.
Metamorphic. In order to further evade detection, malware writers have ex-
tended the above mentioned malware types by applying code obfuscation to the
entire malware body. A metamorphic virus does not contain a decryptor and a
constant data part, instead it consists of a single program code that can replicate
into a completely different variant of the malicious code [Szo¨05]. It is difficult to
detect this type of malware because with every malware evolution the signature
used for detection needs to be completely different.
Description of Malware Obfuscations
Several different variants of malware can be generated by using one or several of
the following (partial list of) common malware obfuscation techniques:
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1 : push eax
2 : nop
3 dec esi
4 : add [eax],al
5 : nop
6 : or al,[eax]
7 : jmp 12
8 : mov [ebp-0x18],esp
9 : mov [ebp-0x14],0x4010e0
10 : and eax,0x1
11 : mov [ebp-0x10],eax
12 : add [eax],al
13 : push 0x0
14 : cmp al,[eax]
15 : nop
16 : pop esp
17 : add bl,dh
18 : xchg edi,eax
Figure 2.2: Garbage insertion obfuscation applied to the fragment of the
Mobler code in Fig. 2.1 on the preceding page (a).
• Code reordering. This technique changes the order of code instructions.
It can be applied to independent instructions where their order in the mal-
ware body do not affect other instructions (i.e. there are no data or control
dependencies between other code fragments). Unconditional branches (e.g.
jump instructions) may be inserted, if necessary, to preserve the original ex-
ecution order. Also, an opaque predicate command may be used to indicate
the correct flow of control within the code. An opaque predicate is a con-
dition that always returns True or False but which cannot be determined
statically. Thus, code reordering allows the creation of new variants that are
syntactically different from but semantically similar to the original malware
code. Figure 2.1 on the preceding page shows an example of code reordering
obfuscation. Note that each jump instruction in this example will point to
the next instruction, thus, the modified code will still run just like the origi-
nal code. Code reordering makes the task of handling obfuscated code more
challenging for syntactic scanners.
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1 : push eax
2 : sub esi,1
3 : add [eax],al
4 : or al,[eax]
5 : add [eax],al
6 : xor ebx,ebx
7 : cmp al,[eax]
8 : mov esp,ebx
9 : add bl,dh
10 : xchg edi,eax
Figure 2.3: A variant produced by applying equivalent code replacement
obfuscation to the fragment of the Mobler code in Fig. 2.1 on page 31 (a).
• Garbage insertion. Malware writers introduce this obfuscation technique
as a way of creating new variants from existing malware. The technique in-
serts irrelevant instructions into a program, which do not affect the original
behaviour of the program. For instance, a new variant can be generated by
adding a fragment of code (i.e. garbage code) that will not be reachable dur-
ing the execution of the malware program. Unconditional jump instructions
allow the correct execution order to be retained and bypass all fragments
of garbage code. Also, a sequence of nop instructions (e.g. the x86 NOP
command) can be inserted anywhere in the code; they modify the syntac-
tic signature of the variant but keep the semantics unchanged. There are
other instruction sequences that are difficult for static analysis to identify as
garbage code. For instance, inserting and retrieving dummy values through
the stack or memory do not alter the original behaviour of the program but it
make harder to reverse engineer the obfuscation. The example in Figure 2.2
illustrates this technique.
• Equivalent Code Replacement. This obfuscation technique replaces in-
structions with other instructions that preserve the semantics of the original
code and creates a new program variant. This obfuscation technique involves
a set of transformation rules that contain equivalent instruction sequences
to replace one instruction sequence with another. Since the x86 assembly
language provides a large set of instructions for programmers, a low-level op-
eration can be implemented with several implementations using a different
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1 : push ebx
2 : dec esi
3 : add [ebx],al
4 : or al,[ebx]
5 : add [ebx],al
6 : push 0x0
7 : cmp al,[ebx]
8 : pop esp
9 : add bl,dh
10 : xchg edi,ebx
Figure 2.4: A variant produced by applying variable renaming obfuscation
to the fragment of the Mobler code in Fig. 2.1 (a).
set of instructions. For instance, the Intel x86 memory addressing modes
provide flexible access to memory and registers, allowing one to easily ma-
nipulate data. This instruction set flexibility allow malware authors to pro-
duce new obfuscated malware variants. However, for an automatic detection
of this obfuscation, a static analysis tool would need to maintain a set of
rewriting rules to transform code variants into a canonical form for signa-
ture matching. Figure 2.3 shows an example of equivalent code replacement
obfuscations.
• Variable Renaming. This obfuscation technique replaces program identi-
fiers (e.g. registers, labels and constant names) throughout the code, but the
code is equivalent in terms of semantics. The implementation of this tech-
nique is expensive in the sense that it requires static def-use and liveness
(identifying which variables are live at each point in a program) analyses of
program identifiers. Thus, to lower the cost, malware authors use this tech-
nique to generate code variants based on a few selected program registers
and branch labels [Szo¨05]. An example of this technique is shown in Fig. 2.4.
• Code and Data Encapsulation. This method is also known, as code
packing [MKK07b, Kuz07]; malware writers use packer tools such as the
UPX packer to reduce the size of their malicious code, generally through
compression. Thus, these tools are used to protect and hide malware variants
from static analysis tools and scanners when they are distributed. According
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to PandaLabs [Pan08], 78% of new malware variants were developed using
this new technique in order to evade detection.
2.3 Theoretical Limitations
Fred Cohen first introduced one of the few solid theoretical results in the study of
computer virology. In particular, Cohen presented a formal definition of a com-
puter virus based on the Turing machine model of computation, and demonstrated
that the problem of detecting viruses is undecidable [Coh87]. That is, no detector
can perfectly detect all possible viruses. Cohen proved also that the detection
problem due to the evolution of viruses from known viruses is undecidable, mean-
ing that detection of (obfuscated) malware variants of known malware code is
undecidable. Chess and White [CW00] applied formal computability theory to
viruses and virus detection, showing that there are computer viruses which no
algorithm can detect, even under a somewhat more liberal definition of detection.
Despite these theoretical limitations, which show that the problem of detecting
malware is, in general, impossible, it could be the case that developing detection
systems that handle a class of malware is a possible (partial) solution [YHR89].
Thus, the malware detection research community has begun to propose detection




Current commercial anti-malware tools are constantly challenged by the increased
frequency of malware outbreaks. Several malware analysis and detection ap-
proaches have been proposed to minimise the distribution of malicious programs.
However, malware writers deploy new techniques such as obfuscation and alter-
ing program behaviour [KKSV10] in order to create new, undetectable, malicious
programs that evade state-of-the-art detectors. We provide, through selective ref-
erence to some of the literature, a clearer understanding of the existing malware
detection techniques. Malware detection approaches presented in the literature
are based on various analysis strategies that are common in computer software
analysis, i.e. static, dynamic and hybrid. Moreover, we propose classifying existing






Before reviewing the development of malware detection research, we categorised it
into three tiers. Research into the detection approach is placed at the top level of
the hierarchy, followed by research into input representations and analysis types.
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Figure 3.1: A three-tier hierarchy diagram of malware-detection research.
Input representations are the intermediate representation formats of malware pro-
grams produced as inputs to the malware detectors. The analysis type divides
detection techniques into three groups: static, dynamic and hybrid. Figure 3.1
shows our three-tier hierarchy for malware-detection research. Our analysis in
this chapter of the existing malware detection research is based on this hierarchy.
We cover the malware detection research hierarchy in the next two sections: Sec-
tion 3.1 covers some input representations and the analysis types that are used
in research. Then, we discuss several recent techniques in malware detection in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 covers some research into malware analysis techniques.
We conclude this chapter, Section 3.4, with a discussion of the surveyed literature.
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3.1 Input Representations and Analysis Types
3.1.1 Input Representations
Malware programs and their malicious behaviours are transformed into a suitable
form that can be used as the input parameter to an analysis or detection tool.
Input representations of malicious programs are used to capture various syntac-
tical or semantic properties of the input code, and can be used to classify and
detect malware families and their variants. Various reverse-engineering methods
are deployed to perform abstraction of programs at different levels (i.e syntactic
and semantic) of malware analysis. We cover some input representations of mal-
ware that are widely used in recent malware analysis and detection methods, such
as control and data flow graphs, byte and instruction sequences, and system call
sequences, abstract models and runtime execution traces.
• Instruction and Data Sequences. The byte representation of a specific
sequence of instructions and data are extracted from a malware file (referred
to as the string signature). This signature is typical of the malware but not
likely to occur in benign programs. Most current anti-virus tools use this type
of signature to scan and detect malicious programs. The signatures exactly
match the corresponding malware sample and, hence, they are prone to a
high number of false negatives (for new syntactically transformed variants
of the malware).
• N-grams. An n-gram is a subsequence of n consecutive tokens in a stream
of tokens. N-gram analysis has been applied to many text and speech pro-
cessing tasks [JM08], and is well understood and efficient to implement. By
converting a string of bytes in a malware executable into n-grams, it can be
embedded in a vector space to efficiently distinguish between malicious and
benign files by comparing the streams of bytes.
• Application Programming Interfaces. API calls and system events are
interface methods that a host operating system (OS) provides for running
processes (programs) to request OS services, such as creating a file, opening
a network socket, etc. Thus, a sequence of system or API calls within an
executable program could be used to describe its activity or behaviour and,
hence, detect malicious programs.
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• Abstract Models. An abstract model is a set of specifications describing
the desired security properties of the system. Usually, specifications in mal-
ware analysis and detection systems are produced to represent the malicious
behaviour of a malware program. A specification is expressed in a suit-
able temporal logic formula such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [BM09] or
Computation Tree Predicate Logic (CTPL) [KKSV10]. An abstract model
allows the description and detection of a large set of known malware variants
using a single specification formula.
• Control Flow and Program Dependence Graphs. CFGs and PDGs
(including data and control dependence graphs) represent the semantic struc-
tures of programs. A suspicious program is detected as a malware variant if
the malware variant CFG has a subgraph that is isomorphic to the CFG of
the suspicious program [GBMKJYM07, AHJD10].
• Program Traces. A trace is an abstracted form of program semantics that
expresses the malicious behaviour of malware. Program traces are gener-
ated at runtime or statically using all possible program paths. A database
of abstract traces that represents malicious behaviour can be used to hold
signatures for malware detection [PCJD07, BGM10].
3.1.2 Analysis Types
• Static. Static analysis discovers information about program control and
data flows and other statistical features (executable formats, instruction op-
code and library signatures) without actually executing the program. The
main method used in the static analysis of malware is reverse engineering.
Several reverse-engineering techniques are applied to extract input represen-
tations of a malware executable binary.
• Dynamic. Dynamic analysis requires executing the program that is be-
ing analysed and monitoring its execution in a real or a virtual machine
environment. This provides actual information about the control and data
flow, which can be used to extract more precise and accurate abstractions
of program code. Dynamic analysis suffers from the execution overhead and
provides information about a particular execution of a malware program for
a given set of inputs. CWSand-box [WHF07] and TTAnalyze [BKK06] are
dynamic analysis-based tools developed for analysing malware.
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• Hybrid. Hybrid analysis is a mixed approach where the abstraction of
malware produced by static analysis is refined by executing portions of the
malicious code. Hybrid analysis can be performed at the source level by static
analysis, which then passes information about the program to the dynamic
analysis phase for detection. Hybrid analysis can improve the understanding
of malware behaviour and, hence, may reduce false positive rates.
3.2 Detection Approaches
We will focus on the strengths and drawbacks of some new and interesting ap-
proaches to malware detection that have recently been proposed in the literature.
This section surveys several proposed detection techniques for the five different ap-
proaches to malware detection: signature-based, behaviour-based, heuristic-based,
model checking and semantic-based. It seeks to gain a general feel for the sort
of work that is being undertaken for these five approaches and to see whether
there are promising applications or theoretical ideas. Moreover, it is an attempt
to identify the trends in this field.
Before we review the detection approaches in the following subsections, we will list
and describe survey papers in this field of research. They were selected to provide
a good survey of the current state of the research in this area and to give several
different facets of the malware detection problem.
An overview of malware detection techniques is presented in [IM07]. This survey
paper examines 45 malware detectors and classifies them into three different mal-
ware detection approaches: anomaly, signature and specification based. Patcha
and Park[PP07] give a comprehensive survey of two malware detection systems:
intrusion detection and anomaly detection techniques. The authors describe the
generic architectural design of intrusion and anomaly detection systems. They
highlight three main detection techniques for malware attacks in computer net-
works and systems: statical, data-mining and rule-based techniques. The authors
suggest that building a hybrid system that consists of both anomaly and signature
techniques could reduce the number of false alarms. Filiol et al. [JDF08] describe
a new taxonomy of two main families of behavioural malware detectors. The au-
thors classify and describe 29 proposed techniques that use simulation-based and
formal verification methods. The survey considers four key points: data-collection
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mechanisms, data interpretation, the adopted model and the decision process im-
plemented within a detection system. The main idea of this survey is that the
identification of functionality is a common principle in the different techniques
examined. [SWL08] surveys data-mining techniques for malware detection using
file features. The techniques are examined according to the features extracted
from the binary program, an analysis of the technique (i.e. whether it is static
or dynamic) and the detection type deployed (i.e. misuse or anomaly detection).
The paper gives hierarchical categories for the 19 surveyed techniques. Glezer et
al. [SMEG09] proposed a new taxonomy for categorising detection techniques of
new malware variants using a machine-learning approach. The authors provide a
comprehensive review of malware detectors that use machine-learning classifiers
on static file features extracted from malicious executables. Their taxonomy has
three dimensions: the file representation method, the feature selection method and
the classification algorithm. The static features discussed in the paper are byte
n-grams, OpCode n-grams and function-based features. The paper suggests that
such a framework for detecting new instances of malware in executable files should
combine multiple classifiers for various types of file feature in order to achieve a
high accuracy in detection. In [RRZ+09], 48 malware detection techniques were
reviewed and analysed for improving the capability of Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS). Furthermore, a new categorisation, called the Hybrid-Malware Detection
Technique (Hybrid-MDT), of malware detection techniques was proposed. Hybrid-
MDT consists of two hybrid techniques: the hybrid signature-anomaly technique
and the hybrid specification-anomaly technique. Both techniques in Hybrid-MDT
were proposed in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses found in the signature-
based, anomaly-based and specification-based techniques. [FSR09] reviewed detec-
tion techniques in the literature for one type of malware: the botnet. This survey
paper identifies four classes of techniques: signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-
based and data-mining-based. It highlighted proposed detectors in each class and
gave a brief comparison of botnet detection techniques.
A significant amount of research has appeared in the professional literature over
the last ten years addressing the problem of malware detection. Almost over 330
research papers have been published since 2001 in 12 computer security confer-
ences (i.e. the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, the Symposium on Re-
cent Advances in Intrusion Detection, the Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, the
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Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, the USENIX Se-
curity Symposium, the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
the IEEE Communications Society/CreateNet International Conference on Secu-
rity and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks, the Conference
on Detection of Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment, the ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, the Inter-
national Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security and the Sym-
posium on Usable Privacy and Security). The papers presented in this overview
were selected from various yearly conferences on computer and information secu-
rity. We will focus on the most relevant (and recent) papers for each approach and
aim to provide the background from which we will develop our thesis. Table 3.1
on the following page gives detailed information about the five malware detection
approaches.
3.2.1 Signature-based Detection
Signature-based detection is based on investigating suspicious code and gathering
information in order to characterise any malicious intent of the malware. The
main objective of this approach is to extract specific byte sequences of code as
signatures and to look for a signature in suspicious files. An excellent overview
of signature-based detection approach is provided in [IM07]. Most of today’s
commercial anti-virus scanners use a collection of signatures to detect malicious
programs [SF01]. That is, the suspicious code is compared with a unique sequence
of program instructions or bytes. If the signature is not found in the file, then
the file is considered to be not malicious. A database of signatures has to be
maintained continuously by manually analysing new variants of malware using
static, dynamic or both analysis methods [SF01]. Therefore, one of the limitations
of the signature-based detection approach is that it requires human intervention to
update the database with new signatures. Moreover, Christodorescu et al. [CJ04]
showed that the authors of metamorphic malware can easily defeat signature-based
detectors by using obfuscation techniques, as discussed in Section 2.2.2. This leads
us to conclude that this detection method is prone to false negatives (failure to raise
alerts); also, as more malicious variants become known, the signature database
grows in size making the false positive (false alerts) issue even more pervasive.
Chouchane and Lakhotia [CL06] extended the traditional string signature method
by using an obfuscation engine signature. This method scans opcode instruction
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Technique Analysis type Input representation Year
Signature-based Approaches
Chouchane and Lakhotia [CL06] static sequence of x86 opcode mnemonics 2006
Karnik et al. [KGG07] static instruction opcode mnemonics 2007
Bruschi et al. [BMM07] static program instructions 2007
Bonfante et al.[GBMKJYM07] static CFG 2007
Cha et al. [CMJ+10] static bit vectors of hashes of files 2010
Behaviour-based Approaches
Rabek et al. [RKLC03] hybrid APIs 2003
Kirda et al. [KKB+06] hybrid browser events and APIs 2006
Bailey et al. [BOA+07] dynamic system events 2007
Collins [Col08] dynamic network protocols events 2008
Aaraj et al. [ARJ08] hybrid regular expressions and data invariants 2008
Heuristic-based Approaches
Zhang et al. [ZYH+07] static n-gram byte sequences 2007
Bose et al. [BHSP08] dynamic TLCK of APIs and system events 2008
Moskovitch et al. [MFT+08] static n-grame of opcode sequences 2008
Griffin et al. [GSHC09] static byte sequence 2009
Shafiq et al. [STMF09] static APIs and .. 2009
Model Checking Approaches
Singh and Lakhotia [SL03] static LTL formulas 2003
Holzer et al. [HKV07] static CFG and CTPL model 2007
Beaucamps and Marion [BM09] dynamic LTL formulas 2009
Kinder et al. [KKSV10] static CTPL formulas 2010
Semantics-based Approaches
Christodorescu et al. [CJS+05] static control-flow graph template 2005
Moser et al. [MKK07a] dynamic input values and CFG paths 2007
Preda et al. [PCJD07] hybrid program trace semantics 2007
Feng and Gupta [FG09] dynamic instruction output 2009
Lee et al. [LJL10] static APIs graph 2010
Table 3.1: Malware detection techniques, their analysis types, input repre-
sentations and year published.
patterns to detect variants of malware generated by a known engine. They de-
signed an engine-specific scoring procedure targeted at the instruction-substitution
technique. Their detector needs only the signature of the specific obfuscation en-
gine and detects malicious variants, which the engine can produce. The method
attempts to alleviate the problem of scanning a byte stream by identifying a set
of instruction opcode sequences and then matching the instruction stream against
the engine signature. However, this technique could be prone to miss true alarms
since the malware engine writer only has to change the form of the engine instance,
not the semantics.
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Karnik et al. [KGG07] extracted a sequence of functions from a disassembled mal-
ware code. Each element in this sequence points to an array of opcode instructions,
which exist in the function. Thus, the signature of a known malware program rep-
resents a sequence of functions and their opcode instruction groups. For a pair
of signatures, the detector computes a cosine similarity measure to determine if
the programs are obfuscated versions of each other. Their approach does not han-
dle the instruction-substitution technique of code obfuscation and no experiments
were presented for evaluating the rate of false positives of the method.
Bruschi et al.[BMM07] proposed a technique that has the ability to take patterns of
malicious behaviour and create a normalised malware as a template for detection.
The main idea of normalisation is to remove the effects of the most well-known
transformation techniques and identify the control flow connections between the
malicious parts of the code. The detector works as follows: first, it performs the
normalisation step on the suspicious program, which may contain some malware
patterns. Second, it generates the inter-procedural control flow graph CFGP , which
specifies all program function connections. Finally, the detector compares the
graph CFGP with the malware template graph CFGM and decides whether CFGM
is actually a subgraph of CFGP . The experimental evaluation of their approach
shows that the detector can detect variants of malware code that contain specific
patterns of instructions in the template. It is obvious that this technique relies on
syntactic patterns of template code to detect malicious programs.
Bonfante et al. produced control flow graphs for assembly x86 programs and
matched them with graphs of known malware programs [GBMKJYM07]. The
graphs represent all paths that might be traversed through a program during its
execution. To remove some classic obfuscation techniques, three graph rewriting
rules are applied to the extracted graphs: instruction nodes are concatenated if
contiguous data instructions have been changed, code is realigned if reordering
jumps have been introduced and any existing consecutive conditional jumps are
merged into a single conditional jump. Their detection technique is based on two
algorithms. The first algorithm searches for isomorphism between the CFGs of
known program m and the program under test p. The second algorithm uses the
reduced CFG of p and tests if m is the reduction of the CFG of p. The two algo-
rithms’ false-positive ratio results against 2278 malware samples were successful
with respect to the size of the CFGs. Algorithms 1 and 2 have a similar detection
accuracy, with 4.5% and 4.4% false positive rates, respectively [GBMKJYM07].
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Metamorphic malware programs are not examined under the proposed detection
method.
Cha et al. describe a network-based system to detect distributed malware files
that uses only a subset of malware signatures [CMJ+10]. The detection system is
based on a text-based pattern matching technique called a Feed-Forward Bloom
Filter (FFBF). Their method works in two steps. First, all files are scanned using
FFBF. The filter outputs (1) a set of suspect matched files, and (2) a subset
of signatures from the signature database needed to confirm that suspect files are
indeed malicious. The system then performs a verification step to eliminate Bloom
filter false positives. The suspect matched files are rescanned using the subset of
signatures and an exact pattern matching algorithm. Two issues are addressed in
this work. First, the technique handles the signature distribution challenges by
producing a smaller subset of signatures from the verification step for matched
malware files. Second, the memory scaling challenge is handled by using a single
FFBF bit-vector to pattern-match input files and another bit-vector for generating
the set of signatures for matched files. The FFBF-generated signatures proved to
be a particularly useful input representation, as opposed to the traditional string
signatures, of input files as the scanning throughput increased by over 2x and using
half as much memory. However, like any other text-based Bloom filter output, the
output pattern subset may contain false positives.
3.2.2 Behaviour-based Detection
Behaviour-based detection techniques aim to reduce the false positive rate gen-
erated during the monitoring stage. A behaviour-based technique monitors and
checks the system to be protected against a given set of requirements and the
security policy. During the learning phase, a behaviour-based detector is provided
with a rule set, which specifies all acceptable behaviour any application can exhibit
within the protected host. The major drawback of behaviour-based detection is
the difficulty of determining the entire set of safe behaviour that a program can
exhibit while running under a protected system. Filiol et al presents a survey of
behaviour-based detection techniques in [JDF08].
Rabek et al. [RKLC03] present a detection method for obfuscated malware that
dynamically injects and generates itself at runtime. The detector uses a static
analysis technique to get details of all relevant system calls embedded in the code,
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such as function names, addresses, and the address instruction followed by each
system call. Also, the detector keeps a record of the return addresses for sys-
tem calls in the code. Then, when a suspicious program is executed, the detector
monitors the behaviour of the executable and ensures that all calls made to the
system services at runtime match those recorded in the first step. The authors
conclude, by a proof of concept study, that their technique ensures that any in-
jected and generated malicious code can be detected when it makes unexpected
system calls. A major drawback of this technique is that when inserting some
irrelevant API calls into a malicious code, the detector may fail to match the new
malicious behaviour with ones kept in the record.
Bailey et al. propose an approach based on the actual execution of malware sam-
ples and observation of their persistent state changes [BOA+07]. The input repre-
sentation that is generated from malware programs is the set of environment state
changes, referred to as a behavioural fingerprint. The behavioural fingerprints
are extracted from the raw event logs during program execution. For instance,
spawned process names, modified file names and network connection attempts are
state changes, which are stored as part of a fingerprint for a known malware pro-
gram. Classes and subclasses of malware are then formed by clustering groups
of fingerprints that exhibit similar behaviour. They produced a distance metric
that measures the difference between any two fingerprints, and used this metric
for clustering. In particular, they utilised the normalised compression distance
(NCD) approach to effectively approximate the overlap in information between
two fingerprints. Then they constructed a tree structure based on a single-linkage
hierarchical clustering algorithm to show the distance between two malware clus-
ters.
Kirda et al. [KKB+06] proposed a novel method for spyware detection that is based
on an abstraction of the characterisation of the behaviour of a popular spyware
family. The method handles spyware applications that use Internet Explorer’s
Browser Helper Object (BHO) and toolbar interfaces to monitor a user’s browsing
behaviour. The method applies a hybrid analysis to binary objects to characterise
and detect specific malicious program behaviour. First, a dynamic analysis tech-
nique is used to expose a suspicious component by simulating user activity. That
is, they dynamically record both the browser events and the Window APIs that
the component calls. Second, a static analysis step is implemented to extract the
control flow graph (CFG) from the disassembled suspicious program. This step ex-
amines particular code regions in the CFG for the occurrence of operating system
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calls. Then their behavioural characterisation is represented as a list of Windows
API calls and browser functions. The characterisation is automatically produced
by identifying the browser functions and Windows APIs performed by malicious
BHOs and toolbars. A total of 51 samples (33 malicious and 18 benign) were
used to evaluate their method. Seven (two benign and five malicious) out of 51
samples were used to develop the behavioural characterisation list. The remaining
samples were considered unknown and were used to validate the effectiveness of
the detection method. All remaining malicious samples were identified malicious
and two benign programs were identified as malicious.
Collins [Col08] introduced the Protocol Graph Detector (PGD) to detect the be-
haviour of a slowly propagating hit-list or topologically aware worms over a net-
work. The detector works by building protocol-specific graphs where each node
in the graph is a host, and each edge represents a connection between two hosts
with a specific protocol. The input representation used in this method is a set of
network protocol events generated by hosts in the graph. The technique is based
on the observation that during legitimate operations over short time periods, the
number of hosts in the graphs is normally distributed and the number of nodes
in the largest connected component of each graph is also normally distributed.
PGD continuously measures the distribution numbers and it detects the presence
of worms when both numbers are beyond their normal range.
Behavioural-based malware detection methods that incorporate hybrid-based anal-
yses for producing and comparing similar behavioural signatures include Aaraj et
al.’s dynamic binary instrumentation-based (DBI) tool [ARJ08]. They used an
isolated testing environment, wherein a suspicious executable code is executed us-
ing a DBI technique. The runtime behavioural pattern of the program is checked
against extensive security policies, which consist of a set of behavioural signatures
of malicious programs. The runtime behavioural pattern is collected in the form
of a hybrid model that represents the program’s dynamic control and data flow
execution traces. They used the same model to express the security policies of
malicious behaviour. Then a suspicious program is extensively tested with the
tool and its behaviour is checked against the model. An automatic input gen-
eration technique based on static analysis and symbolic propagation is deployed
to generate input values. A formal proof to show the correctness of their input
generation technique was not presented.
Chapter 3. Literature Review 48
3.2.3 Heuristic-based Approaches
Heuristic-based approaches to malware detection deploy several well-known experience-
based and machine learning techniques to search for specific attributes and char-
acteristics for capturing malware variants. Most malware detection systems that
make use of heuristic-based techniques do not need to create, match or maintain
signatures. This approach usually detects an abnormality in the program under
test or the host system where the program will run.
Detecting malware programs using a heuristic-based technique is accomplished in
two phases. The first phase is to train the malware detector. A detector system
must be trained with data in order to capture characteristics of interest. The
second phase is the monitoring or detection phase where the trained detector
makes intelligent decisions about new samples based on training data. Moreover,
there are two methods deployed in the training phase. The first method uses two
classes of data, i.e. both normal and abnormal data. The second method uses a
single class of data, where malware detectors are trained with only one (normal
or abnormal) class. This means the system only needs to be trained with normal
system activity, allowing it to produce a useful output about what activity is
abnormal. The rest of this section briefly outlines some proposed techniques in
the literature that utilise this approach to malware detection. [SWL08] presents
an in-depth survey of proposed methods in this approach.
Zhang et al. [ZYH+07] detected and classified new malicious code based on n-
gram byte sequences extracted from the binary code of a file. They used a se-
lection method called the information-gain to choose the best n-gram byte se-
quence. Then, a probabilistic neural network (PNN) was used to construct several
classifiers for detection. Finally, during the learning step of each classifier, they
produced a single set of decision rules consisting of the individual decision results
generated from each PNN classifier. Three classes of new malicious program files
downloaded from the the VX Heavens computer virus collection website [Hea] and
some Windows benign files were used to evaluate their method. The false and
true positive rate results show a great improvement of the combined PNNs over
the individual PNN classifier of each of the three classes.
Bose et al. [BHSP08] proposed a detection method based on a supervised learning
method, Support Vector Machines (SVMs), for malware variants that increasingly
target mobile handsets. A lightweight temporal pattern classifier for malware
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detection was implemented. The method requires a malicious behaviour signature
database to train the classifier. Each type of malicious behaviour is described in
terms of API calls and events represented by temporal logic of causal knowledge
(TLCK). Thus, a single TLCK signature is used to represent the behaviour of an
entire family of malware including their variants. The database is generated at
runtime by monitoring the API calls and system events from more than 25 distinct
families of mobile viruses and worms. Their evaluation showed that this method
results in very high detection rates (over 96%) and is able to detect new malware
that contain similar behavioural patterns with existing ones in the database.
Moskovitch et al. [MFT+08] present a machine learning method for detecting un-
known malware variants using the operation code (opcode) of the binary code as
the input representation. The set of opcodes is converted into several n-grams
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6-byte sequences of opcodes), which are used as inputs to the
classifiers. They deployed four commonly used classification engines for detecting
unknown malware files: Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Decision Trees (DT),
Nave Bayes (NB) and Adaboost.M1. The classifiers were compared and the re-
sults show that DT and ANN outperform NB and Adaboost.M1 by exhibiting
lower false positive rates.
Griffin et al. [GSHC09] present a system that automatically generates string sig-
natures. Each generated string signature is a contiguous 48-byte code sequence
that potentially can match many variants of a malware family. The system uses
two types of heuristics to examine and to find potential candidate signatures.
That is, every 48-byte code sequence in unpacked malware files are inspected us-
ing probability-based and disassembly-based heuristics to find string signatures.
From a large set of benign programs, a pre-computed Markov chain-based model
probability threshold is used to filter byte sequences whose estimated occurrence
in benign programs is above the limit. Further, they refine their string signature
set into a multiple component signature (MCS) set that consists of multiple byte
sequences that are potentially disjoint from one another. Each component in the
MCS set represents a unique signature sequence found in the longest substring that
is common to all malware files that have the sequence. They show that the mul-
tiple component signatures are more effective than single-component signatures,
but the actual runtime performance impact of MCS is unclear.
Shafiq et al. [STMF09] developed a data mining-based framework that automati-
cally extracts distinguishing features from portable executable (PE) files to detect
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previously unknown malware. A PE file is a data structure that encapsulates the
information necessary for the Windows OS loader to execute the wrapped exe-
cutable code. They believe that the structural information contained within PE
files such as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) and PE section headers have the poten-
tial to achieve high detection accuracy. The proposed detection method consists of
three steps: data extraction (the program input representation), data preprocess-
ing and classification. The input representation is statically extracted as a set of a
large number of features from a given PE file. To improve the training and testing
of classifiers, three well-known data reduction filters are used in step 2. The filters
are Redundant Feature Removal (RFR), Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
and Haar Wavelet Transform (HWT). They evaluated their method with five dif-
ferent data-mining algorithms. Their results on two malware collections, the VX
heavens and Malfease databases, show that the method achieves more than a 99%
detection rate with a less than 0.5% false alarm rate for distinguishing between
benign and malicious executables. Their method is robust with respect to different
polymorphic techniques in PE files but it is not clear if it handles metamorphic
techniques in new malware variants.
3.2.4 Model Checking
Singh and Lakhotia [SL03] introduced a malicious code verifier, which statically
verifies binary executables against a property formula for viruses and worms. The
malicious behaviour of viruses and worms is manually extracted and encoded using
linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas. Each formula is representative of a partic-
ular action by the program. A program action is described by a sequence of one
or more function system calls, connected through a flow relationship. They spec-
ified five functions, which are sufficient to describe the behaviour of a malicious
program. These functions are survey, concealment, propagation, injection and self-
identification. The verifier takes as input the program and a set of behavioural
properties (LTL formula). It explores all possible paths (branches) at each condi-
tional branch instruction in the program. If malicious behaviour is detected, the
execution path of the matched property is returned by the tool. Although their
method statically detects a malicious action in a program, its detection capability
relies on manually formulated LTL formulas.
The work proposed in [HKV07] uses the control flow graph of a program as a
model and defines a set of specifications at the level of assembly instructions. The
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creation of malicious code specifications requires assistance from a user using Com-
putational Tree Predicate Logic (CTPL). The user selects relevant instructions in
the control flow graph that are of particular relevance for program behaviour. The
temporal logic formula uses predicates rather than atomic propositions to repre-
sent assembly instructions and to quantify an instruction’s parameters. In their
model each line of code corresponds to a state model and it is uniquely labelled by
a location. The model checker returns a report to the user if the input program
satisfies the specification. The model-checking tool is PSPACE-complete and it
uses several optimisation techniques to reduce the overhead of verifying the num-
ber of procedures and computing the number of variable assignments. Also, the
disassembled code of a new malware is manually analysed to locate portions of
code that exhibit characteristic malicious behaviour.
In [KKSV10], a malware-detection tool is presented. The tool extends the use
of the new expressive branching time logic formula CTPL to check a model of a
potentially malicious code against known malware specifications. The authors are
able to produce precise specifications as signatures that can match a large class of
functionally related worms; for instance, they show that with one single CTPL for-
mula, several variants of worms can be detected without false positives. The set of
malicious code specifications in this method cover program calls to the system API,
the program stack layout, which can be affected by push and pop instructions, and
program register values at a particular point in a program execution path. The
model produced for an input program consists of a set of Kripke structures, where
each structure represents the control flow of one subroutine. The tool was tested
using 21 worm variants from 8 different families. Two malicious specifications
were developed in CTPL of two portions of known malware. The specifications
were used to verify the input samples. The results showed that the model checker
is able to categorise all variants of the worm families. However, similar to pre-
vious work on model checking, the process of constructing the specifications (i.e.
CTPL formulas) from a fragment of malicious code and the identification and the
extraction of characteristic code sequences from a set of worms requires a major
intervention by a user.
Beaucamps and Marion in [BM09] proposed an approach that considers malware
as a concurrent system interacting with an environment. They extracted malware
traces from execution runs as infinite words and created a trace automaton, which
then compared these using a database of malicious behaviour. The method allows
the detection of similar malicious behaviour in a generic way but the behaviour
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patterns they define for detection do not consider data flow information when
matching trace elements (e.g. system calls). Also, the approach looks at a single
execution run during the detection of malicious behaviour and it does not cover
all possible execution paths in the control flow graph of a program. [KKSV05]
contains an overview of the model checking-based approach to malware detection.
3.2.5 Semantics-based Malware Detection
Semantics-based malware detection is a new approach, which may overcome the
weaknesses of heuristic- or signature-based detection methods by incorporating the
semantics of program statements (instructions) rather than the syntactic proper-
ties of the code. This section investigates some recent preliminary work that han-
dles code obfuscation in malware detection using the program semantics approach.
The preliminary work reviewed in this section shows that the semantics-based ap-
proach has the ability to identify the malicious behaviour of a program hidden
under the cover of obfuscation and can improve the detection of future unknown
malware variants. [PCJD08] contains an overview section of related techniques in
semantics-based detection.
Christodorescu and Jha [CJS+05] presented a semantic-based method for detecting
malicious programs. That is, the malware detector is aware of common malicious
behaviour of malware variants. This work mainly presents two key contributions.
First, specifying a set of malicious behaviour using a template in order to match
it with a malicious code fragment in a program. Second, using a state and an
execution context, which allows the representation of the behaviour of a program
and abstracts away both from registers and the names of constants. Christodor-
escu and Jha show that their semantics-based matching algorithm is resilient to
some code obfuscations, for instance, register renaming and code reordering. The
algorithm looks at the state of the memory after the check in order to determine
if the suspicious program code memory segment matches the template’s memory
segment. This is implemented using def-use pairs; a match can occur if there is
a unique def-use pair both in the template and in the disassembled suspicious
code. However, as it requires an exact match between the template node and pro-
gram instructions, obfuscation attacks using equivalent-instruction replacement
and reordering are still possible. Moreover, because some memory segments of a
suspicious program are more complex than others, the algorithm uses four different
decision functions to determine the state of memory before and after the check.
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Their results show that the semantics-aware approach has zero false positives in
detecting malware.
Moser et al. [MKK07a] introduced a software testing-based tool for discovering
multiple execution paths and generating semantic signatures of malware. Their
tool helps to improve test coverage in malware analysis systems. For a given
set of inputs, the tool executes a malicious program and monitors its runtime
behaviour. The input dependency of the program control flow is examined and
different input values are generated to alter the execution along a specific path.
Then the tool explores the actions generated from the executed path, and if any
malicious action is encountered, the input values along with the path are used
as a semantic signature for the malware. For each new execution path taken, a
snapshot is created of the current process at control flow decision points. The
evaluation shows that the tool was able to successfully identify the behaviour of
malware variants from different malware families, but no sound arguments were
presented to prove the accuracy of their testing coverage technique.
Preda et al. [PCJD07] proposed a formal semantics-based framework for assessing
the resilience to obfuscation of malware detectors. The authors presented an ab-
stract interpretation of trace semantics to characterise malware behaviour and to
incorporate it into their semantic malware detector (SMD). Since malware writ-
ers use obfuscation to generate metamorphic malware variants, the authors con-
sider obfuscation as a transformation of the trace semantics of a malware program
where an obfuscating transformation O : P → P produces a set of transforma-
tions. Moreover, the authors define their notion of semantic trace abstraction so
as to allow discarding of the details changed by the obfuscation while preserving
the maliciousness of the obfuscated program. The authors prove that SMD is
complete and sound with respect to obfuscation O under abstraction α if it de-
tects all obfuscated programs O(P ) that are infected by a malware M (no false
negatives). Preda et al. have two major classifications of obfuscations. The first
class is conservative obfuscation, which covers obfuscation techniques such as code
reordering, opaque predicate insertion, semantic NOP insertion and substitution
of equivalent commands. The process of dealing with this class of obfuscation
is straightforward, the abstraction αc handles common obfuscations listed above
by providing environment-memory traces only of the program. The second class
is non-conservative obfuscations, which deals with the variable-renaming obfus-
cating transformation. Since, with the variable-renaming obfuscation technique
the names of register in the malicious code are changed, the environment-memory
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traces will look different to the original malware traces. Therefore, a canonical
abstraction αυ is introduced to deal with this obfuscation. All register names are
replaced or mapped with a set of canonical names before applying the abstraction
αe between M and P traces.
Much effort has been made to improve the detection of obfuscated malware vari-
ants using dynamic analysis. Feng and Gupta [FG09] presented a malware detector
that uses dynamic signatures to detect obfuscated malware variants. Their dy-
namic signatures are produced from the runtime behaviour of a known malware
program. Each dynamic signature can be extracted from the program runtime
trace by taking a backward slice of the program trace with respect to an API call.
The detector maintains a database of dynamic signatures that are generated from
a set of known malware families. Their evaluation show that the detector can
handle a set of obfuscation techniques, including variable renaming, instruction
reordering, insertion of NOP instructions, control flow alteration and a limited
set of instruction substitutions. However, since the signatures are based on API
syntax, the method fails with techniques that alter API operation syntax.
Another semantic-based detection mechanism for defeating packing and code ob-
fuscation techniques in malware variants was introduced by Lee et al. [LJL10].
They consider the static API call sequences as program semantic invariants. Then
their method abstracts away program instructions and produces a (code) graph
using the API call sequence of a known malware. Code graphs are stored as
semantic signatures and used to compare with new generated graphs of suspi-
cious programs. To evaluate the detection tool, 300 obfuscated malware programs
were generated using the code insertion, code reordering and code replacement
techniques. The results showed that the generated samples were not found by
anti-virus detection tools, but their method was able to detect all of the samples.
However, the method lacks the ability to capture obfuscated malware variants
generated by using equivalent API operations and when introducing meaningless
API calls.
3.3 Malware Analysis Techniques
Malware analysis techniques help to improve the process of understanding the
functionality and the intent of executable code. Anti-malware product developers
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and analysts use a variety of reverse-engineering tools to assist with the analysis
process. Reducing the amount of time necessary to understand the overall program
layout yields large increases in reverse engineering and detection productivity. Ob-
fuscating a program with packers and other code metamorphic tools makes the
analysis more difficult. Several recent research studies have introduced and im-
proved the tools and techniques within malware analysis research. This branch of
malware problem research is based on two main classes of analysis tools: static
and dynamic tools. Static analysis tools include disassemblers (e.g. IDAPro [Res])
and signature scanners (e.g. anti-virus scanners). Dynamic analysis tools include
executable trace and operating system environment monitoring (e.g. virtual ma-
chines [Ora, VMw] and Pin [LCM+05]) and debugging tools (e.g. OllyDbg [Yus]).
Static analysis tools extract and investigate binary code without executing its
instructions. However, dynamic analysis tools can handle more sophisticated mal-
ware programs by monitoring and understanding program execution behaviour.
Using a visualisation method for monitoring program execution and exploring the
overall flow of a program was suggested by Quist and Liebrock [QL09]. They
proposed the VERA architecture, which distills large compiled malware programs
(over 1 million lines of code) and produces a high-level overview of the overall flow
of basic-block portions of a program.
Recent work by Miwa et al. [MME+07] introduced an isolated sandbox for analysing
malware programs. The tool handles anti-virtualisation malware that are capa-
ble of detecting analysing environments (i.e. virtual machines) and it avoids any
impacts to/from the Internet. Mimetic Internet functionality is implemented to
fool detecting mechanisms of malware. The proposed isolated sandbox is a closed
experimental environment that executes anti-virtualisation malware. To recover
from damage caused by executing malware, the tool rebuilds the executing envi-
ronment using a clean image from a disk-image.
Rieck et al. [RHW+08] proposed an automatic classification method of malware
families based on their dynamic behaviour (input representation). Their method
consists of two major machine learning steps. Learning the behaviour of labelled
malware samples is the first step. The second step constructs models that are
capable of classifying unknown variants of sampled malware families while rejecting
the behaviour of benign program files and malware families not considered during
the first step. A large number of malware samples were dynamically analysed using
a sandbox environment and their behaviour (e.g. API calls) collected. Their model
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construction step use the vector space model and bag-of-words model techniques to
create behaviour patterns, which are used later as training data. The method uses
the well-established technique of Support Vector Machines (SVM) as a classifier,
which takes training data of two classes and measures the optimal distance from
them. Their results show that the proposed method can correctly classify 70% of
malware instances that are not detected by anti-virus software.
Purely dynamic behaviour monitoring and analysis methods for malware programs
include FuYong et al.’s MBMAS tool [FDJ09]. They developed an automatic tool
to execute malware programs in an isolated environment, and to monitor five as-
pects of the state of a system: process, file system, registry, port and networks. A
report is produced for a human analyst. To analyse malware behaviour more accu-
rately, the tool deploys a filtering mechanism, which identifies process information
created by the malware, the tool only collects information related to identified
processes.
Roundy and Miller [RM10] developed a hybrid malware analysis method to sim-
plify malware analysis by providing a pre-execution analysis of binary code and a
post-execution analysis of malware behaviour. Their method combines static and
dynamic techniques to construct and maintain the control- and data-flow analyses
that form the interface through which the analyst understands and instruments
the code. It provides a dynamic instrumentation feature to identify new instruc-
tions that are dynamically generated and hidden by obfuscations. Then the CFG
is updated with the captured code and presented to the analyst. The method
works well on self-modifying, packed and obfuscated programs.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The detection approaches and the list of surveyed research present the plethora
of research in the area of malware detection. There are several observations that
can be made about the growing trend in malware detection.
• The traditional signature approach lacks the ability to detect new malware
variants due to the syntactic proprieties used (e.g. byte and instruction se-
quences) in their detection methods. The methods work well for extracting
and matching signatures of loosely structured data; nonetheless, for binary
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executables, these techniques have high overheads in processing structural
data in executable files and they are prone to a high number of false posi-
tives. Our work addresses this deficiency by automatically generating com-
pact semantic signatures using a trace-slicing algorithm. Our trace-slicing
algorithm improves the detection rate (by helping to increase the accuracy
and the performance of matching semantic traces).
• Behaviour detection techniques use very restrictive behavioural specifications
(i.e. normal and malicious behaviour) to detect a large number of malware.
However, this notion of restriction in detection may lead to a high number
of false positives. Most benign programs perform similar operations with
a host system (e.g. making system calls to access OS resources). Thus, in-
formation about a sequence of events (e.g. API calls) of a program is not
enough to determine whether the program is malicious. Also, the complexity
of the approach (e.g. the intensive monitoring of OS and program activi-
ties against a behavioural specification) makes such detectors undesirable
for users to run as it tends to slow down the performance of their computer
systems. Also, this approach requires a security expert to specify the be-
havioural specification (of benign or malware programs), as no automatic
method for generating such specifications is implemented. Our research ad-
dresses this weakness by computing a set of program inputs (as part of the
semantic signature) for discovering multiple program execution paths using
an automatic test data generation algorithm.
• An issue with the heuristic-based approach to developing a machine-learning
malware detector, is that the detector would need to be trained using many
malware programs, which could become infeasible, as well as making the
detector ‘aware’ of specific malware instances rather than a broader general-
isation of what a malware family is. Thus, detectors which are purely based
on heuristics have a very low resilience against new attacks of metamorphic
malware variants. Our approach doesn’t consider (nor is it affected by) the
syntactical structure of a file as it focuses on the semantics of the code to
detect malware variants.
• A novel approach to malware detection using program semantics seems a
promising approach to improve current detection tools. Semantics-based
techniques are very effective in using low-level properties of programs and
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are accurate (few false alarms). This has, therefore, motivated the implemen-
tation of our semantic signature to capture new variants of known malware
and to improve the detection rate.
• The malware analysis approach is a potential method for achieving a com-
plete understanding of new malicious behaviour. Malware analysis tech-
niques may be used primarily as back-end tools that act as good filtering
mechanisms through capturing useful information that security experts need
for most malware. A key feature of analysis techniques is that they allow
security analysts to be selective about the behaviour monitored and about
the granularity of results captured. Most proposed techniques are purely
dynamic and expensive as they try to analyse malicious code incorporating
anti-static analysis features. However, a combination of static and dynamic
analysis might lead to cost-effective and high-performance malware analysis
tools. Our work takes a step toward a hybrid (static-dynamic) approach
in malware analysis by automating malware classification using semantic
simulation of malware code.
• Most malware analysis and detection techniques handle the problem of un-
packing/decrypting malware executables quite well. These techniques as-
sume that the unpacking and decryption processes are self-contained within
malware programs (i.e. decryption and unpacking routines are part of the
code). Our malware-detection system uses unpacking tools to extract mali-
cious payloads.
• Malware detection is similar to other related fields, such as clone detection
and dynamic software birthmarking techniques. However, there are impor-
tant differences. First, clone-detection methods [RC07, LRHK10, PTK11]
analyse programs for similarities, at the syntax level or at the structural
level, between and within large-scale programs. Thus, the clone-detection ap-
proach is not robust to code obfuscation. Dynamic software birthmark tech-
niques identify a software application piracy event by comparing the runtime
behaviour of programs [WJZL09a, CHY11]. Two methods for creating dy-
namic birthmarks have been proposed: a whole program path (WPP)[MC04,
ZSSY08] and application programming interface (API) [TONM04, WJZL09b]-
based birthmarks. The WPP-based birthmark method extracts the dynamic
control flow of a program while the API-based birthmark method uses a se-
quence of recorded API function calls during the execution of a program
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to identify similarities. The WPP-based method is not robust to opaque
predicate obfuscation. The API-based method is robust to code obfuscation
but it is platform dependent and needs to run the program. Second, to our
knowledge, all proposed work on clone-detection and dynamic birthmark
techniques analyse source code (i.e. to find similarities between high-level
software applications). In contrast, our technique analyses malicious binary




In this chapter, we describe the improvements to our semantic signature genera-
tion and detection approach for malware variants. We introduce trace slicing for
malware executables. We propose a trace-slicing algorithm, which aids the con-
struction of a semantic signature for a known malware variant. From a known
malware variant, a set of semantic traces (trace slices) are produced by applying
our trace slicing. With trace slicing, we may be able to capture slices of the trace
semantics and construct a semantic signature that could improve the detection of
(possibly obfuscated) variants of malware. The proposed trace-slicing algorithm
works on our abstract machine code language AAPL and is based on computing and
updating data dependencies in the trace at simulation time. We use our abstract
machine code language, AAPL, which is introduced in Section 4.1, to represent
malicious code and understand the effects of code obfuscations on both a program
code and its trace, and to apply our trace-slicing method to compute trace slices.
Moreover, our trace-slicing algorithm can be used as a trace slicer for executable
machine code as we show in the implementation section (Section 4.3.5).
Our conjecture is that the trace-slicing method can improve the detection of mal-
ware variants in two ways. First, the trace-slicing algorithm handles some code
obfuscating techniques and abstracts away their effects. Second, it computes a set
of correct trace slices as short semantic signatures for the malware variant detec-
tion algorithm in an attempt to efficiently match against semantic signatures of
a known malware family. Thus, the slicing approach may improve the speed and
accuracy of the malware detector.
In summary, the contributions of this chapter are fourfold:
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1. We identify a suitable target low-level language to describe the syntax and
semantics of malware code.
2. We define slicing for the traces that occur in the semantics, and provide a
slicing algorithm for the abstract machine code (AAPL).
3. We introduce the correctness property for the trace-slicing algorithm and
prove the algorithm is correct with respect to the semantics.
4. We provide a prototype implementation of our algorithm, which works on
binary executables and evaluate our algorithm on several real-world binary
executables. A version of this implementation is developed for the AAPL
code and is part of the signature extraction process in Chapter 5.
To fully appreciate this contribution, it is necessary to understand the context in
which we propose to apply the slicing algorithm. The remainder of this chapter
is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents our low-level programming language
AAPL. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the slicing approach. Section 4.3 gives
the details of our trace-slicing algorithm. The correctness proof of the algorithm
is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 highlights the strengths and limitations of
the algorithm. Section 4.6 describes related research work in the area of dynamic
program slicing and slicing binary executables. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.1 Programming Language
In this section we introduce our simple Abstract Assembly Programming language
(AAPL), which is used for reasoning about code obfuscating transformations in
malware program variants. Our main objective is to have an intermediate repre-
sentation of assembly programs that aids in supporting various program analysis
approaches such as generating data dependence graphs (DDGs) (presented in Sec-
tion 4.3) and control flow graphs (CFGs) (presented in Chapter 6); moreover, this
approach allows us to investigate the semantic properties of code independently of
the target architecture. This means we can employ source code analysis techniques
on low-level code. The aim of AAPL is to significantly improve code analysis while
preserving code semantics.
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4.1.1 Syntax
Programs written in AAPL consist of a sequence of statements. Every program
statement contains a command C and, optionally, a label L. We define program
registers to be a finite set of assembly registers that represent a small fixed set
of word-sized containers used during program simulation. We define PC as the
program counter register to hold the memory address of the next command to be
executed and SP as the stack pointer register, which points to a region of memory.
Our programming-language semantics are similar to those presented in [CC02] and
[PCJD07], except that our language treats memory addresses as unsigned integer
numbers Z⊥ and assumes they hold either integer values or commands.
Figure 4.1 on the next page describes the programming syntax of AAPL. A pro-
gram P is a set of commands ℘(C). There are two types of command in AAPL,
actions and conditional jump commands. An action command CA may perform
the following: evaluating an expression to a register (R := E ), loading the re-
sult of an expression into a memory location pointed to by a register, performing
the SKIP (i.e. nop) operation, or branching to another part of a program using
unconditional jump commands. An unconditional jump command may perform
jumps based on an expression value, a call by expression value and a return to a
memory location specified by the stack pointer SP . A conditional jump command
CB performs a jump to a location specified by the value of expression E when
the Boolean expression B evaluates to true (e.g. Bˆ[[B ]] = true). In Figure 4.1
on the following page, we let ρ describe the environment of program registers, in-
cluding the program counter, during program simulation. An environment ρ ∈ E
maps a register to its content value, i.e. ρ : R → Z⊥. Moreover, the memory in
the language describes the actual contents of the program environment. Program
labels L hold the locations of program code in the memory. We let API denote
the set of system calls in the AAPL language and ∀api ∈ API, we have an output
component api.out, which represents the set of registers that are updated when
evaluating a system call. We define a function sys env to map the set of registers
R ∈ api.out to their new (pre-defined) values n after evaluating an API command.
4.1.2 Semantics
The semantics of the programming language is shown in Figure 4.2 on page 64. The
semantics of actions describes how the memory and the environment pair (ρ′,m ′)
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R ::= {PC , SP , r0 , r1 , . . .} (program registers)
API ::= {api1, api2, . . .} (system calls)
E ::= n | L | R | ∗E | E1 op E2 (op ∈ {+,−,×, /, ...})
B ::= true | false | E1 < E2 | ¬B1 | B1 && B2 (boolean expressions)
A ::= R := E | ∗R := E | ∗n := E | ∗(E1 op E2) := E | API (program actions)
| CALL E | RTN | SKIP | JMP E | POP E | PUSH E
C ::= CA := A (action command)
| CB := B JMP E (conditional command)
P ::= ℘(C)
B = {true, false} (truth values)
n ∈ Z (unsigned integers)
C ∈ C (commands)
ρ ∈ E = R→ Z⊥ (environments)
m ∈M = Z→ Z⊥ ∪ C (memory)
ξ ∈ X = E ×M (execution contexts)
S = C×X (program states)
Figure 4.1: Instruction syntax and value domain of the Abstract Assembly
Programming Language (AAPL).
of the next command to be executed in the program is evaluated. The simulation
of program P = ℘(C) (i.e. a set of commands) starts by evaluating the initial
command of P that is specified by the program counter PC in Figure 4.1. PC is a
special register that always points to the memory location of the next command,
to be executed, in the program. That is, a sequence of program commands stored
in the memory are reachable through simulation via memory locations pointed to
by PC . The memory location values are computed during program simulation
and assigned to PC . Thus, PC should hold a valid memory address. For instance,
when executing a call command, the location of the next command in the program
is stored in the stack memory indexed by SP . Also, in the semantics of the return
command (RTN), the program counter retrieves the location of the next command
to be executed from the stack.
The behaviour (i.e, the set of traces) of a program during simulation is described
using the set of execution contexts X , where X = E ×M is a set of pairs each
composed of an environment and a memory of the program being simulated. The
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Semantics of Arithmetic Expressions:




Eˆ[[∗E ]]ξ = if (∃n Eˆ[[E ]]ξ ∈ Z) then m(n); else ⊥
Eˆ[[E1 op E2]]ξ = if (Eˆ[[E1]]ξ ∈ Z and Eˆ[[E2]] ∈ Z) then Eˆ[[E1]]ξ op Eˆ[[E2]]ξ; else ⊥
Semantics of Actions:
Aˆ : A×X → X
Aˆ[[SKIP]]ξ = ξ where ξ = (ρ,m)
Aˆ[[R := E ]]ξ = (ρ′,m) where ξ = (ρ,m) and ρ′ = ρ(R 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[∗R := E ]]ξ = (ρ,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m) and m ′ = m(ρ(R) 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[∗n := E ]]ξ = (ρ,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m) and m ′ = m(n 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[∗(E1 op E2 ) := E ]]ξ = (ρ,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m) and m ′ = m(Eˆ[[E1 op E2]]ξ 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[JMP E]]ξ = (ρ′,m) where ξ = (ρ,m) and ρ′ = ρ(PC 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[CALL E]]ξ = (ρ′,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m), ρ′ = ρ(PC 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ,SP 7→ SP − 1) and
m ′ = m(ρ(SP − 1) 7→ ρ(PC + 1))
Aˆ[[RTN]]ξ = (ρ′,m) where ξ = (ρ,m) and ρ′ = ρ(PC 7→ m(ρ(SP)),SP 7→ SP + 1)
Aˆ[[PUSH E]]ξ = (ρ′,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m), ρ′ = ρ(SP 7→ SP − 1) and m ′ = m(ρ(SP − 1) 7→ Eˆ[[E]]ξ)
Aˆ[[POP E]]ξ = (ρ′,m ′) where ξ = (ρ,m), and
(ρ′,m ′) =
{
ρ′ = ρ(SP 7→ SP + 1),m ′ = m(Eˆ[[E]]ξ 7→ m(ρ(SP))) if E := ∗E
ρ′ = ρ(SP 7→ SP + 1, Eˆ[[E]]ξ 7→ m(ρ(SP)), m ′ = m otherwise
Aˆ[[API]]ξ = (ρ′,m) where ξ = (ρ,m) and ρ′ = ρ(R 7→ n), ∀R ∈ API.out and
sys env : API → n
Semantics of Commands:
Cˆ : S → Σ(S) (determines transition relation between program states)
Cˆ[[CA]]ξ = (ξ
′,C ′) where ξ = (ρ,m), ξ′ = Aˆ[[A]]ξ and
C ′ =
{
m ′(ρ′(PC )) if A := JMP ∪ CALL ∪ RTN
m(ρ(PC + 1)) otherwise
Cˆ[[CB ]]ξ = (ξ
′,C ′) where ξ = (ρ,m), and
(ξ′,C ′) =
 ξ
′ = (ρ′,m), ρ′ = ρ(PC 7→ Eˆ[[E ]]ξ), and
C ′ = m(ρ(Eˆ[[E ]]ξ)) if Bˆ[[B ]]ξ = true
ξ′ = ξ,C ′ = m(ρ(PC + 1)) otherwise
Figure 4.2: Semantics of AAPL.
simulation trace of a program is a sequence of program states representing the eval-
uation of the binary executable’s environment (i.e. registers and memory) during
the simulation of the instructions in a program run. More precisely, in AAPL, we
refer to the program execution state and execution trace as the program state and
simulation trace, respectively.
Definition 4.1 (Program State). The program state s ∈ S is a pair s = (C, ξ)









8 Exit: JMP End
(a)
tx :
s0 r0:=1, (ρs0 ,ms0)
s1 r1:=2, (ρs1(r0 7→ 1),ms1)
s2 Loop: (r0 >= 3) JMP Exit, (ρs2(r1 7→ 2),ms2)
s3 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs3 ,ms3)
s4 r0:=r0+1, (ρs4 ,ms4(2 7→ (ms4(1) + 4)))
s5 r1:=r1+1, (ρs5(r0 7→ 2),ms5)
s6 JMP Loop, (ρs6(r1 7→ 3),ms6)
s7 Loop: (r0 >= 3) JMP Exit, (ρs7 ,ms7)
s8 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs8 ,ms8)
s9 r0:=r0+1, (ρs9 ,ms9(3 7→ (ms8(2) + 4)))
s10 r1:=r1+1, (ρs10(r07→ 3),ms10)
s11 JMP Loop, (ρs11(r17→ 4),ms11)
s12 Loop: (r0 >= 3) JMP Exit, (ρs12 ,ms12)
s13 Exit: JMP End, (ρs13 ,ms13)
(b)
Figure 4.3: A sample program in AAPL and its simulation trace. A sample
program P ; A trace on program input x: n = 1, w = 2
composed of the next command C to be evaluated in the execution context ξ. The
set of states, denoted by S = (C×X ), describes both the program command and
the execution context of the program in each state.
Given a state s ∈ S, the transition function Cˆ(s) provides the set of possible
successor states of s, that is, Cˆ : S → ℘(S ) specifies the transition relation between
states. We let S[[P ]] be the set of states of a program P , then we have S[[P ]] =
X [[P ]] × P . The transitional semantics Cˆ[[P ]] ∈ S[[P ]] → ℘(S[[P ]]) of a program P
is defined as: Cˆ[[P ]](c, ξ) = {(c′, ξ′) ∈ Cˆ((c, ξ)) | c′ ∈ P, ξ′ ∈ X [[P ]]}.
Chapter 4. Trace Slicing 66
Definition 4.2 (Simulation Trace). A trace tx ∈ S∗, where S∗ is the set of
finite sequences of states over S, consists of a sequence of states < s0, . . . , sn >
of length |tx| ≥ 1 that has been produced by simulating the program P with a
given program input x at initial state s0 (i.e. x is the initial execution context
ξ0 in which the first command in P is to be evaluated with) such that for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n : si ∈ Cˆ(si−1).
That is, for a given state s = (Cs, ξs), Cˆ(s) provides the next program state s ′
by evaluating the program command Cs with the current execution context ξs at
the state s [CC02]. For instance, for the jump command, JMP E , the arithmetic
expression E in the current command must be evaluated and the result is assigned
to the program counter PC that represents the location of the next program com-
mand (i.e. C ′ = m(ρ(PC ))). Figure 4.3 on the previous page shows a fragment
of a malware routine written in AAPL and its single simulation trace tx, which
represents the program syntax, environment and memory evolution. Note that tx
begins with the initial state s0 = (Cs0 , ξs0), where ξs0 = (ρs0(n 7→ 1, w 7→ 2),ms0),
and ends with the final state s13 = (Cs13 , ξs13).
4.2 Overview of Slicing Approaches
Since code obfuscation is used in most new malware instances, collected traces from
malicious code simulation may contain some elements of code mutation, such as
irrelevant code instructions. Therefore, it is less effective to construct a semantic
signature of a malware family from an entire trace of the program simulation when
trying to detect obfuscated variants of the same malware. A possible solution to
this problem is to incorporate a dynamic slicing approach when constructing a
semantic signature from a simulation trace. Dynamic slicing, introduced by Korel
and Laski [KL88], has been available for almost two decades. The idea of this
approach is that program dependencies that are exercised during a program run
are captured precisely and collected in the form of a program dynamic dependence
graph. Then, dynamic program slices are produced by traversing the dynamic de-
pendence graph. Since the objective of dynamic slicing is to determine a relevant
subset of executed program statements that can potentially contribute to the com-
putation of the value of a variable during a program run, short and precise slices
of program traces are desired for producing semantic signatures in malware detec-
tion. Although many different techniques have been introduced in various dynamic
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slicing algorithms [KY94, BGS+01, Far02, ZGZ03, MM06, HMK06, WR07], there
are two main challenges to adopting these algorithms for our case. First, only lim-
ited efforts have been made in developing a formal guarantee for the correctness
of existing dynamic slicing algorithms [MM06]. Second, conventional algorithms
produce dynamic slices that are usually a subset of the original program code;
however, when producing semantic signatures for malware, our interest lies in
producing trace slices that are a subtrace of the simulation trace and not an ex-
ecutable sub program of the machine code. Therefore, an efficient and provably
correct trace-slicing algorithm for executables that includes dynamic program slic-
ing [KL88, AH90, ADS91b] is required.
4.3 The Trace-Slicing Algorithm
Given a program input x (i.e. initial execution context) and a program P , a
simulation trace tx is generated by simulating P with the input x. The simu-
lation trace tx of a program captures the semantic information of the program
instructions’ evaluations, which can later be used by our slicing algorithm. The
information that the trace holds consists of both the command (the syntax ) trace
and the execution context reference (the semantics) trace. For example, tx =
< s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13 > is a program simulation trace
when the program in Figure 4.3 on page 65 is simulated on the input data (the
initial execution context at s0) n= 1,m= 2. A simulation trace is a sequence of
program states. Notationally, each program state in a trace is subscripted with
its position. We let POSt denote the set of positions of program states S in a
trace t. Also, in order to map a particular position (i.e. a state index) to a state
in t and vice versa, we define two auxiliary functions: State : POSt → S and
Index : S → POSt. The function State allows one to produce the program state
which POSt refers to. The function Index provides the position index POSt of a
state in the trace. Also, we define functions to extract information from states,
i.e. we let Command : POSt → C and Context : POSt → X denote the map-
ping from a position index in the simulation trace t to the command and the
execution context, respectively, if they exist in that particular state. Our trace-
slicing method differs from traditional slicing algorithms found in the literature
[AH90, KL88, MM06], where the control flow graph of the program is statically
analysed. In other dynamic slicing methods [MMS02, MMS03], the program de-
pendence graph (PDG) is constructed as an intermediate program representation
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to compute dynamic slices. However, the algorithm that we present, Trace Slic-
ing, does not require the computation of either control dependencies or the PDG.
Instead, our trace-slicing algorithm involves the following:
• on-the-fly computation of data dependence edges from the trace, construct-
ing a dynamic data dependency graph (DDG),
• performing the backward slice for a given trace-slicing criterion.
Therefore, the trace slice, which is computed from the program simulation trace, is
the transitive closure of data dependencies in the DDG relevant to the trace-slicing
criterion. The details of our trace-slicing algorithm are presented in the following
subsections.
4.3.1 Capturing Memory References and Assignments
The possible presence of indirect memory accesses (dereferencing) causes complex
data-dependence relationships between states in a simulation trace. In the litera-
ture, many studies have addressed static program slicing for high-level languages
(e.g. C) in the presence of array or pointer variables [CWZ90, HPR89, OSH01,
LB97]. Also, in the area of dynamic program slicing, the approach of Agrawal et
al. uses a dynamic dependence graph to resolve use and def sets in terms of mem-
ory cells and composite variables, and to detect inter-statement dependencies in
C [ADS91a]. The possibility of accessing memory locations using several methods
(i.e. aliasing), in low-level languages such AAPL, makes the computation of variable
definition and use in code statements more difficult. For example, unlike high-level
programming languages, in AAPL a memory location may be accessed at a given
statement using syntactically different indirect access methods, e.g. dereferencing
a memory location via an immediate offset, a register or one or two registers with
an offset.
Therefore, syntactic information is not sufficient because of these methods, and
the set of memory locations that can be accessed through a reference must be de-
termined before the computation of definition-use associations. Moreover, because
an assignment or use through the dereference of a memory location can potentially
use the value of one or two registers, or assign a value to, or use the value of, a
memory location, these memory assignments and uses must be treated differently
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from direct (i.e. syntactic) assignments. A reference to ∗r (the syntax of AAPL
shown in Figure 4.2 on page 64.) is a reference to a register r and a possible
reference to any memory location that r might point to. To capture such effects,
we adopt the technique in [LB97] to develop two cases where memory reference
and memory assignment can be determined for each program state in a trace:
Memory Reference (use)
Suppose we have a statement at position i in a trace such as:
i : r0 = ∗D + n
where n is a constant and ∗D is an operand dereferencing to a memory location
in a program state indexed by i, i.e. msi(D) where State(i) = si = (ρsi ,msi). Let
ruse(D) be a function that returns the set of registers that are used in expression
D to compute the memory location value. To compute the references at i, we take
a union of the memory address computed at runtime m(D) and the set of registers
used in D, ruse(D), that is:
use(i) = msi(D) ∪ ruse(D)
Algorithm 4.1 on page 72 shows the pseudocode for computing the set of registers
and memory addresses used (the registers or memory values are used) in expression
exp at position i in a simulation trace of an AAPL program. The algorithm has
one routine find use, which accepts two input parameters: i and exp. In order
to evaluate the expression exp at trace position i and compute the set of variables
that are used at i, six cases are implemented in the routine. The first two if
conditions (Lines 7 and 10) handle the base cases where the expression is either a
register or a memory address (a dereferenced expression). In the first base case the
routine returns the register as the used variable in the expression. For the second
case, the routine returns the computed memory address and the set of registers
that are used for computing this memory address in the dereferenced expression
∗E. The other cases in the algorithm (Lines 13, 16, 22 and 25) analyse operation,
assignment, branch and boolean expressions using recursive calls. Note that for
an assignment expression, the left-hand expression LE is only evaluated if it is
a dereferenced operand ∗E where the routine ruse(E) (in line 18) is called to
extract the set of registers used in E. Finally, the algorithm returns the list U of
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the registers and memory addresses that are used at exp. Note that Algorithm 4.5
on page 80 (introduced in Section4.3.3) uses the routine find use for definition-use
analysis.
Memory Assignment (define)
Suppose we have a statement at position i in a trace such as:
i : ∗D := r0 + n
This statement computes a value by adding the value of r0 to the constant n. The
result is stored at a memory address specified by D. Thus, the definition in the
statement at i is the memory address computed when the assignment is executed:
def(i) = msi(D)
Algorithm 4.2 on page 73 shows the pseudocode for computing the register or the
memory address defined (the register or memory location value is assigned a value)
in expression exp at position i in a simulation trace of an AAPL program. The
function in Algorithm 4.2 on page 73 accepts two input parameters, i and exp, and
returns the program variable (i.e. a register or a memory address) that is defined for
the given expression exp. The function accepts an assignment expression (in line
4) that consists of a left-hand expression, LE, and a right-hand expression, RE.
Then according to the AAPL syntax in Figure 4.1, two cases are implemented for the
defined program variable, where LE is either a register R or a memory address
ms)i(E). Note that for a memory address, the function returns the computed
memory address dereferenced by E at the current state si. Both Algorithms 4.1 on
page 72 and 4.2 on page 73 will be used to compute the definition-use associations
between states in Algorithm 4.5 on page 80.
Example 4.1. The sets of memory addresses and registers referenced (their values
are used) and defined at each program state in the simulation trace in Figure 4.3


















We present a few definitions that are necessary for our trace-slicing algorithm
(TSAlgo). In these definitions, and throughout the rest of the chapter, we use the
term state nodes to denote program states in a trace. Since our proposed trace-
slicing method could be applied to a program trace that may have been generated
by the simulation of the program, we use simulation trace and execution trace
interchangeably. Also, AAPL uses registers, r (i.e. the environment ρ(r)) and direct
memory locations (i.e. addressing memory locations with an immediate offset,
a register, or a register with an offset) for data manipulations during program
simulation, such as retrieving and storing data from memory.
We use the term data manipulator to denote registers and memory locations that
are used to process the program data.
Definition 4.3 (Data Manipulators). In AAPL, a data manipulator dm is a pro-
gram register or memory location used to perform data definition and manipulation
operations. The value of dm is described as either the environment value, ρ(dm)
in the case of a register, or the memory value m(dm) in the case of a memory
location, as described by the semantics of AAPL shown in Figure 4.2 on page 64.
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Algorithm 4.1: find use(i,exp) finds references in exp at position i in a sim-
ulation trace.
1: Input: A state node index i and
2: expi is an expression at i
3: Output: The set of registers and memory addresses that are used at position i
4: begin find use(i,exp)
5: initialise the set to empty:
6: Ui → {∅}
7: if exp is register then
8: return U → {exp}
9: end if
10: if exp is ∗E (memory address) then
11: return U → msi(E) ∪ ruse(E)
12: end if
13: if exp is E1 op E2 then
14: return U → find use(i,E1) ∪ find use(i,E2)
15: end if
16: if exp is LE := RE (assignment) then
17: if LE is ∗E then
18: U → ruse(E)
19: end if
20: U → U ∪ find use(i,RE)
21: end if
22: if exp is JMP E or CALL E (unconditional jump) then
23: U → find use(i,E)
24: end if
25: if exp is E1 bop E2 JMP E3 (conditional jump) then
26: U → find use(i,E1) ∪ find use(i,E2) ∪ find use(i,E3)
27: end if
28: return U
29: end find use(i,exp)
During program simulation a data manipulator can be defined or used at any point
via a state node (e.g. assignment or memory update operations). We define an
auxiliary function man[[t]]
def
= {data manipulators occurring in t} to provide the set
of data manipulators that are defined and used in a simulation trace. For instance,
the set of data manipulators that occur in tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 is man[[tx]] =
{r0, r1,ms3(r0),ms3(r1),ms8(r0),ms8(r1)}. In order to capture data dependency
information in a simulation trace, the following definitions are introduced.
Definition 4.4 (Definition Position def(p)). Let def(p) be the set of data manip-
ulators whose values are defined at position p in a simulation trace t.
Definition 4.5 (Use Position use(p)). Let use(p) be the set of data manipulators
whose values are used at position p in a simulation trace t.
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Algorithm 4.2: find def(i,exp) finds definitions at position i in a simulation
trace.
1: Input: A state node index i and an expression exp at i
2: Output: a register or a memory address that is defined in exp at position i
3: begin find def(i,exp)
4: if exp is LE := RE (assignment) then
5: if LE is register then
6: return LE
7: end if




12: end find def(i,exp)
Definition 4.6 (Def-clear Path). Given a simulation trace t, and a data manip-
ulator dm ∈ man[[t]], ∀i, k ∈ POSt and i < k. The path < i, ..., k > is a Def-clear
path w.r.t dm iff ∀j ∈< i, ..., k >, dm /∈ def(j).
Definition 4.7 (Recent Definition Position dpi(dm)). For a simulation trace t,
let i∈POSt and dm be a data manipulator dm ∈ man[[t]]. The function dpi(dm)
computes the position of the most recent data definition of dm with respect to any
given point, i, in t. dpi(dm) = k iff ∃ < k, ..., i >, dm∈def(k) and < k + 1, ..., i >
is a Def-clear path or k = 0 (no definition exists for dm).
The most recent definition of a data manipulator dm can be computed as a pro-
gram is simulated (i.e. during the simulation of the program). dpi(dm) allows one
to keep track of positions of state nodes that define dm from any given index i in
a trace. For instance, consider the trace tx in Figure 4.3. The recent definition
position of the data manipulator r0 ∈ man[[t]] from state s12 is dp12(r0) = 9 as r0
is defined at position 9 (i.e. r0 ∈ def(9) in Example 4.1 on page 70), and there
has been no subsequent definition up to position 12.
Definition 4.8 (Dynamic Data Dependence si
ddd→ sj). In a simulation trace t, let
i, j∈POS where i < j and si, sj ∈ t. sj is (directly) data dependent on si iff there
exists a data manipulator dm∈DM in t such that:
• when dm is a memory location dereferenced by operation ∗(A), i.e. dm =
mj(A), then:
1. mj(A) ∪ ruse(A) ∩ use(j) = φ, and
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2. dpj(mj(A))= i or ∃r∈ruse(A), dpj(r)= i
• when dm is a register, i.e. dm = r, then:
1. r ∈ use(j), and
2. dpj(r)= i
Example 4.2. Consider the trace tx in Figure 4.3; some data dependencies be-
tween states can be established using Definition 4.8 as follows:
• s8 is data dependent on s3, s3 ddd→ s8, because the data manipulator ms8(r0)
at index 8 in tx is ms8(r0) ∈ use(8) and dp8(ms8(18)) = 3; note that at state
s3 the memory location ms3(r1) = ms3(2) = m(2) is defined and then it has
been used at state s8, i.e. ms8(r0) = ms8(2) = m(2).
• s3 is data dependent on s0, s0 ddd→ s3, since r0 ∈ ruse(ms3(r0)), r0 ∈ use(3)
and dp3(r0) = 0.
• s7 is data dependent on s4, s4 ddd→ s7, as register r0 ∈ use(7) and dp7(r0) = 4.
Note that the second condition in Definition 4.8 ensures that a data manipulator
is not redefined after position i in the trace. Due to Definition 4.7, the most
recent definitions of program data manipulators are captured during the program’s
simulation.
During the simulation of a program with program input, data dependence edges
and a dynamic data dependence graph can be constructed from the trace and in-
formation gathered (e.g. the recent definition positions of the data manipulators).
Definition 4.9 (Data Dependence Edge). A data dependence edge is an ordered
pair of positions of program states in a trace. A directed edge de is constructed
between a pair of positions of state nodes in a trace, s.t. de=(j, i), iff si
ddd→ sj.
Definition 4.10 (Data Dependence Graph (DDG)). A data dependence graph
is a set of data dependence edges that represents the data dependencies between
state nodes in a program execution trace.
Since we are interested in slicing simulation traces of assembly code, the definitions
below capture the notion of the trace slice.
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Definition 4.11 (Trace-Slicing Criterion (tsc)). Let t be a simulation trace of
an AAPL program P simulated on input x. A trace-slicing criterion is a pair,
tsc=(dm, k), where dm ∈ man[[t]] is a program data manipulator, and k ∈ POSt
is a state node position in the simulation trace t.
Definition 4.12. DDGtsc is the set of data dependence edges obtained from DDG
by computing the backward reachability in DDG from the position specified by
dpk(dm) for dm in the trace-slicing criterion tsc.
Definition 4.13 (Trace Slice). A trace slice of an AAPL program simulation trace
t is a trace t′ that is a projection of t relevant to the value of the slicing criterion
of dm. That is, t′ is t less any state nodes not in DDGtsc.
A desired property of a trace slice is that it preserves the effect of the original
program trace on the data manipulator chosen at the selected point of interest
within the trace. Although any static data slice of a program can be computed by
pure static analysis, the computation of a trace slice requires evaluation informa-
tion. The evaluation information is generated as the program is simulated with a
given program input. This information provides the control flow path the program
follows (while it is under the simulation) to reach the specific state of the program
command in the slicing criterion. Definition 4.13 captures the set of all reachable
program states from position k in the trace t that directly or indirectly affect a
slicing-criterion data manipulator dm in tsc. Thus, the trace slice preserves the
program’s behaviour with respect to dm and removes any irrelevant state nodes
from t, producing a shorter trace slice (a proof of this property is presented in
Section 4.4). This definition will be applied by our algorithm.
4.3.3 Overview of the Trace-Slicing Algorithm
Dynamic slicing algorithms typically first carry out all the static computation of
the control dependencies and then construct the dynamic program dependence
graph (DPDG) to calculate the slice. The generated slices are program state-
ments that may be a subset of the original program [KL88, AH90]. Our goal is
to slice the simulation traces of a program under inspection and to generate a
trace slice that is a subsequence of the original trace. Given a simulation trace t
(produced by the semantic simulator) and for all data manipulators man[[t]], the
semantic trace-based malware-detection system in Chapter 5 makes several calls
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to the trace-slicing algorithm to compute trace slices. That is, in each slicing call,
a criterion tsc = (dm, k) is passed to the slicing algorithm where dm ∈ man[[t]].
Then the set of computed trace slices can be used to construct semantic signatures
for detecting malware variants. Moreover, we observe that the trace captures the
full control flow and data manipulation information of the program’s simulation
for a given input. Therefore, a program trace abstracts away the effect of control
dependencies and contains the complete path followed during the simulation in
which the value of the tsc data manipulator is computed. For this reason, we
propose a precise trace-slicing algorithm that does not perform any static evalu-
ation of control dependencies or construct a PDG. We refer to our algorithm as
the trace-slicing algorithm (TSAlgo).
TSAlgo has two main steps (procedures) when producing a trace slice:
1. The DDG computation (procedure find data dep edge in Algorithm 4.3
on page 78). This step is performed once and the DDG can be used for
all slicing calls. Also, the step can be accomplished either during (on-line)
or after (off-line) the program simulation. In our system (Chapter 5), the
semantic simulator retrieves the simulation trace of a program and the DDG
information is computed once and the DDG is then available for all slicing
calls.
2. The trace-slice computation (procedure compute slice in Algorithm 4.4 on
page 78). Once the DDG is constructed and a call is made by our detec-
tion system, a trace slice is computed from the simulation trace using the
DDG information with respect to a given slicing criterion (Definitions 4.12
and 4.13).
The objective of the procedure find data dep edge in Algorithm 4.3 on page 78
is to establish dynamic data dependence edges between a given state and other
states in a given trace tx. The algorithm accepts two parameters as input: a sim-
ulation trace tx and a state index j for which the algorithm computes dependence
edges. The algorithm starts, in line 9, with a for loop, which extracts the set of
data manipulators that are used in the current position j; it then determines the
positions of the previous states where the data manipulators are defined. Finally,
the algorithm creates a dependence edge, between each state and j, and adds the
edge to the set of dynamic dependence edges DDG in lines 11 and 12.
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The objective of the procedure compute slice in Algorithm 4.4 on the next page
is to compute the backward trace slice t′ for a given simulation trace tx with respect
to a trace slice tsc. The algorithm uses the DDG of the simulation trace, which
is produced by applying Algorithm 4.3 on the following page. The procedure
compute slice sets all states in the trace as not marked and not visited (line 5)
and starts processing the DDG to find outgoing dependence edges from the slicing
criterion position k in tx. The backward traversal in the trace and the creation
of the slice are implemented as a while loop (lines 7 to 13). For each visited
state (through an outgoing data dependence edge) the procedure adds the state
to the slice and marks all states (to be visited later) that can be reached from the
current state. Finally, in line 14, the procedure adds the state that preserves the
final value of the slicing criterion data manipulator in the slice.
TSAlgo employs the dynamic definition-update analysis of the data manipulators
to recover dynamic data dependencies between program states. The algorithm (in
Algorithm 4.5 on page 80, step 1, line 7) performs a dynamic definition-update of
all data manipulators in each state node using the dp() function (Definition 4.7).
This allows the algorithm to compute new data dependencies in a dynamic fashion
from the trace and then to construct the DDG.
The construction of a DDG with dynamic definition-update analysis of data ma-
nipulators allows the production of a precise trace slice for any data manipulator
at any state node position in the trace. For example, if we need a dynamic data
slice for a value of a data manipulator dm at position p in the simulation trace, we
begin traversing the computed DDG from the definition position of dm, which is
recovered from the definition-update analysis (i.e. dpp(dm)). Thus, the algorithm
needs to traverse the simulation trace only once to compute data dependencies
during the computation of any trace slice.
In essence, this algorithm produces a short trace slice that consists of only those
program states in the trace tx that contribute to the computation of the value of
the slicing criterion.
4.3.4 Description of the Trace-Slicing Algorithm
The trace-slicing algorithm processes simulation traces of an assembly-level pro-
gram. For a given trace, it analyses the program state by state and generates the
DDG. Then a slice is computed with respect to the slicing criterion.
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Algorithm 4.3: The construction of DDG in TSAlgo.
1: Input: a simulation trace tx and an index j of a state node in the trace
2: Output: a set of dynamic dependence edges DDG for tx
3: procedure find use in Algorithm 4.1 on page 72.
4: procedure use(i)
5: find all uses in command ci at location i:
6: return find use(i,ci)
7: end procedure
8: begin find data dep edge(j)
9: for all dm∈use(j) do
10: if ∃z = dpj(dm), z ∈ POSt s.t. z < j then
11: create dynamic data dependence edge de=(j, z)
12: DDG→ DDG ∪ {de}
13: end if
14: end for
15: end find data dep edge(j)
Algorithm 4.4: The computation of the slice in TSAlgo.
1: Input: a simulation trace tx, a set of dynamic dependence edges DDG and a trace
slicing criterion tsc = (dm, k)
2: Output: a trace slice t′ for tx
3: begin compute slice()
4: t′ → ∅
5: Set all state nodes in tx as not marked and not visited
6: Set sdpk(dm) ∈ tx as a marked and not visited state
7: while there exists a marked and not visited state in tx do
8: Select marked and not visited state sq ∈ tx
9: Set sq as visited in tx and t
′ → t′ ∪ {sq}
10: for all outgoing dep. edges from sq to some state si in DDG s.t. de=(q, i) do
11: find and mark si ∈ tx
12: end for
13: end while
14: Include the state sdpk(dm)+1 that contains the final value of slicing criterion dm
15: t′ → t′ ∪ {sdpk(dm)+1}
16: end compute slice()
During the simulation (in Chapter 5) of the program with program input x, the
execution contexts and commands are stored as state nodes in a simulation trace tx.
As the simulation trace is captured, TSAlgo uses only data dependence relations
that are established between state nodes in the trace for identifying a trace slice.
The data dependence associated with each command in a state is determined when
a state node of the command is processed in the DDG construction step. New
dependence edges between state nodes, are only established when the associated
dynamic data dependence exists. That is, as dependence edges are established,
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the DDG for a particular tx is created. Let us assume that a dynamic outgoing
dependence edge, de, is established from a state node sj at position j with the
existing state node si in the trace tx (i.e. i < j). Then the updated DDG after
identifying de is DDG → DDG ∪ {de}, where de= (j, i). After constructing the
DDG for the trace tx, our algorithm (in step 2, line 14) computes the backward
reachable subgraph with respect to any given tsc, and all state nodes that appear
in the reachable subgraph are contained in the trace slice. That is, the trace slice is
computed by traversing only the relevant dynamic dependence edges in the DDG.
Algorithm 4.5 on the next page shows the pseudocode for the trace-slicing al-
gorithm. It constructs the DDG for a simulation trace tx by computing data
dependence edges between state nodes in tx. Then the algorithm computes the
trace slice for a given slicing criterion (e.g. tsc= (dm, k)). We consider that the
simulation trace is constructed (by our semantic simulator) and it is provided as
an input to TSAlgo. In the first step of Algorithm 4.5 on the following page,
data dependence edges are computed for each state in the trace. This part of
the algorithm is a while loop (lines 9 to 13). On each iteration of the while loop,
a new state node sj is selected and de is computed for j. In line 11, the pro-
cedure find data dep edge(sj) identifies data dependence edges by finding the
state node at position dpj(dm) that defines data manipulator dm, which is used
at position j. The pseudocode of find data dep edge is listed in Algorithm 4.3
on the previous page. If there exists a definition position node dpj(dm) in the
trace tx such that dpj(dm) < j then the procedure creates a dependence edge
de= (j, dpj(dm)) and includes it in the set DDG. The process of identifying data
dependencies for state nodes in a trace and creating dependence edges in the
DDG continues until all states in the trace are processed. Finally, the procedure
compute slice, line 15, performs a backward slice and produces the sequence of
state nodes in tx that are reachable from the slicing criterion via de in the DDG.
In order to include the final execution context of the last evaluated command in
the trace slice, the procedure includes (in the trace slice) the state whose position
in the original trace is one more than the recent definition position of the slicing
criterion data manipulator, i.e. dpk(dm) + 1 (given that tsc= (dm, k)). This en-
sures that the last state in the trace slice preserves the final execution context of
the original trace (the program’s behaviour) with respect to the slicing criterion
data manipulator. The pseudocode of compute slice is in Algorithm 4.4 on the
preceding page.
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Algorithm 4.5: Trace-Slicing Algorithm (TSAlgo).
1: Input: a simulation trace tx and a trace slicing criterion tsc = (dm, k)
2: Output: a trace slice t′
3: procedure find data dep edge(j) in Algorithm 4.3 on page 78.
4: procedure compute slice() in Algorithm 4.4 on page 78.
5: DDG: a set of dynamic dependence edges
6: begin TSAlgo
7: step 1: construct DDG only once.
8: start at index j = 0 in tx:
9: while there exists a state sj in tx do
10: compute data dependence edges for sj :
11: find data dep edge(j)
12: j++
13: end while
14: step 2: for each call (a slicing query made by our detection system) w.r.t tsc =
(dm, k), compute the slice:
15: compute slice()
16: end TSAlgo
Example 4.3. We illustrate the working of TSAlgo with the aid of the sample
AAPL program in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and its simulation trace t in Figure 4.3
on page 65. When Algorithm 4.5 is applied to tx for dm= r0 at position k = 13
and for dm= ∗ r1 at position k = 8 (in a different slicing query), the DDG, and
the trace slices t′ and t′′ are computed (w.r.t. ∗r1 and r0, respectively) as shown
in Figure 4.4 on the following page. The trace slice t′′ for r0 at position 13 in tx
is computed in the following way:
After the initialisation steps in compute slice (lines 4–6 of Algorithm 4.4 on
page 78), all state nodes in the trace are set as not marked and not visited, the
slice set is empty and the algorithm marks the most recent definition node of r0
(i.e. dp13(r0) = 9). After the first iteration of the while loop, t
′′ = s9 and the
following state is set as marked and not visited in tx in line 7: this is {s4} because
it is reachable from s9 in the DDG of Figure 4.4 on the following page. After
the second iteration of the while loop in line 7, the slice contains s9; s4 is set as
marked and as a not visited state in tx so far. The following is the outcome of the
remaining while loop iterations of Algorithm 4.4 on page 78:
• After the third iteration: t′′ = < s4, s9 > and marked and not visited state
nodes are tx={s0}.
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s′0 r0:=1, (ρs′0 ,ms′0)
s′1 r1:=2, (ρs′1(r07→ 1),ms′1)
s′2 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs′2(r1 7→ 2),ms′2)
s′3 r0:=r0+1, (ρs′3 ,ms′3(2 7→ (ms′2(1) + 4)))
s′4 r1:=r1+1, (ρs′4(r07→ 2),ms′4)
s′5 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs′5 ,ms′5)
s′6 r0:=r0+1, (ρs′6 ,ms′6(3 7→ (ms′3(2) + 4)))
t′′ :
s′′0 r0:=1, (ρs′′0 ,ms′′0 )
s′′1 r0:=r0+1, (ρs′′1 ,ms′′1 (2 7→ (ms′′1 (1) + 4)))
s′′2 r0:=r0+1, (ρs′′2 ,ms′′2 (3 7→ (ms′′1 (2) + 4)))
s′′3 r1:=r1+1, (ρs′′3 (r0 7→ 3),ms′′3 )
(b)
Figure 4.4: DDG of the program P with respect to tx in Figure 4.3 on
page 65. t′ and t′′ are computed by Algorithm 4.5 on the preceding page w.r.t.
tsc = (∗r1, 13) and tsc = (r0, 8) (i.e. ∗r1 and r0 at positions 8 and 13 in tx,
respectively) (b). Note that the state indices in both slices are renumbered to
reflect the new sequencing in the trace slices.
• After the fourth iteration: t′′=<s0, s4, s9> and marked and not visited state
nodes are tx={φ}.
Finally, to show the final value of the slicing criterion data manipulator r0 is
preserved in t′′, the state which is at position dp13(r0) + 1 = 9 + 1 = 10 (in the
original trace) is included in t′′=<s0, s4, s9, s10>.
4.3.5 Implementation
The objective of the algorithm is to evaluate the trace-slicing algorithm using bi-
nary executables. In Chapter 5, a version of this implementation is developed for
slicing traces of an AAPL program in which the trace-slicing algorithm is incor-
porated into our trace-based malware detection system. In this experiment, we
implemented trace generation, DDG construction (step 1 of TSAlgo) and trace-slice
















Figure 4.5: Instrumentation tool infrastructure.
computation (step 2 of TSAlgo) presented in this chapter for malicious binary exe-
cutables. In addition, we also developed implementations of several slicing queries
for the slicing criterion data manipulators in the captured traces.
PIN DBI framework. There are many DBI frameworks; Nethercote [15] dis-
cusses eleven in detail. To carry out this experiment, we use Pin [LCM+05], a
dynamic instrumentation tool, to instrument the input binary programs and col-
lect execution traces. We selected the Pin framework because it is the best known
of the currently available DBI frameworks, and the one that provides the most sup-
port for virtual registers or register re-allocation and memory values. Pin makes
instrumentation tools, which are robust, relatively easy to write and has powerful
instrumentation mechanisms with reasonable performance. Pin is more suitable
for lightweight dynamic binary analysis (DBA) than other popular frameworks,
such as DIOTA [MRD02], Valgrind[Net04] and DynamoRIO [BGA03].
Tool Infrastructure. The experiment was carried out on a Core 2 Duo CPU
2.10 GHz machine with 4 gigabyte RAM and a 120 gigabyte hard disk, running
Ubuntu Linux (kernel 2.6.32-22). Since our algorithm is designed to handle ex-
ecutable malicious programs the malicious code must be instrumented and exe-
cuted. However, the execution of malicious code may cause damage to the host
machine. To make our approach practical, we use a virtual machine (VM) [VMw]
running on the host machine. A virtual machine is a closed environment, so that
the untrusted code is kept in an isolated operating system. The instrumentation
tool analyses a malicious executable in the isolated environment. Thus, the actual
host machine will not be damaged by running the programs. Figure 4.5 shows the
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Program Description
print tokens lexical analyser
gzip compression utility
bzip2 compression utility
flex lexical analyser generator






Table 4.1: Program samples used in the experiment.
main components of our tool. The dynamic profiling component of our system,
based on the Pin profiler, runs an executable program (the input) and collects the
sequence of program states, i.e. program commands that are executed during the
instrumentation and information about the environment of program registers and
memory locations (that are modified by the program commands). With Pin, we
can code our slicing algorithm in a single .cpp file then feed it to Pin to generate
our customised instrumentation tool. The slicing instrument accepts input code
from Pin, instruments it and returns the instrumented binary back to the Pin
framework. The instrumented binary is executed with the support of the slicing
instrumenter. Pin executes the input binary by calling the instrumentation rou-
tine in the instrumenter. The instrumentation routine instruments the basic block
provided and returns the instrumented code to Pin. Then Pin executes the instru-
mented code instead of the original one. Our tool intercepts output system calls
to collect dynamic information, and these are used to augment the execution trace
and to update the dynamic data dependence graph (DDG). Our tool [Alz10b] can
be run under Pin and accepts application binaries (currently, in order to use our
tool with Pin, the binaries have to be produced and run under Linux). The slicing
tool can then perform slicing on the collected trace.
Table 4.1 shows the programs we used for our experimentation. The first five
programs are medium-sized Linux utility programs and the remaining five are ex-
ecutable variants of malware programs (Linux-based viruses) downloaded from the
VxHeavens [Hea] website. The instrumentation program ran the executable pro-
grams and collected the sequences of program states, i.e. program commands that
are executed during the instrumentation and information about the environment
of program registers and memory locations (that are modified by the program
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Program Slicing Queries Slice Size Execution Time
MIN MAX AVG inst t trace t + slice t
print tokens 20 2 32 638 5.98 2.23
gzip 20 1 499 25 3.66 2.58
bzip2 20 2 818 41 6.05 4.15
flex 20 1 679 34 9.04 3.02
gap 20 2 1098 55 12.02 5.07
lychan 20 1 699 35 5.03 3.34
rst 20 3 437 22 5.76 2.51
telf 20 1 139 7 1.81 1.40
xone 20 1 299 15 2.89 1.67
binom 20 1 359 18 3.36 1.93
Table 4.2: Summary of overhead results.
commands). With Pin, we can code our slicing algorithm in a single .cpp file then
feed it to Pin to generate our customised instrumentation tool. Our tool [Alz10b]
can be run under Pin and accepts application binaries (currently, in order to use
our tool with Pin, the binaries have to be produced and run under Linux). The
slicing tool can then collect dynamic data dependence information from the instru-
mented application. For all programs tested in this experiment, the slicing criteria
we chose, at the end of each trace, are the set of defined program registers and
memory addresses (i.e. variables) in the trace. We limited the number of slicing
queries to 20 for each program run.
Improving Execution Time Performance. To reduce the overhead of col-
lecting trace information and the slicing computation, the tool removes program
states (and their instructions) from the trace if they do not contribute to the data
dependency. That is, the instrumentation executes these instructions to update
the flow of the execution and to find the next instruction to be executed, but it
does not include them within the trace and the DDG. Also, due to the presence of
loops, the trace data collection step may require significant space and time to run.
To reduce the time and space overheads, a termination condition is set. Once the
execution of the instrumented program reaches the termination threshold (e.g. the
number of program states recorded is over a threshold, h), the instrumentation
tool stops the instrumentation analysis of the running program. With the current
computing power, we specified the termination threshold to be around h = 1.5
million program state nodes (with their instructions) to be collected and analysed
by the slicing algorithm.
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Figure 4.6: A simulation trace configuration t and its slice t′. Each state
consists of an execution context and a command. States in t with solid and
dotted-line squares represent sliced states and non-sliced states, respectively.
Execution Time Overheads. Table 4.2 on the preceding page shows the over-
head of the implementation on the program examples. For each of the programs,
the slicer had computed 20 distinct trace slices at the end of the program’s exe-
cution. The minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX) and average (AVG) trace slice
sizes that were observed are given in the slice size column. The slice sizes are
measured in terms of program instructions (statements) sliced from the execution
trace. The key components in the implementation that contribute to the execu-
tion time are: inst t, the time required by instrumentation analysis (i.e. executing
program commands and capturing the trace), trace t, the time required by step 1
of TSAlgo (Algorithm 4.5 on page 80) to construct the DDG graph and slice t, the
time required by step 2 of TSAlgo to compute a trace slice. The average total time
required by all three components was around 8.35 seconds, based on an average of
20 executions consisting of 1.5 million program state nodes. In fact, the average
total inst t time for producing the same number of state nodes without trace t
and slice t was 5.57 seconds. Thus, running all three components increases the
average total (execution) time by 50% compared to running only the first com-
ponent (inst t). We believe that this incurred time is acceptable and does not
impose a severe limitation on a module within a semantic malware detector.
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4.4 Correctness of the Trace-Slicing Algorithm
Given a trace t of a program P simulated with a program input x, the trace slice
t′ is generated by applying TSAlgo on t with respect to a slicing criterion tsc.
The conjecture of the correctness property states that our trace-slicing algorithm
produces a correct trace slice (i.e. t′ is a correct slice of t with respect to tsc) if the
observable behaviour in the simulation of program commands in the trace slice is
similar to the observable behaviour in the simulation of the original program for
the slicing-criterion data manipulator dm. That is, the semantic values of dm in
t and t′ during the simulation are consistent.
The correctness proof of Algorithm 4.5 on page 80 is based on a given trace t∈S∗,
and its slice t′. We present some definitions for the correctness proof:
Definition 4.14 (n-sequence Directed Trace). The n-sequence directed trace t is
a trace that consists of ordered program states, with n > 1. t = ({s0, ..., sn−1},→)
where t ` si → si+1 for any i ∈ [0, n− 2].
That is, within a trace t, only one transition ‘→’ can occur from one state to
another such that each state in the n-sequence directed trace has only one outgoing
transition edge and one incoming transition edge. Thus, a transition edge has one
source state and one destination state. Figure 4.6 on the previous page depicts
a trace configuration and the transitions between its states. Also, we let si ⇒ sk
be the reflexive transitive closure of multiple state transitions ‘→’ taken between
states si and sk in t, i.e. si ⇒ sk if there exists sj ∈ t s.t. si → sj → sk. Also, in
order to distinguish between state transitions that are produced by sliced states
(t′) and the ones produced by non-sliced states in t, we use the following two
labels:
• t ` s c→ m if t ` s→ m, c = cmd(s) and s ∈ t′
• t ` s •→ m if t ` s→ m and s /∈ t′
• t ` s •⇒ s′ if for all si ∈ <s . . . s′> such that si •→ si+1 (reflexive transitive
closure of all non-sliced state transitions)
• t ` s c⇒ m if there exists s′ ∈ t such that t ` s •⇒ s′, and t ` s′ c→ m.
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Example 4.4. Given a simulation trace configuration and its slice t′ in Figure 4.6
on page 85, then the state transition from s0 to s1 is labelled with the instruction
command c0, t ` s0 c0→ s1 since s0 is included in the slice. Also, there exists a
multiple state transition t ` s1 •⇒ s3 between non-sliced states s1 and s3. However,
the multiple transition state between s1 and s4 is labelled with c3 since s3 ∈ t′ and
t ` s3 c3→ s4.
Definition 4.15 (Sliced State Successor SSuc()). Let t be an n-sequence directed
trace, and i, q ∈ POSt. Let si, sq ∈ t where si = (ci, ξi) and sq = (cq, ξq). Let t′
be a trace slice of t. sq is the successor of si in the trace t, SSuc(si) = sq iff
∃ < i, .., q >∈ t where i ≤ q such that sq ∈ t′ and for all j ∈ i, ..., q − 1, sj /∈ t′.
Example 4.5. Consider the trace t in Figure 4.6 on page 85. SSuc(s1) = SSuc(s2) =
{s3}, SSuc(s4) = {s5} and SSuc(s6) = {∅}. But for states that are in the slice,
SSuc(s3) = {s3}, SSuc(s0) = {s0} and SSuc(s5) = s5.
Note that every state in the trace slice s ∈ t′ is the sliced state successor of itself,
i.e. SSuc(s) = s.
Definition 4.16 (Weak Simulation). Given two simulation traces t and t′, a binary
relation  is a weak simulation of t by t′ if ∃si∈ t and ∃s′g∈ t′ and whenever si  s′g
and SSuc(si) = sj then ∃s′q ∈ t′ s.t. sj  s′q and SSuc(s′g) = s′q.
Definition 4.16 describes a relation between states in a trace t and its slice t′ with
respect to a slicing criterion. If a state has a sliced state successor in t then it
corresponds to the same sliced state successor in t′.
Definition 4.17 (Relevant Data Manipulators). In a simulation trace t, let i, k∈
POSt, and i < k. Also, let < i, ..., k > be a state index sequence in t where
s= (ci, ξi) ∈ t, and n= (ck, ξk) ∈ t are program states in t. Moreover, let t′ be a
trace slice of t. ∀sj in t where i ≤ j ≤ k, we define RDM(sj), the set of relevant
data manipulators of state sj, such that dm∈RDM(sj) iff there exists a state m∈ t′,
z = Index(m) and cz = ck s.t. dm∈use(k), but ∀j∈ i, ..., k − 1, dm /∈ def(j).
Example 4.6. Consider the trace tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and its slice t
′
in Figure 4.4 on page 81, the sets of relevant data manipulators Rt and Rt′ are
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computed for each state in t and t′, respectively, as follows:
tx Rt t
′ Rt′
s0 {ms0(1)} s′0 {ms′0(1)}
s1 {ms1(1), r0} s′1 {ms′1(1), r0}
s2 {ms2(1), r0, r1} s′2 {ms′2(1), r0, r1}
s3 {ms3(1), r0, r1} s′3 {ms′3(2), r0, r1}
s4 {ms4(2), r0, r1} s′4 {ms′4(2), r0, r1}
s5 {ms5(2), r0} s′5 {ms′5(2), r0, r1}
s6 {ms6(2), r0, r1} s′6 {r0, r1}
s7 {ms7(2), r0, r1}






Next Lemma 4.1 shows that whenever SSuc(s) = SSuc(s′) where s ∈ t and s′ ∈ t′
then both states s, s′ have the same set of relevant data manipulators.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that trace slice t′ produced by TSAlgo (Algorithm 4.5 on
page 80) on t (in Figure 4.6 on page 85) is closed under
ddd→, and that each state s in
a trace has at most a single slice successor, i.e. 0 ≤ |SSuc(s)| ≤ 1. Let states si ∈ t
and sv ∈ t′ be such that SSuc(si) = SSuc(sv), then we have RDM(si) = RDM(sv).
Proof When SSuc(si) = ∅, there is no sliced state successor in t and, hence, no
sliced state in t′, and, thus, RDM(si) = RDM(sv) = ∅. Otherwise, there exists a
command {c} such that SSuc(si) = SSuc(sv) = {s} such that cmd(s) = c.
First let dm ∈ RDM(si) be given; ∃so ∈ t such that so ∈ t′ with dm ∈ use(o), and
a subsequence < i, ..., o>∈ t such that if s exists (with k = Index(s)) in the path
<i, ..., o> in t and s 6= so then dm /∈ def(k). Since SSuc(si) = {n}, n must occur
somewhere in <i, ..., o> (Definition 4.15); we now infer that dm ∈ RDM(n).
Next, let dm ∈ RDM(n) be given (where j = Index(n)); ∃so ∈ t such that so ∈ t′
with dm ∈ use(o), and a path <j, ..., o> in t, such that if n occurs in <j, ..., o>
and n 6= so then dm /∈ def(j). Since SSuc(si) = {n}, ∃ a path < i, ..., j > such
that if s exists in < i, ..., j > and s 6= n then s /∈ t′. To establish RDM(si), it
is sufficient to show that if s occurs in < i, ..., j > and s 6= n then dm /∈ def(k).
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Assume the contrary, then the path < i, ..., j > contains at least s, but for that s
we would have s
ddd→ so and, thus, s ∈ t′, which is a contradiction.
Example 4.7. Consider the states s6 ∈ tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and s′5 ∈ t′
in Figure 4.4 on page 81. SSuc(s6) = {s8} and SSuc(s′5) = {s′5} where cmd(s8) =
cmd(s′5). We have RDM(s8) = RDM(s
′
5) = {m(2), r0, r1}. Note that m(2) =
ms6(2) = ms6(2)
Next, in Lemma 4.2, we want to show that for any non-sliced state transition
•→ in a trace t, the values of the relevant data manipulators before and after
the transition are unchanged. Since a data manipulator is either a register or a
memory location, we define an auxiliary function valsi(dm) to represent the value
of dm, where si is a state at index i in a simulation trace:
valsi(dm) =
{
ρsi(dm) if dm is a register
msi(dm) if dm is a memory location
Lemma 4.2. Assume that t′ produced by TSAlgo on a trace t is closed under ddd→,
and that each state in t has at most one sliced state successor. If there exists
a state transition t ` si •→ sv and SSuc(sv) 6= ∅, then for all dm ∈ RDM(si),
valsi(dm) = valsv(dm).
Proof From t ` si •→ sv and SSuc(sv) 6= ∅ we infer that si /∈ t′ and there exists
n ∈ t such that SSuc(si) = SSuc(sv) = {n}. By Lemma 4.1, RDM(si) = RDM(sv).
Next, let dm ∈ RDM(si); since si /∈ t′ we infer that dm /∈ def(u), where u =
Index(n) in t, which shows that valsi(dm) = valsv(dm).
Example 4.8. Consider states s6, s7 ∈ tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 where t `
s6
•→ s7. Also, from Example 4.7 we have RDM(s6) = {m(2), r0, r1} and ∀dm ∈
RDM(s6) we have vals6(dm) = vals7(dm).
Definition 4.18 (Relation r). Let t, t′ be execution traces, i ∈ POSt, j ∈ POSt′
where si=(ci, ξi)∈ t and s′j =(c′j, ξ′j)∈ t′. We define si r s′j to hold iff:
1. SSuc(si) = s, SSuc(s
′
j) = s
′ such that s = s′, i.e. cmd(s) = cmd(s′)
2. ∀dm∈RDM(si), valsi(dm)=vals′j(dm)
Example 4.9. Consider states s9 ∈ tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and s′′2 ∈ t′′x in
Figure 4.4 on page 81, where t′′x is a trace slice of tx w.r.t tsc = (r0, 8), s9 =
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(ξs9 , cs9) and s
′′
2 = (ξs′′2 , cs′′2 ). We have cs9 =c
′′
s2




The following lemma allows us to extend the relation r to cover the non-sliced
states in t.
Lemma 4.3. Let t be a simulation trace and assume that t′ is closed under ddd→.




Proof By assumption, there exists a state from t that is included in the sliced
trace, i.e. s ∈ t′, such that SSuc(sj) = s; from t ` si •→ sj we infer that si /∈ t′
and that SSuc(si) = s. From si r s
′





RDM(si) = RDM(sj) = RDM(s) = RDM(s
′
q) (by Lemma 4.1). Also, from si r s
′
q,
for all dm ∈ RDM(s) we have valsi(dm) = vals′q(dm) by Lemma 4.2, which shows
that sj r s
′
q.
Example 4.10. Consider states s6, s7, s8 ∈ tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and s′5 ∈ t′
in Figure 4.4 on page 81. Let s6 r s
′
5 (Definition 4.18) and t ` s6 •→ s7. Since
SSuc(s7) = {s8}, cmd(s8) = cmd(s′5) and ∀dm ∈ RDM(s7) = {ms7(2), r0, r1} we
have vals7(dm) = vals′5(dm), and thus s7 r s
′
5.
The following lemma shows that whenever there is a relation r between a sliced
state in t and a state in the trace slice of t, their destination states have a relation
r. That is, whenever we have a transition from a sliced state to a state in t and
the source state is in relation r with a state in the slice, there will be a similar
transition in the slice in which the destination states of both transitions have the
same relation r.
Lemma 4.4. Let t be a simulation trace and assume that t′ is closed under ddd→.
Also, let si, sj ∈ t and s′q ∈ t′. If si r s′q and t ` si c→ sj, where c = cmd(si), then







′ ` s′q c→ s′v.
Proof From t ` si c→ sj we infer that si = s ∈ t′ and thus SSuc(si) = s. From
si r s
′




q, and cmd(si) = cmd(s
′
q) and by Lemma 4.1
we have RDM(si) = RDM(s
′
q). Also for all dm ∈ RDM(si), valsi(dm) = vals′q(dm)
and we also infer that for all dm ∈ use(i), valsi(dm) = valsq(dm). Thus, the sliced
state s′q contains the same values of dm as the original trace state si, and since
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cmd(si) = cmd(s
′
q) = c then the outcome of their commands, c, is the same. Next
we show that given dm ∈ RDM(sj), it holds that valsj(dm) = vals′v(dm). This can
be shown in two cases:
• If dm ∈ def(i), and since cmd(si) = cmd(s′q) = c then ∃E s.t. c = (dm :=E),
thus si+1 = Cˆ[[dm := E]]ξi and s′q+1 = Cˆ[[dm := E]]ξq. From si
c→ sj and
s′q
c→ s′v, we infer that valsj(dm)=valsi+1(dm) and vals′v(dm)=vals′q+1(dm),
and thus valsj(dm)=vals′v(dm).
• If dm /∈ def(i), then dm ∈ RDM(si), and the claim follows from ∀dm ∈
RDM(si) : valsi(dm) = vals′q(dm) since valsj(dm) = valsi(dm) = vals′q(dm) =
vals′v(dm).
Example 4.11. Consider the states s1, s2 ∈ tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65 and
s′1, s
′
2 ∈ t′ in Figure 4.4 on page 81. Let s1 r s′1 (Definition 4.18) and t ` s1 c1→ s2
(since s1 is a sliced state) and t
′ ` s′1 c1→ s′2. We have SSuc(s2) = s3, SSuc(s′2) = s′2
and cmd(s3) = cmd(s
′
2). From Example 4.6, RDM(s2) = {m(1), r0, r1} and for all
dm ∈ RDM(s2), the values produced in dm in tx and t′ in Figures 4.3 on page 65




The following theorem proves the correctness of the slicing algorithm.
Theorem 4.1. Let si, st ∈ t and s′q, s′v ∈ t′ where i, l ∈ POSt, q, v ∈ POSt′ and t′
is the slice produced by TSAlgo on t with w.r.t. a slicing criterion. Assume that
t′ is closed under ddd→. Whenever si r s′q, and t ` si c⇒ st, the relation r is a weak
simulation (Definition 4.16).
Proof From t ` si c⇒ st we infer that there exists < i . . . k > (k ≥ i) such that
sk
c→ sl, and for all j ∈ < i . . . k − 1 > we have sj •→ sj+1, sj /∈ t′, and thus
SSuc(sj) = sk ∈ t′. By Lemma 4.4 and from sk c→ sl we infer that there exists
s′v ∈ t′ where q ≤ v such that st r s′v. Then with t ` sj •→ sj+1, we can apply
Lemma 4.3 to infer that for all states at j from <i . . . k−1> we have sj r s′q.
Example 4.12. The trace slice computed in Figure 4.4 on page 81 for data manip-
ulator ∗r1 in the trace in Figure 4.3 on page 65 is not ‘executable’ in the sense that
it does not correspond to an execution, but we can produce an ‘executable’ program
P ′ from the trace slice via extraction of the set of commands P ′ from the trace slice











s′0 r0:=1, (ρs′0 ,ms′0)
s′1 r1:=2, (ρs′1(r07→ 1),ms′1)
s′2 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs′2(r17→ 2),ms′2)
s′3 r0:=r0+1, (ρs′3 ,ms′3(2 7→ (ms′2(1) + 4)))
s′4 r1:=r1+1, (ρs′4(r07→ 2),ms′4)
s′5 *r1:=*r0+4, (ρs′5(r17→ 3),ms′5)
s′6 r1:=r1+1, (ρs′6 ,ms′6(3 7→ (ms′2(1) + 8)))
(b)
Figure 4.7: The program P ′ is produced by extracting the command sequence
from the trace slice t′ in Figure 4.4 on page 81 (a); a simulation trace t′x of P
′
on input x : n=1,m=2 (b). Note that at final state s′ ms′7(3 7→ (ms′6(2) + 4))
where ms′6(2) = ms′5(2) = ms′4(2 7→ (ms′3(1) + 4)).
in Figure 4.4 on page 81. Then, we execute the program P ′, shown in Figure 4.7,
with the same program input (n= 1,m= 2) used to run the original program and
generate tx, as shown in Figure 4.7. The generated simulation trace (a projection)
t′x agrees with the original trace (i.e. tx in Figure 4.3 on page 65) for the values of
the slicing criterion. Thus, we claim that we have the correct sub-trace if we can
execute the program projection from the given input and the sub-trace agrees with
the original trace for the values of the slicing-criterion data manipulator at the
corresponding program point. Therefore, the observable behaviour of the trace of
program P ′ is similar to the observable behaviour of the original trace of Figure 4.3
on page 65, with respect to the slicing criterion.
4.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Trace Slic-
ing Algorithm
The main motivation for our TSAlgo is to counter the effects of code obfuscations
on simulation traces of malware variants and to improve the detection rate using
short trace slices in the malware signature. Thus, the construction and match-
ing of semantic signatures is enhanced and a malware detector will have fewer
false-negative results in detecting obfuscated malware variants. This can be ac-
complished by removing the effects of the obfuscation techniques (deobfuscation)
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and capturing the true semantics of program traces using slicing. Thus, the power
of our TSAlgo algorithm relies on its ability to handle malware-obfuscating trans-
formations. We discuss below the set of obfuscating transformations that are used
to generate new malware variants and which the TSAlgo algorithm can handle;
we call this set TSAlgo-handled obfuscations. TSAlgo-handled obfuscations are
code transformations that add new (syntax) code lines to create new program
variants while preserving the data dependence structure of the original program.
Code reordering : this obfuscation technique is commonly applied on independent
commands where their order in the code does not affect other commands. The ex-
ecution order of commands can be maintained using unconditional jumps. Thus,
new variants of the program can be created with the same semantics but different
syntax. Garbage insertion: this transformation technique introduces commands
that have no semantic effect on the program execution. The main objective of the
technique is to create new program variants that preserve the original program
semantics but contain different syntax. Equivalent functionality : this obfuscation
technique replaces commands with other equivalent commands that perform the
same operations as the original code. Variable renaming is an obfuscation tech-
nique used by malware writers to obfuscate their code and to produce new malware
variants by simply changing registers and variable names in the program. To deal
with variable-renaming obfuscation, TSAlgo can be applied to all possible data
manipulators in a given simulation trace to produce a set of trace slices. Opaque
predicate: a predicate whose value (True or False) is known, by the malware writer,
a priori to a code transformation but is hard to determine by examining the ob-
fuscated code [CTL97]. This technique obfuscates the program control flow and
makes it difficult to analyse statically.
Limitations. The TSAlgo algorithm has some limitations. The slicing algorithm
is not resilient with respect to data obfuscation techniques. Introducing new data
dependencies between program registers and memory locations is an obfuscation
technique that cannot be handled by our TSAlgo algorithm (TSAlgo-unhandled
obfuscation class) and thus, generated trace slices may not be efficient in improv-
ing the detection rate. This transformation technique obfuscates a program by
creating dependencies between variables by rewriting assignments or introducing
new ones [CTL97, MDT07]. For instance, malware writers may use this technique
to split a register into two registers or to transform a register r0 into the expression
r1∗r0+r2 where r1 and r2 contain dummy constant values. Thus, this technique
increases the number of data dependencies in the obfuscated variant so that the











10 Exit: JMP ...












Figure 4.8: An obfuscated code variant of program P in Figure 4.3 on page 65
and its DDG after applying data obfuscations.
trace slices have different semantics compared with the trace slices of the malware
parent. The example in Figure 4.8 illustrates this transformation technique.
4.6 Review of Related Work
Dynamic slicing has been extended from the traditional slicing techniques for
debugging programs [AIP04] to a wider set of applications such as dynamic slicing
for concurrent programs [MKM+06, RLG02] and software testing [KY94]. The
dynamic slicing approach takes into consideration only one execution history of
a program when computing a slice. Thus, it may significantly reduce the size
of the slice as opposed to the approach of static slicing. To present all of the
dynamic program slicing approaches would be beyond the scope of this chapter.
A survey of dynamic program slicing techniques and applications can be found in
[XQZ+05, Tip94].
For dynamic slicing techniques that depend on an execution trace, the computed
dynamic slice is a subset of the original program. Korel et al. [KL88, KL90] ex-
tended Weiser’s static slicing algorithm [Wei81] to the dynamic approach. They
incorporated the execution history of a program as a trajectory to find the state-
ments that actually affect a variable at a program point. Thus, the resulting
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slices are more compact and precise than the program slices proposed by Weiser.
Agrawal and Horgan [AH90] provided a novel approach for computing dynamic
program slices via program dependence graphs (PDGs). Their algorithm uses the
reduced dynamic dependence program (RDDP) where a new node is created if it
introduces a new dependence edge with other existing nodes in the RDDP. How-
ever, different occurrences of the same node cannot be distinguished in RDDP.
None of the above mentioned slicing methods provide a way to capture the dy-
namic values of variables in a program slice without at least re-executing the
program slice. Instead, our approach extracts a trace slice from an simulation
trace. The computed slice preserves the semantics of the execution trace of the
original program.
Zhang et al. [ZGZ03, ZGZ05] present a dynamic slicing technique that depends
on a recorded execution history. Their limited preprocessing (LP) algorithm per-
forms some preprocessing to first augment the record with summary information
and then it uses demand driven analysis to extract dynamic control and data de-
pendencies from the augmented record. In this sense, our approach is similar to
the approach of Zhang et al. In our approach, the data dependence information
can be computed on-the-fly during program simulation and is not used to find
control dependencies or to augment the execution trace, but it is mainly used to
construct the DDG.
In terms of slicing binary executables, it is hard to find practical slicing solutions
for binary executable programs in the literature. The existing techniques proposed
in the literature perform static slicing only. Cifuentes and Fraboulet use intrapro-
cedural slicing for handling indirect jumps and function calls in their binary trans-
lation framework [CF97]. Debray et al. [DEMDS00] and Kiss et al. [KJLG03]
presented methods for the interprocedural static slicing of binary executables.
However, these approaches require the extraction of static data dependence infor-
mation from a control-flow graph (CFG). Instead, our slicing algorithm does not
rely on a CFG but it computes information from a simulation trace. Bergeron
et al. [BDEK99] propose a static slicing technique for analysing assembly code
to detect malicious behaviour. Their approach compares program slices against
behavioural specifications (e.g. a set of API signatures) to detect potentially mali-
cious code. However, since their method is purely based on signatures of function
calls and the sequence of commands, it lacks the ability to handle certain obfusca-
tion techniques such as code reordering and equivalent functionality. Probably the
most similar approach to ours is the work presented in [FG09]. Feng and Gupta
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developed a virus detector based on dynamic backward slices of system API traces.
Their algorithm uses dynamic data dependence graphs of a system function call
as the intermediate representation of the program. However, the slices produced
by their algorithm are subsets of the program. Also, they use a statement-based
graph as their virus signature that depends on the syntax of the instructions and
the data dependency information between the instructions. Instead, our slicing
algorithm computes a trace slice that is a subsequence of a simulation trace and
preserves the semantic details of the trace. Also, we prove that our trace-slicing
algorithm produces a correct trace slice.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a trace-slicing algorithm for machine code. The
method supports the process of capturing semantic details of trace slices as part
of a malware signature for detecting (obfuscated) malware variants. Equally im-
portantly, a correctness property is developed and our slicing method is proved
to be correct with respect to the property. Trace slicing in this context has two
roles: to reverse engineer the effect of obfuscations on the trace and to produce
a small trace slice of the simulation trace of a malicious program for efficient
signature construction. As a result, detection of malware variants using precise
semantic signatures can be improved in terms of speed and accuracy (i.e. fewer
false negatives). Our implementation has shown that our TSAlgo may be efficient




The malicious behaviour of a malware family is the fundamental qualifying char-
acteristic of all its variants [Coh87, Szo¨05]. Malware variants generated via code
obfuscation can easily change the original syntactical structure of the code and
evade syntactic malware detectors. This chapter introduces the approach and im-
plementation of a semantic trace-based malware detector. A semantic trace-based
detector is based on the idea of incorporating semantic information about the sim-
ulation traces of executables to detect malware variants. The detector consists of a
static analyser and a semantic trace-matching algorithm. The semantic-based de-
tector uses semantic traces of malicious code as a semantic signature to detect code
variants. A static analyser evaluates program instructions and generates semantic
traces of executables; we call it the Semantic Simulator (SemSim). A semantic
trace-matching algorithm uses the SemSim architecture to match semantic traces
of malware.
We use the observation that the semantics of program traces represent the effects
of malware behaviour. The malicious functionalities of a particular malware code
are implemented in its variants, each of which has a different syntactical appear-
ance in the binary code. Our malware detector uses the semantics of the trace
to determine whether a given program is a variant of known malware. That is,
for a specific malware program to be detected as a variant of a malware, the se-
mantic characteristics of the malware family are consistently presented in their
semantic trace information. Our hypothesis is that trace semantics matching is an
excellent basis for a malware detector to successfully detect obfuscated variants
that belong to the same malware family. We describe a matching algorithm for
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identifying similar semantic details for malware variants using semantic traces.
We present SemSim for processing program instructions and generating semantic
information of the program simulation as a trace. Furthermore, our trace-based
malware detector uses trace-slicing algorithm (presented in Chapter 4) and sim-
plification functions (presented in Section 5.1) to construct semantic signatures of
known malware variants.
The contributions of this chapter include:
• A specification of the semantic signature. A semantic signature of
a known malware variant consists of a set of semantic traces and a test
input. A semantic signature is used to match variants of the malware. The
construction of a semantic signature requires the use of the trace-slicing
method and trace simplification functions.
• A method to match the semantic traces in signatures of code vari-
ants. The approach is a program algorithm TraceMapping that uses the
program environment and memory domains (i.e. (E ,M), defined in Chap-
ter 4), a semantic simplification step and a program state matching method.
• A static analyser for simulating the execution of code. The SemSim
architecture statically evaluates a program’s execution, computes the in-
structions and collects a finite simulation trace. The architecture consists of
two main steps. First, the malicious code is translated into our intermediate
language AAPL and we refer to this step as “input extraction”. Second, the
known malware code is evaluated and a pair of semantic trace and program
input is produced. The outcome of the simulation analysis is an approxima-
tion of the program execution behaviour with respect to a program input,
which is used to build a signature for code-variant detection.
• A prototype of a semantic trace-based malware detection system
for binary executables. We have designed and implemented a prototype of
a malware detector based on trace semantics. The prototype malware variant
detector uses a single signature of a known malware, which consists of a pair
of a program test input and a set of semantic traces. The evaluation of the
system on real-world and obfuscated malware samples shows that our static
analyser (SemSim) together with the semantic trace matching algorithm are
effective in detecting real-world and new obfuscated variants of malicious
code and in avoiding false positives.
Chapter 5. Semantic Trace Matching 99
When generating a semantic signature for a known malware sample, SemSim pro-
duces a random program input to evaluate the malware program and generate a
simulation trace. The trace-based malware detection system implements TSAlgo
(Chapter 4) to slice a simulation trace and produce a set of traces for the construc-
tion of a malware signature. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. An
overview of the detection system architecture is given in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2,
a method of matching semantic traces with code variants and their algorithms are
discussed. The discussion of our static analyser architecture is divided into two
sections; Section 5.3 presents the input extraction of malicious executables and
Section 5.4 presents the semantic simulator. Section 5.5 details the implementa-
tion prototype and the experimental results. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.1 Overview of the Detection System
To determine whether a given executable program is a variant of a malware family
(or a known malware program), we must extract the semantic signatures of the
program and the known malware. Once a semantic signature is produced, a de-
tector can then identify the malware variant. This section presents the definitions
for the semantic signature for malware detection and the semantic trace-based
malware detector (Section 5.1.1). Also, the architecture of the detection system is
introduced (Section 5.1.2).
5.1.1 Defining Semantic Signatures
For an AAPL program P , a simulation trace (Definition 4.2 on page 66) can be
produced by simulating P . We present our semantic simulator in Section 5.4 which
takes a program P (a candidate malware variant) and a program input x to gen-
erate a simulation trace: semsim : (P, x)→ t. During a simulation of a program,
most instructions in the code are responsible for producing data and assigning it
to specific registers or memory locations. The produced data is important for the
malware program to accomplish its functions (e.g. copying a piece of code into a
memory region, calling system functions, etc.). Thus, any manipulation can reveal
some of the behaviour (i.e. the semantics) of the malicious program [YHR89]. Our
matching method, presented in Section 5.2, looks for the semantic information
(of the evaluated code) in the produced trace without considering the syntactical
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changes introduced by some obfuscations. In other words, most of the super-
fluous instructions that are introduced in a malware variant to thwart the static
signature- or pattern-based detection techniques, do not affect the semantics of the
malicious code. Thus, our detection technique extracts semantic signatures from
simulation traces of known malware variants and uses them to detect unknown
variants.
The semantic signature we develop is in the form of a pair consisting of a set
of semantic traces and a corresponding test input. We use the test input from a
known malware signature to simulate a suspicious malware variant and to produce
a simulation trace. Matching between a semantic trace and an entire simulation
trace of a suspicious binary executable will be an expensive task. However, to
have an efficient and acceptable detection method, we extract a more compact
representation of the trace semantics of malware using the trace-slicing method
and trace simplifications (presented in Definitions 5.1 and 5.2), which we call
semantic traces. A semantic trace is a simple representation of a simulation trace
that is produced by simulating program instructions with a given program input.
As we will show in Section 5.2, the detection method, which we refer to as semantic
trace matching, benefits from the trace representation and it can match variants
of malware under the presence of code obfuscation transformations. The following
are the definitions that are used in the steps we take to generate our semantic
signatures of known malware programs.
We define a simplification function αsem that removes any state from a given trace
t that does not change the environment or memory of program variables (i.e. the
environment E and memory M of program registers and memory locations).
Definition 5.1 (Semantic simplification αsem). Given a simulation trace t ∈
S∗, t =< s0, . . . , si > of a program P where 0 ≤ i < |t|, si = (csi , ξsi) and
ξsi = (ρsi ,msi), the function αsem : S
∗ → S∗ removes program states si from t




′) if i ≥ 0, t = sit′, ρsi 6= ρsi+1 , mi 6= msi+1
αsem(t
′) if i ≥ 0, t = sit′, ρsi = ρsi+1 , mi = msi+1
< > if t =< > (empty trace)
The following simplification function, αe, takes a simulation trace and retains only
the information about the execution contexts of the trace:
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Definition 5.2 (Execution Context simplification αe). Given a simulation
trace t =< s0, . . . , si > where 0 ≤ i < |t| and si = (csi , ξsi), the function αe
removes all information about commands that are simulated and produces only




′) if t = (csi , ξsi)t
′
< > if t =< > (empty trace)
Definition 5.3 (Semantic Traces). A semantic trace of a program P is produced
by applying the simplification αe to a simulation trace t of P , i.e. t
′ = αe(t). We
use the term semantic states to denote the elements in the semantic trace (i.e. the
execution contexts).
Now we present our semantic signature, which is produced by applying the trace-
slicing algorithm and the simplification functions on a simulation trace. Given a
simulation trace of length k and for all data manipulators that have been defined in
the trace (i.e. ∀dm ∈ man[[t′]], dpk(dm) 6= ∅ (not empty) (Chapter 4)), our trace-
based malware detector uses TSAlgo to compute trace slices with respect to the
data manipulators. Thus, the trace-slicing algorithm, given in Chapter 4, accepts
several slicing queries from the detector where each query consists of a slicing
criterion tsc = (dm, k) and produces a trace slice, TSAlgo : (dm, k)→ slice. Then
the command information are removed from the set of trace slices to form the
semantic traces. We create a semantic signature for a known malware program
by including the set of semantic traces, denoted by τ , of slices with the program
input x of the simulation trace t.
Definition 5.4 (Semantic Signature). Given a known malware variant M and
a program input x ∈ I, a semantic signature is a pair of simplified, sliced traces
and a program input that is produced by the following steps:
1. Generate a simulation trace t of the malwareM with x, semsim : (M, x)→ t,
and k = |t| − 1.
2. Apply the simplification αsem on the trace t, αsem : t→ t′.
3. Slice the simulation trace and produce a set of trace slices, slices: ∀dm ∈
man[[t′]], dpk(dm) 6= ∅, tsc = (dm, k), TSAlgo : (t′, tsc)→ slices
4. Apply the simplification αe on the set slices to produce semantic traces,
αe : slices→ τ .
Chapter 5. Semantic Trace Matching 102
5. Then a semantic signature of M is
sig = (τ, x)
Mapping Semantic Traces Given a known malware program M , its semantic
signature sig = (τ, x), a suspicious program P and the semantic trace of P , tp,
that is produced using the program input x from sig, we say that P is a variant
of M if τ is contained in tp. In particular, for the execution context updates
(states) in each semantic trace in the known malware program signature we look
for corresponding semantic states in tp, ∀t ∈ τ , where t is mapped to tp such that
t ⊆ tp; i.e. a sub-trace inclusion match in which for each t we identify whether the
sequence of nodes (the evolution of execution contexts) in τ exists in tp. Moreover,
to show the effectiveness of the semantic signatures, we use a single semantic trace
(i.e. produced only by applying the abstraction functions on the simulation trace)
for a known malware to match against semantic traces of suspicious programs. We
developed an algorithm that takes a pair of semantic traces and determines if one
trace of a suspicious program corresponds semantically to the other trace (of a
known malware program). We use the algorithm to iteratively map the semantic
traces (the slices) in the set τ to tp. The method is discussed in Section 5.2.
Malware Variant Detector Our malware detection system, which includes
three phases: simulation, signature generation and mapping semantic traces, acts
as a malware variant detector MD. The detector takes as its input a signature
sig = (τm, x) of a known malware program M and a suspicious program P and it
determines whether P may be a variant of M :
MD(sig, P ) =
{
yes if ∀t ∈ τm, t is contained in tp
no otherwise
5.1.2 The Architecture of the Detection System
In developing the trace-based detection system, which can process executable bi-
naries, extract semantic signatures and identify malicious code variants, we built
an architecture with three main components: an input extractor, semantic simu-
lator and signature analyser. Figure 5.1 on page 104 shows the architecture of the
trace-based malware variant detection system.
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Signature Analyser. This component determines whether the semantic sig-
nature, generated by the simulator, contains the signature of a malware family.
Thereby, the analyser determines if the input program is a variant of a previ-
ously known malware. The analyser maintains and uses a database of malware
signatures. This component runs a signature-matching algorithm based on se-
mantic trace mapping and program variants comparison. Details can be found in
Section 5.2
Input Extractor. This component transforms an executable binary object into
an AAPL code representation. An AAPL program is an intermediate form of the
extracted assembly program of the input. We define the syntax and semantics
of AAPL in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1). The binary executable is disassembled into
assembly code using off-the-shelf disassembler tools. We implemented a program
called asm2aapl, which translates an assembly program into an AAPL program.
Different assembly code syntax such as in Intel and AT&T assembly languages
can be represented in AAPL. Section 5.3 discusses the details of our translator.
Semantic Simulator. This component takes AAPL code, evaluates its instruc-
tions and generates semantic traces. The simulator evaluates the program based
on a set of states (a random program input) for the program environment (i.e.
initial memory and register values, system call return values). We include a pro-
cedure to generate a random program input for each known malware signature.
Section 5.4 describes the simulator in detail.
5.2 Signature Matching
The signature analyser in Figure 5.1 on the next page implements the signature-
matching mechanism. Trace mapping and program variant comparison are two
algorithms that we developed for signature matching.
5.2.1 Mapping Semantic Traces
The objective of the mapping process is to automatically identify a correspon-
dence between program states (nodes) of two semantic traces. The two semantic
traces are produced by collecting the simulation traces of two program variants.






























Figure 5.1: The architecture of the Trace-based Malware Detection System.
The outcome of the system is either “yes” for a successful detection of a mal-
ware variant or “no” otherwise.
We assume that the variants of the program were created by applying semantics-
preserving program transformations [CTL98]. In establishing a map between a
pair of semantic traces it is our objective to provide an algorithm that produces
complete and correct results. By complete, we mean that our algorithm finds as
many true mappings as possible and by correct, we mean the algorithm finds only
true mappings as we show later in the evaluation section (Section 5.5), that our de-
tector reports no false positives (i.e. no benign programs are detected as malicious)
and few false negatives (i.e. a file from a malware family is misidentified).
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Our method uses the known malware signature and a semantic trace produced
from a suspicious code variant. The method establishes a correspondence between
the program states by examining the semantic details of individual states in both
traces. The mapping process has three main steps:
Semantic simplification. Our matching method begins by using the simpli-
fication function αsem (Definition 5.1) to remove redundant program states (i.e.
execution contexts) in a semantic trace of a suspicious program. During the sim-
plification step, if a state (e.g. si) is found to contain similar semantic details (i.e.
execution contexts) as the next state (i.e. si+1) in the sequence (i.e. trace) then
the state si will be abstracted away from the trace.
State matching. For each given program state in the trace, the semantic value
is produced, i.e. the execution context. The semantic values are used to compare
two program states, so as to identify potential mappings or exclude mappings of
states.
Trace mapping. Given a pair of ordered sets of unique program states, we in-
troduced an iterative algorithm to establish mappings between the states (nodes).
For each state in the first set (the semantic trace of a known malware), the algo-
rithm identifies a correspondence candidate state in the other set (the semantic
trace of a suspicious program). We consider that the semantic trace of a known
malware m is contained in the trace of a suspicious program m′ if a large number
of semantic states (nodes) in the trace of m are matched with states in the trace
of m′. We use the outcome of the trace-mapping step to measure the similarity
percentage between the pair of traces. With the similarity measure, we can dis-
tinguish between matched and unmatched traces during the signature-matching
phase.
Next, we will discuss the details of how the semantic values of program states are
used in the state-matching step. Then we discuss the details of the trace-mapping
algorithm.
5.2.1.1 State Matching
Before we present our algorithm for mapping a pair of semantic traces from two
program variants, we introduce the matching step between a pair of program exe-
cution contexts, which we call semantic states. A semantic state is a simplification
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of a program state that contains only the information about the execution context
(after applying the simplification function αe to a simulation trace), i.e. a semantic
state s = ξs ∈ X where s = ξs = (ρs,ms). The mapping algorithm establishes
mappings between two semantic traces based on the successful matches of states.
When the state-matching step matches a pair of semantic states, it essentially
compares the semantic values produced by both states. The semantic values pro-
duced by a state can either represent an environment value ρ or memory value m.
Since our mapping step deals with semantic traces of obfuscated program variants,
program syntax, i.e. commands, may be altered and also some program variables
may be replaced with different ones. Thus, establishing an exact match between
semantic states is unlikely to succeed. Therefore our state-matching step uses the
results computed from individual instructions and ignores command syntax such
that the derived semantic results can be easily matched even if program obfusca-
tions have affected the corresponding instructions. For semantic traces with long
state sequences, it is unlikely to map traces based on semantic results of states
that do not correspond to each other. However, there is a chance of false (i.e.
coincidental) mappings between a pair of semantic traces with very short state se-
quences. Thus, to avoid such false mappings, our state-matching method consists
of the following semantic components of the execution context:
Environment values (ρ ∈ E). To match the environments of semantic states,
the environment values are extracted from states and represented as single values
ρ ∈ E . Each environment of a semantic state s returns a single value (ρs), which
represents the evaluated data value of a data manipulator (i.e. the output) at that
particular state. For instance, the output of the semantic state which corresponds
to the evaluation of the instruction POP r7 is the environment value of r7, i.e.
ρ(r7); the pop command retrieves the data from the stack into the r7 register.
When matching a pair of semantic states, we look for a match in the evaluated
data values of both states. Given two states s1 and s2 with their output data
values ρ1 and ρ2, respectively, we consider that s1 matches s2 if the value of ρ1 is
equal to the value of ρ2.
Memory values (m ∈ M). When we match memories of semantic states, we
are unlikely to find true matches of memory addresses between states of semantic
traces of both variants. That is because the memory locations of two program
variants may vary at runtime. Also, matching the offsets of the memory address
of both variants may not be effective in finding matches because we assume that
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programs might incorporate dynamic code generation and code reordering tech-
niques to execute new code with a different memory layout (i.e. offset). Therefore,
memory values m ∈ M are used to establish matches between corresponding se-
mantic states instead. For instance, the output of the instruction *r1:=r2+m is
the data m(r1) stored at the memory address specified by the operand r1. Mem-
ory addresses are only used to obtain the memory values of data manipulators in
states where memory updates have been performed. The memory match step is
performed between a pair of semantic states that have updated (outputted) mem-
ory values. The comparison generated values in M can be performed in the same
fashion as that for values in E.
5.2.1.2 Trace Mapping
This section describes the trace-mapping algorithm and how the algorithm es-
tablishes mappings between a pair of semantic traces of a known malware and
a candidate malware variant. As stated at the start of the chapter, the goal is
to map two trace variants of a malware where another variant may have been
produced via some code transformations (obfuscation). Semantics-preserving pro-
gram obfuscations can have significant effects on program syntax. In particular,
obfuscating transformations may rename program registers, add irrelevant com-
mands to the original program, e.g. garbage, system call and opaque predicates,
or some transformations may split, reorder or merge commands. Table 5.1 on the
following page contains some code transformation techniques deployed in creating
new program variants.
Figure 5.2 on page 109 illustrates obfuscation effects on program syntax. In this
figure each program command is labelled by a letter. New commands that have
been introduced in the program variant are labelled with the obfuscation that was
used to create them. Corresponding commands in the original and obfuscated
variants are labelled, for example, as g and g′, respectively. We use subscripts
to show the correspondence between one command in one variant and multiple
instructions in the other variant. Figure 5.3 on page 110 shows the generated
simulation traces of the program variants p and p′ with respect to program input
x = (5, 6). Note that due to the obfuscation effects on p′, the simulation trace
t′x of p
′ contains more states than the trace tx of the original program. However,
with our trace-mapping method, a match could be established between a pair of
semantic traces of two program variants.
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Label Category Obfuscation
gi Garbage insertion {} → {C}
sc System call {} → {api}
op Opaque predicate {} → {P T/F}
ec Equivalent command {op} → {o¯p}
rr Register renaming {Rx} → {Ry}
cs Command split {C} → {Cx, Cy}
cm Command merging {Cx, Cy} → {Cxy}
cr Command reorder {(Cx, Cy)} → {(Cy, Cx)}
Table 5.1: Obfuscating transformations.
Algorithm 5.1 on page 112 is our trace-mapping algorithm (TraceMapping), which
was developed to identify mappings between the semantic traces of two variants of
a program that use malware obfuscating transformations. Given a pair of semantic
traces (tm, tm′) for two program instances m and m
′, the algorithm begins by
first generating two ordered lists of semantic states worklistA and worklistB by
applying the semantic simplification αsem on tm and tm′ , respectively. For instance,
Figure 5.4 on page 111 shows the semantic traces tp and tp′ that are produced
by applying the simplification functions αe and αsem on the simulation traces in
Figure 5.3 on page 110. Note that after applying αsem on t
′
x of the obfuscated
program variant, the program states cr1, cr2 and op1 are removed from tp′ . Then
the algorithm begins to establish a correspondence between the semantic states
(elements in the lists) by examining the semantic information in the semantic
traces of the two malware variants. The output values of the semantic states in
each trace, tp and tp′ , are extracted and shown in Figure 5.4 on page 111. The
matching in Algorithm 5.1 on page 112 consists of a single pass over worklistA
and for each element in worklistA a corresponding matching state in worklistB is
determined, and the Mappedlist is appended with the matched pair. A semantic
check between a pair of elements is performed by calling the state-matching
procedure in step 15 in Algorithm 5.1 on page 112, which is an implementation
of the state-matching algorithm presented in Section 5.2.1.1. The trace-mapping
(TraceMapping) algorithm used is a form of sub-trace inclusion match, in which for
the known malware program’s semantic trace tm, the algorithm identifies whether
the sequence of semantic states in tm occurs in the candidate malware variant
trace tm′ , i.e. tm ⊆ tm′ , possibly with the interpolation of irrelevant semantic
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Figure 5.2: A sample program (a) and its variant (b), after applying program
obfuscation techniques from Table 5.1.
states introduced by obfuscation artefacts. Figure 5.5 on page 111 shows the
mappings between the corresponding program states in semantic traces tp and tp′
of the program variants (in Figure 5.2). Since a malware signature contains a set
of semantic traces (slices) τm, the trace-mapping algorithm is applied to determine
if each trace in τm is contained in the semantic trace of a suspicious code tp. Next
(in Section 5.2.2) we define a function to measure the degree of similarity between
two semantic traces and determine if a program is a variant of a known malware
with respect to a single semantic trace.
5.2.2 Program Variant Comparison
Given a program input x, we assume that for two semantically equivalent program
variantsm andm′ (possibly an obfuscated variant ofm), thatm ≡ m′ ifm′ exhibits
the same behaviour as m and m′ has already produced more program states than
m for the input x. Thus, the semantic trace t′m of m
′ contains more states than
the semantic trace tm ∈ τm of m. We consider that the semantic trace of m is a
subsequence of m′, i.e. a large number of semantic states (nodes) in tm are matched
with states in tm′ . We define the term similarity percentage function between two
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tx :
a r0:=5, (ρa,ma)
b r1:=6, (ρb(r0 7→ 5),mb)
c r2:=r1⊕r1, (ρc(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6),mc)
d r3:=r1+r0, (ρd(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0),md)
e r2:=r1+9, (ρe(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0, r3 7→ 11),me)
f r4:=r3-r2, (ρf (r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 6 + 5),mf )
g JMP . . ., (ρg(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb, r4 7→ 4),mg)
t′x :
rr1 r10:=5, (ρrr1 ,mrr1)
cr1 JMP rr2, (ρcr1(r10 7→ 5),mcr1)
rr2 r11:=6, (ρrr2(r10 7→ 5),mrr2)
gi2 r22:=r11+1, (ρgi2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6),mgi2)
ec r2:=0, (ρec(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7),mec)
cr2 JMP op1, (ρcr2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0),mcr2)
op1 P
T JMP cm, (ρop1(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0),mop1)
d′ r3:=r11+r10, (ρcm(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0),mcm)
e′1 r2:=9, (ρe′1(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0, r3 7→ 0xb),me′1)
e′2 r2:=r11+r2, (ρe′2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 9, r3 7→ 0xb),me′2)
rr2 r4:=r3-r2, (ρrr2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb),mrr2)
g′ JMP . . ., (ρg(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb, r4 7→ 4),mg)
Figure 5.3: tx and t
′
x are simulation traces of programs p and p
′, respectively,
(in Figure 5.2 on the preceding page); both traces are generated using program
input x = (5, 6) for n and m, respectively.
given semantic traces to determine the percentage of matched nodes between two
given semantic traces as
similarity percentage = |mappedlist|/|t|
where mappedlist is the set of mapped states between two given semantic traces in
Algorithm 5.1 on page 112, and t is the semantic trace of the known (unobfuscated)
program variant, e.g. m. For instance, for the mappings established between the
pair of semantic traces in Figure 5.5 on the following page, the number of matched
state pairs, i.e. |mappedlist|, is 6 and the length of tp of the (unobfuscated) pro-
gram variant is |tp| = 7. Thus, the similarity percentage of mapping semantic
traces of p and p′ is 85.7%. In the case of using a single semantic trace in the
signature of a known malware (see Section 5.5.2.1), we consider a program to
be a variant of a malware program if the similarity percentage of mapped states
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tp semantic state output:(ρ,m)
a (ρa,ma) (5,−)
b (ρb(r0 7→ 5),mb) (6,−)
c (ρc(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6),mc) (0,−)
d (ρd(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0),md) (0xb,−)
e (ρe(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0, r3 7→ 0xb),me) (0xf,−)
f (ρf (r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb),mf ) (4,−)
g (ρg(r0 7→ 5, r1 7→ 6, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb, r4 7→ 4),mg) (−,−)
tp′ semantic state output:(ρ,m)
rr1 (ρrr1 ,mrr1) (5,−)
rr2 (ρrr2(r10 7→ 5),mrr2) (6,−)
gi2 (ρgi2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6),mgi2) (7,−)
ec (ρec(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7),mec) (0,−)
d′ (ρcm(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0),mcm) (0xb,−)
e′1 (ρe′1(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0, r3 7→ 0xb),me′1) (9,−)
e′2 (ρe′2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 9, r3 7→ 0xb),me′2) (0xf,−)
rr2 (ρrr2(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb),mrr2) (4,−)
g′ (ρg(r10 7→ 5, r11 7→ 6, r22 7→ 7, r2 7→ 0xf, r3 7→ 0xb, r4 7→ 4),mg) (−,−)
Figure 5.4: The semantic traces tp and tp′ are generated by applying αe and
αsem to tx and t
′
x, respectively, of Figure 5.3 on the preceding page. An output
of each semantic state (ρ,m) is extracted for mapping program states.
a fc gb ed




Figure 5.5: Mapping program states of trace variants in Figure 5.4. Since
there are no values produced at program state g, a map with its corresponding
program state in tp′ could not be established.
between their semantic traces in the semantic trace mapping is above a certain
similarity threshold k,
k ≤ similarity percentage ≤ 100
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Algorithm 5.1: TraceMapping(t,t′) maps semantic traces of two program
variants.
1: Input: a pair of semantic traces t and t′ of a known malware program and a
suspicious program, respectively.
2: Output: a list of pairs of mapped program states mappedlist
3: procedure state-matching is described in Section 5.2.1.1
4: αsem is presented in Definition 5.1
5: first index(l) returns the first index in list l
6: worklistA: an ordered list of unique program states
7: worklistB: an ordered list of unique program states
8: begin TraceMapping(t,t′)
9: perform semantic simplification process on both traces t and t′:
10: worklistA→ αsem(t)
11: worklistB → αsem(t′)
12: set all elements in worklistA as unvisited:
13: i = first index(worklistA)
14: while worklistA[i] 6= empty do
15: j = first index(worklistB)
16: while worklistB[j] 6= ⊥ and match = false do
17: if state-matching(worklistA[i],worklistB[j]) then
18: match = true




23: if match = false then





where k represents a large percentage of (desired) state mappings between a pair of
semantic traces. Moreover, when comparing a suspicious program using a malware
signature that contains a set of semantic traces, we apply TraceMapping and
calculate the similarity percentage between each trace in the signature and the
semantic trace t′m of a suspicious program. That is, we consider m
′ is a variant
of m if ∀tm ∈ τm, the similarity percentage of tm (w.r.t t′m) is above threshold
k. The prototype implementation and results section (Section 5.5) discusses the
selection process for k. In the ideal case, we would expect to have a 100% mapping
(similarity) from tm to tm′ where (|tm| ≤ |tm′|) for two semantically equivalent
program variants. However, this case is rarely achievable and it is illustrated by the
example in Figure 5.5 on the previous page and demonstrated by the experimental











Figure 5.6: Implementation of the input extractor module. Solid-line boxes
represent off-the-shelf tools.
results in Section 5.5. The reason is that a program variant might be altered by
obfuscation techniques that introduce new instructions.
5.3 Input Extraction
Figure 5.6 shows the basic blocks of our automatic input extractor module (IEM),
which is a three-stage process. First, the program has to be prepared for disas-
sembly (e.g. by removing dynamic packing or decrypting the code) so that the
potentially malicious binary code is exposed. Then, the resulting binary code is
passed to a disassembler to produce assembly code. Third, the assembly code
detail is abstracted and an AAPL representation of the code is generated. The
first two steps of IEM are implemented using existing tools whereas for the third
step, we developed a translator (called asm2aapl), which transforms assembly in-
structions into a simple form of AAPL commands. This step abstracts away some
simple obfuscation operations and creates a file in a format that is acceptable for
the semantic simulator.
5.3.1 Binary Code Extraction
Malware writers use executable packing tools to hide their malicious code from
anti-malware scanners. According to some anti-virus (AV) reports [Symantec,
BitDefender], code-packing techniques (i.e. compression and encryption) are used
in 75% of all malware executables. Executable packing tools such as Ultimate
Packer for eXecutable (UPX) [upx10] and FSG [fsg] compress the binary pro-
gram in order to save bandwidth or memory space. These tools compress/encrypt
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a binary executable and append an extraction/decryption routine to the com-
pressed/encrypted object file. The packer routine is activated at runtime when
it decompresses/decrypts the original object code. With a packed binary file, we
need to unpack it first and get hold of the original binary object representation.
A packed file can be processed by either of two methods: the first method is to
execute the packed file and, thus, allow the packer routine to unpack and to out-
put the original executable file. The second method is to use packing tools. We
prefer to use the second method as it is a more efficient and reliable way to unpack
malware samples. We have selected the UPX packer tool, as it is one of the most
commonly used packers in wild malware variants [Res08, SVBY10].
5.3.2 Code Disassembly
Once the binary file has been unpacked and the original suspicious executable is
obtained, the machine-level code can be extracted (i.e. disassembled). In general,
there are two main approaches for disassembling binary executables. The first
approach is a linear sweep where the disassembler decodes every sequence of binary
code in the file in a strict sequence, starting at the entry point of the program,
assuming that each sequence of binary code (i.e. instruction) is aligned to the next.
The second approach, which is called recursive traversal, decodes each basic block
of instructions and determines the control flow of the program by decoding the
target address of each branch instruction. In our implementation, IDAPro [Res]
is used to disassemble the binary executable of the suspicious file. IDAPro is a
state-of-the-art recursive traversal disassembler, which deploys several heuristics
and library (API) signatures to resolve imported kernel calls.
Note that extracting a correct syntactical representation of disassembled code can
heavily impact upon any malware detection methods based on static analysis. This
is because some code obfuscation techniques introduced at this level can hinder
successful disassembly. For instance, Linn and Debray [LD03] introduced various
anti-disassembling obfuscation methods that are specifically designed to make the
disassembly of executable code more difficult. Handling such anti-disassembly ob-
fuscations is possible but our method does not. Moreover, from our observations
of existing malware variants, we believe the use of these advanced obfuscations in
malware is currently minimal. The majority of executable virus, trojan and worm
variants are not distributed with any anti-disassembling obfuscation techniques















Figure 5.7: Implementation of asm2aapl translator module.
besides the use of executable packers. Thus, we assume that malware code is pro-
duced either by compiling a high-level code using an industry standard compiler
or by writing the program in a standard assembly language, and, thus, in both
cases we assume current disassemblers are able to process the produced code suc-
cessfully. Thus, our approach (and any static approach) is limited to what existing
static analysis tools (e.g. disassemblers) provide.
5.3.3 asm2aapl: a Translator
The asm2aapl translator is an important step in our IEM process, it is designed so
that it gives a semantically equivalent simple code of a disassembled executable.
The objective of the translator is to analyse assembly code and generate AAPL
code, which represents the machine-level operations in a simple and intuitive form.
We view this step as a way to transform a given assembly code, which may in-
clude simple superfluous commands, into a simple, canonical representation that
captures the semantics of program operations and is expressive of a large set of
assembly programming instructions. By having malicious executables with dif-
ferent syntactic formats translated into normal form representations, we believe
that our detection approach can be leveraged to capture semantic traces and to
detect malware variants. Figure 5.7 shows the components of the translator. The
source code of the translator can be found in [Alz10a]. The asm2aapl translator
consists of four stages: lexical analysis, syntactic analysis, semantic analysis and
AAPL code generation. All four stages are written in Python and extensive use is
made of the Pyparsing Python class library, version 1.5.5 [McG]. We describe our
implementation of the four stages in detail as follows.
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Lexical and Syntactic Analyses. The first and second stages are a standard
process of scanning the input file, generating a sequence of tokens and an abstract
syntax tree (AST). Both stages are implemented using the Pyparsing module,
which features a set of classes to construct grammar rules. The Pyparsing classes
are straightforward to use as an alternative to the lex/yacc approach or the use
of regular expressions. During the lexical analysis stage, each line of the source
file is tokenised with the help of Pyparsing into two token types: instruction and
label. Comments are stripped out and labels and assembler directives are used
to build a symbol table. The output of the first stage is a list of line tokens.
Each element in the list represents a sequence of tokens describing the types and
values for the corresponding line of the input file. The list is then processed
during the second stage (syntactic analysis) to resolve instructions, labels, data
and register formats and to produce an abstract syntax tree of the parsed code.
The syntactic analysis stage performs a “top–bottom” approach to parse the token
list and retains syntactic information, such as procedure labels, and the start
and end boundaries of data. During this stage, the translator can generate error
messages for unrecognised syntax, which then can be handled by identifying the
syntax and incorporating suitable AAPL syntax. The output of the second stage
is an abstract syntax tree (AST).
Semantic Analysis and Code Generation. This component contains a set of
semantics-preserving translation rules, which are used to examine the AST and
extract the semantic details of the assembly instructions. That is, the component
applies semantic rules to each instruction and annotates the AST with semantic
information, which is used by the next step to generate AAPL code. The purpose of
this stage of the translator is to examine the AST produced by the previous stage
and to define a canonical form of the input code in AAPL syntax; by canonical we
mean a standard representation. Specifically, we are interested in producing an
AAPL representation of the machine-level code with the following information:
• Registers, variables and datatype information (e.g. base and pointer types)
• Data assignment operations
• Instructions for arithmetic and bitwise operations
• Instructions for operations over the stack
• Control flow operations (e.g. call, return, loop, conditional, unconditional
jump commands)
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40143e: mov eax,DWORD PTR [esi]
401440: mov edx,DWORD PTR [eax]





401448: mov DWORD PTR [eax],eax











401438: r6 = r6 + 1
401439:
40143c: ( r6 != 0x64 ) jmp 0x40142a
40143e: r17 = *r4
401440: r6 = *r17





401448: *r17 = r17
40144a: *(r17 + 0x4) = r17
40144d: rtn
40144e: r17 = r17
401450: push r3
401451: push r4
401452: r4 = r6
401454: r3 = r17
401456: call 0x4013f8
40145b:
40145d: ( r17 != r17 ) jmp 0x401464
40145f: r17 = r17 ^ r17
Figure 5.8: A fragment of an assembly .asm file and its AAPL file from the
Bho (win32) virus code.
• Instructions for operations over the environment (e.g. system calls)
Special instructions (i.e. system instructions) for optimisation and control opera-
tions over the processor (CPU) are not handled by our tool. System instructions,
such as halt – halting processor, are implemented to manage and control the pro-
cessor’s functionalities [Int90, Int]. Also, the multimedia (MMX) instruction set
(and MMX registers) are not covered in our AAPL syntax. The MMX is an exten-
sion to Intel’s standard instruction set and it is implemented to greatly increase
performance of the execution of programs related to digital signal processing and
graphics processing applications. Our tool deals with malicious programs that
are possibly variants of known malware code which do not in general incorporate
MMX instruction set. However, our tool can be amended to handle MMX in-
structions as malware authors could use this technology to enhance their future
malware variants [Sop09].
Figure 5.8 shows a fragment assembly code of the Bho virus variant in x86 Intel
format (i.e. IA-32) and its translation into AAPL. Note that each line in the as-
sembly code may represent a valid instruction. Each line of code is divided into
three distinct columns or fields, as in the fragment in the figure. The first, second
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and third columns (from left to right) in the assembly code represent labels, oper-
ations and the operands of the instructions, respectively. Labels are optional and
are used to represent the locations (or names) for a section of code or data. Labels
are preserved in the AAPL code. The translation process of the assembly code that
appears in Figure 5.8 on the previous page seems intuitive, but generating the
AAPL form of an assembly code requires the construction of a set of formal rules.
We implemented translation rules based on the Intel Architecture (IA-32, Intel
Syntax) [Int]. Table 5.2 on the following page gives a subset of the translation
rules for assembly instructions.
We map assembly registers (33 registers for Intel Architecture 32-bit (x86) [Int])
into a table of AAPL registers. For instance, we map the general-purpose regis-
ter eax to r17 where number 17 corresponds to eax in the register table. The
datatype information of AAPL instruction operands are designed to accommodate
32 bit unsigned integers (i.e. DWORD unsigned values) as contemporary Intel proces-
sors are oriented toward operations over 32-bit numbers. Note that we could have
one-to-one, many-to-one and one-to-many instruction translations. A one-to-one
translation occurs when a single AAPL instruction corresponds to one assembly
instruction. A many-to-one translation occurs when several (more than one) in-
structions in the AAPL code correspond to one instruction in the assembly code.
For instance, in Figure 5.8 on the previous page, two assembly instructions at
labels 401439 and 40143c are translated to a single “normal” AAPL instruction
i.e.
{cmp edx,0x64; jne 0x40142a} → {( r6 != 0x64 ) jmp 0x40142a}
Since the above two assembly instructions (cmp, jne) together subtract the operands
without changing their values and branch to the target location 0x40142a if the
flag register is not set, the translator generates the AAPL conditional instruction
that provides equivalent semantics to the jump operation.
The code generation stage takes the processed AST, the generated semantic infor-
mation and stores the AAPL instructions in a file. For the code and data segments
of a program, all data are stored in the same sequence as they appeared in the
source code.
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Rule Semantics asm → AAPL
r1 Load the effective address in
m to reg.
lea reg,m → reg:=m
r2 Load the data to or from the
register, memory or imme-
diate operand.
mov dst,src → dst:=src
r3 Add data to or from reg or
m or imm.
add dst,src → dst:= dst + src
r4 Sets each bit of dst to the
result of an exclusive or op-
eration of the corresponding
bits of the two operands.
xor dst,src → dst:=dst & src
r5 Load the result of multiply-
ing al by reg or m to ax.
mul src → r40:=r10×src
r6 Compare and jump if equal. cmp dst, src
je target
→ (dst==src) jmp target
r7
Exchange data between reg-








and its extension (edx,eax)
by the divisor src (32-bit).
Load the quotient and the
remainder to eax and edx’s
extension, respectively,







Table 5.2: Application of the translation rules (partial list) of assembly in-
struction syntax to AAPL code. Note that reg, m and imm denote a register,
operand located in memory and immediate operand (constant), respectively.
5.4 Semantic Simulator (SemSim)
The semantic simulator (SemSim) is a program which statically evaluates AAPL
code, and produces the effects of the code evaluation in a form of a semantic
trace. The simulator is a software tool that simulates the execution of a malicious
program and captures the outcome of a simulated execution without harming or
contaminating the host system. The simulator tool is based on AAPL operations.
The abstract machine-level (AAPL syntax is presented in Figure 4.1 on page 63)
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Semantic TraceAAPL File
Evaluation Module
               Environment list
Simulation Environment
  Instruction Evaluation









(detection step) Program Input(signature gen. step)
Figure 5.9: Architecture of SemSim. In the signature-generation step, Sem-
Sim takes an AAPL file as an input and outputs a trace and a program input;
In the detection step, SemSim takes an AAPL file and a program input as an
input and outputs a trace as an output.
approach is chosen for the development of the semantic simulator because it par-
ticularly fits the purpose of evaluating executable malicious code and capturing its
approximate semantics. Most malware variants are reproduced and distributed as
executable objects; thus, an effective approach in detecting malicious code variants
would be to produce and examine suspected machine-level code. Since AAPL code
is an approximate representation of the malicious executable program under test,
the goal of our semantic simulation approach is to handle the intermediate repre-
sentation (e.g. AAPL) of executables and to perform simulations of the program
execution and to generate semantic traces from the simulations. Our semantic
simulator takes a known malware program during the signature generation step
(i.e. AAPL code) as input and simulates the code based on a random configuration
of program variables. At the end of the simulation process of a known malware,
SemSim generates a set of semantic traces and a program input as a semantic
signature of the known malware program. However, during the detection phase,
SemSim accepts, as an input, a candidate malware variant and the program input
that is part of the signature of a known malware. Figure 5.9 shows the architecture
of SemSim and its input and output parameters for the signature-generation and
detection steps.
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In order to process the AAPL program input and compute semantic traces, the
semantic simulation (SemSim) tool comprises three main modules: the evaluation
module, a simulation environment and trace collection.
The Evaluation Module (EM) EM includes a set of evaluative procedures,
which process AAPL program commands, and a procedure to generate program
inputs. The evaluative procedures implement the evaluation rules of the AAPL
commands; the semantics are shown in Figure 4.2. The AAPL command set that is
handled by our semantic simulator includes commands for data assignment, arith-
metic, boolean and program control operations. Moreover, a variety of addressing
modes typically available for use in an assembly language are also implemented for
AAPL command evaluation in the tool. Table 5.3 on page 123 lists the formats of
the addressing modes that can be used for AAPL code. For each AAPL command
to be evaluated, EM performs the following steps:
1. Find the values of program data manipulators which are used (read) by the
command (Algorithm 5.2 on page 124)
2. Identify the command type (i.e. conditional or action command)
3. Evaluate the command according to its semantics (Figure 4.2 on page 64)
4. Update the program environment and memory lists
5. Update the program input list (Algorithm 5.3 on page 125)
6. Update the PC register to contain the location of the next command to be
evaluated
The objective of Algorithm 5.2 on page 124 is to compute the current values of pro-
gram input data manipulators that are required to simulate program commands in
EM. The main procedure in the algorithm is find dm value; it accepts four input
parameters: a command c (to be simulated), the current program environment
list, the program memory list and program input list x of the simulation trace t.
The procedure is invoked each time a command is to be evaluated (in Step 5 in
Algorithm 5.4 on page 126). For each given program command c (instruction), the
procedure find dm value computes the value of each data manipulator dm that
is used (read) in c. First, the procedure finds all the program input data manip-
ulators that are referenced in the command c and store them in the list use list
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(line 9). Then the algorithm (in a for loop) computes the current value for each
data manipulator in use list and stores these values in the list value list (lines 12
to 26). If dm has already been defined during the simulation, then the procedure
returns the value of dm from the current program environment or memory in the
case of a register or a memory address, i.e. in lines 13 and 19, respectively. How-
ever, if a program input data manipulator has no previous defined value, i.e. dm
has not been defined since the start of the program simulation, then the proce-
dure gets a new generated value (by procedure compute value, in line 29) and
initialises dm in the current environment or memory with the new value, lines 16
and 22, respectively.
In procedure compute value (in Algorithm 5.2 on page 124), the computation
of a new value for an undefined program input data manipulator can be per-
formed under two cases: first (in line 30), if the simulation is performed during
the signature-generation step (i.e. constructing a semantic signature for a known
malware program) then the new value is generated by calling a random data gen-
erator, get random value, in Algorithm 5.3 on page 125. Second (in line 33),
if the simulation is performed during the detection step, then the new value is
extracted from the program input x of the given malware signature (procedure
get program input() in Algorithm 5.3 on page 125). The simulation terminates
if list x is empty and no values can be provided to evaluate the candidate program
variant. The program under the detection step is considered a benign file with
respect to the malware signature used.
The objective of Algorithm 5.3 on page 125 is to provide the value of a program
input data manipulator for Algorithm 5.2 on page 124. The algorithm consists of
two main procedures: get random value (in line 3) and get program value (in
line 11). The algorithm takes and updates a list. A program input x is treated as a
list, consisting of a sequence of values. The procedure get random value generates
a random 32-bit unsigned integer (stored as hexadecimal) value n and appends n to
the program input list x (e.g. x.append(n)). Thus, at the end of the simulation run
of a known malware program, SemSim outputs the program input list x as a part
of the semantic signature of the malware. During the detection step, the procedure
get program value in Algorithm 5.3 on page 125 extracts (and removes) the first
input value n, as required by find dm value, from x (e.g. x.remove(n)). As
we discuss potential approaches that could defeat our approach in Section 5.5.3,
creating a new malware variant that contains new irrelevant program variables
could consume the signature program input values. Thus, during the detection






Table 5.3: Supported addressing modes in the semantic simulator.
phase the detector may not be able to extract the correct simulation trace for the
variant as the input values are used by irrelevant variables.
The Simulation Environment Module (SE) The simulation environment
module consists of the program memory list M, the program environment list E
and a function to simulate API system calls. SE maintains the lists M and E
and interacts with the evaluation module by providing EM with specific semantic
information (values) related to the operands (e.g. program registers, stack pointer
and memory locations) and commands being evaluated. The system environment
(sys env) function is implemented to simulate the system (kernel) calls (APIs) and
their outputs. That is, sys env takes a system call command as an input, checks its
input parameters and returns a set of default values Val for the command output
parameters. Let API denote the set of system calls in the AAPL language. For all
system calls api, we have an output component api.out, which represents the set
of registers that are modified when evaluating an api command. The semantics of
an api command is described in Chapter 4 in Figure 4.2 on page 64. SE produces
a set of possible output values for pre-specified system services. That is, when
the semantic simulator evaluates a system call, SE checks the corresponding input
parameters (registers) that are associated with the system call and returns outputs
to EM. A partial list of system calls and their input and output parameters that
are implemented in SE are shown in Table 5.4 on page 125.
The Trace Collection Module (TC) TC monitors the simulation process and
captures information produced by the evaluation module. When a code sample
is simulated in SemSim, the evaluated information (i.e. a pair of command and
execution context) is captured and added to the simulation trace. Figure 5.4
illustrates how the above components are combined into an iterative algorithm
that allows us to provide semantics-based static simulation of program executables.
The key feature of this algorithm is that program commands in the program path
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Algorithm 5.2: find dm value(c) finds the current values of program data
manipulators used in the program command c with respect to current execu-
tion context (ρ,m).
1: Input: command c to be evaluated, current program environment list ρ ∈ E , current
program memory list m ∈M, program input list x of simulation trace t
2: Output: returns the current values of dm to be used (read) in c
3: procedure find use is presented in Algorithm 4.1 on page 72
4: procedure get random value is presented in Algorithm 5.3 on the next page
5: procedure get program input is presented in Algorithm 5.3 on the following page
6: begin: find dm value(c)
7: for a given program command c (to be evaluated) at position i in t:
8: find all data manipulators (use list) that are used (read) in c at i:
9: use list = find use(i,c)
10: initialise the list of program input values to empty:
11: value list→ ∅
12: for all dm∈use list do
13: if dm is a register then
14: if ρ(dm) = φ then
15: compute a value for dm in the program environment:
16: ρ(dm→ v | v = compute value())
17: end if
18: value list→ value list ∪ ρ(dm)
19: else if dm is a memory address then
20: if m(dm) = φ then
21: compute a value for dm in the program memory:
22: m(dm→ v | v = compute value())
23: end if
24: value list→ value list ∪m(dm)
25: end if
26: end for
27: return value list
28: end: find dm value(c)
29: procedure compute value()
30: if signature generation step then
31: generate a random value and append x
32: v = get random value()
33: else if detection step then
34: extract a program input value from x




are semantically evaluated, the control flow is updated, and only updates to the
trace are recorded.
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System calls Input Output
sys write r3,r6,r17 r6
sys sethostname r3,r15,r17 r17
sys munmap r3,r15,r17 r17
sys ftruncate r3,r15,r17 r17
sys read r3,r6,r15,r17 r6
Table 5.4: A sample of system calls and their I/O parameters (AAPL registers)
implemented in SE for simulating system interactions in a program.
Algorithm 5.3: get random value() and get program value() updates
program input list x with input values for Algorithm 5.2 on the preceding
page.
1: Input: program input list x is used to append and remove a program input value
during signature generation and detection step, respectively.
2: Output: update x and return a value n
3: procedure get random value()
4: this procedure is invoked during the signature generation step to select a random
value for a new program input in x.
5: a data manipulator dm has no value in the current program environment.
6: generate a random value for dm and append the value to x:




11: procedure get program value()
12: this procedure is invoked during the detection step.
13: the procedure extracts (removes) the first input value n from the program input list
x:




18: there exist no values in x and the simulation (the detection step) terminates.
19: end if
20: end procedure
It is possible that the program under simulation may contain a loop or condi-
tional jump operation that may force the simulation to evaluate the program for
a very long time (or infinite time). This will increase the overhead of collecting
trace information. To handle this situation, the TC module triggers the simulator
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Algorithm 5.4: Sketch of the AAPL code simulation algorithm.
1. Load the program into the environment memory
2. Set the label _start as the entry point of the program
3. Load the (valid) address of an instruction line, else
terminate the simulation
4. Parse the instruction line from the memory
5. Evaluate the command at the current line
6. Update the simulation trace with the current program state
7. Compute the valid address of the next point in the program
8. Return to step 3
to terminate the evaluation process if the number of program instructions evalu-
ated so far exceeds a certain limit; we discuss the selection of the threshold for
terminating a program simulation in Section 5.5.1.
For each known malware program that has already been captured and identified,
the TC module generates a semantic signature from the recorded trace. Semantic
signature generation is realised by simulating the execution of the sample program
with a random program input and generating a simulation trace. Then this trace
is sliced by the trace slicer with respect to the set of program data manipulators
defined in the trace. For each data manipulator, the slicer performs a backward
slice from the recent definition position (Definition 4.7 on page 73 in Chapter 4)
of the data manipulator in the trace. The trace slicer applies the trace-slicing
algorithm (Algorithm 4.5 on page 80 in Chapter 4) and produces a set of compact
traces as part of the semantic signature of the malware. To avoid identifying
a benign executable program as a malicious variant of a malware family, i.e. to
minimise the number of false positives in the detection process, the set of traces
within the signature is reduced by removing ineffective traces. An ineffective trace
is a sub-trace that contains fewer semantic states and, hence, is likely to produce
false positive matches. Trace slices with a length above a predefined threshold are
considered to be part of the semantic signature (e.g. we set the acceptable trace
length to 20 program states as a minimum sequence of states in a trace).
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5.5 Prototype Evaluation
Four experiments were conducted with the semantic trace detection system. The
objective of the experiments was to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed tech-
nique to produce semantic signatures and use them to detect program variants in
a malware family. The semantic simulator and the signature analyser are mod-
ules implemented in Python, along with an input extraction component, forming
our malware detector tool. In this section, we discuss details of the prototype
implementation, experimental results and the limitations.
5.5.1 Prototype Setup
The implementation and deployment of the system prototype is realised through
Python classes. The semantic simulator (SemSim) [Alz11] was developed under
Python 2.4.3. The detection system (i.e. asm2aapl, SemSim and the signature
analyser) can be flexibly installed on various operating systems. During the ex-
perimental evaluation of the prototype, it was successfully deployed over diverse
distributions of Linux, namely Debian, Ubuntu and CentOS. The semantic simu-
lator is a two-pass AAPL program simulator. During the first pass, each instruction
line of the source code is tokenised with the help of Pyparsing [McG]. The Py-
parsing module classes are used to construct the AAPL grammar directly in the
simulator module. Comments are stripped out and instruction labels are used to
build register, memory and branch tables. The output of the first pass is a list of
parsed tokens for each instruction of AAPL code and the program tables (registers
and symbol table, memory table and label-branch table). During the second pass,
the evaluation process handles the instruction list and the tables to evaluate the
commands and to generate the trace output for the simulator.
To avoid a very long simulation process when an infinite loop is encountered,
the termination threshold k is defined and set to k = 10, 000 (maximum number
of program instructions to be evaluated) for a simulation run. This allows us
to manage the computing resource and lower the time and space overhead. All
experiments were performed on a machine running an Ubuntu Linux OS, with an
Intel Core 2 Duo processor, and 4 GB of RAM.
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5.5.2 Evaluation
Many malware variants are created with common functionalities, but with dif-
ferent syntactical appearances in an attempt to avoid detection by AV tools. We
evaluate our prototype malware detector against real-world malware variants. Sev-
eral samples of malware and variants can be retrieved from the Internet. For
the experiments, we collected two types of malware variants from the VxHeav-
ens [Hea] website: viruses and worms. These malware samples were developed for
the Windows and Linux operating systems. Originally, the total number of mal-
ware examples considered was around 62 programs (from 12 malware families);
the assembly code of 24 of the samples could not be generated as the off-the-shelf
tools (i.e. UPX and IDAPro) failed to handle the binaries. Of these, the UPX
packer could not successfully unpack 16 of the packed malware files to recover the
binary code. For the other eight excluded programs, IDAPro failed to identify
the functions or produced incorrect function-start addresses in the binary code.
A further 12 of the extracted binary programs produced no or short simulation
traces (e.g. < 10 states) when they were simulated using the input test generated
from their family and so we had to exclude them as the sizes of their semantic
traces were insufficient for detection. Thus, ten malware families were used for
the experiments, consisting of 26 malicious programs. Table 5.5 on page 133 lists
the malware variants that were used to test our detector. These families (out of
12) were considered because (random) test input cases were successfully gener-
ated during the signature-generation step (using Algorithm 5.2 on page 124) for
the malware programs (i.e. known variants) of each family. Also, a collection of
benign executable programs were used to test the system for false positives. The
goals of the evaluation were:
• to extract semantic signatures that can be used to match in-the-wild variants
from the same malware family;
• to demonstrate that the detector can detect new obfuscated malware variants
using the existing semantic signatures of their families;
• to show that the detector produces few false positives when running on benign
programs; and
• to demonstrate that the detector is able to classify malware samples accord-
ing to their families.
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Performance Complexity. During the signature-generation phase, the method
requires O(N) space to store the simulation trace and O(N2) space to store the
dynamic data flow information (DDG), where N is the length of the trace. A
single trace slice from a DDG can be extracted in O(N) time and a semantic trace
can be produced (i.e. applying the abstraction functions) in O(n). During the
detection phase, the complexity of the method consists of the time complexity
of producing a semantic trace from a simulation trace and the time required to
match the trace against a single trace signature. The complexity of applying the
abstraction functions can be calculated as being of O(N) of the simulation trace.
Matching the trace with a signature trace of length M requires O(M.N). When
applying the matching step using a signature with a set of traces (slices) against
a semantic trace of a suspicious program, the time complexity is proportional to
the number of traces and the size of each trace in the signature.
5.5.2.1 Signature Extraction
The process of producing semantic signatures from the input program consists of
the following steps. First, the semantic simulator evaluates an input program (a
known malware), generates a random program input and outputs the simulation
trace of the program simulation. The semantic simplification step reduces the trace
to eliminate any duplicate states within it. Then the trace is sliced using the trace
slicer. The simulation trace is sliced into a set of traces. At the end of the trace
collection process, a data dependence graph (DDG) is constructed using TSAlgo
algorithm (step 1 in Algorithm 4.5). Then for each data manipulator dm defined in
the trace, a call is made to TSAlgo (step 2 in Algorithm 4.5 on page 80) to compute
a trace slice with respect to dm at the end of the simulation trace. The final
step is to abstract away command syntax from each state within the trace slices.
The output of the syntax simplification forms the set of semantic traces, which is
paired with the input program to form a signature of the known malware program.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the process of extracting the semantic traces from a sample
malware program, Binom, using a program input x = (64, 20, 21a, 120, 1f4). The
set of semantic traces is extracted from the simulation trace produced by the
simulator. A signature is represented as a pair of a program input and a set of
semantic traces. Figure 5.10 on page 131(a), Step 1, shows a fragment of the
collected trace from the simulation. In Figure 5.10 on page 131(b), Step 2, the
simplification function αsem has been applied to the simulation trace and two
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program states (states 4 and 8) have been removed from the trace. In Figure 5.10
on the following page(c), Step 3, the trace has then been sliced with respect to the
defined program registers, r17, r3 and r7 at position (state) 13 in t. Finally, in
Figure 5.10 on the next page(d), Step 4, a semantic trace has been produced by
removing the trace syntax from the slices. The total number of states of the Binom
simulation trace is 926. It took 460 milliseconds to produce the semantic traces
(slices) at the end of the simulation. The set of semantic traces in the signature
of Binom consists of 12 traces and the average number of states in each trace slice
is 34. In general, the longer the collected trace, the more time it takes to extract
semantic traces and construct the signatures.
However, to evaluate the effectiveness (speed and detection rates) of semantic
signatures produced by the trace-slicing algorithm, we created and used another
set of signatures that incorporate semantic traces, which are produced without
applying the trace-slicing algorithm. We call these signatures, “sig-wo-slice”. That
is, a sig-wo-slice signature consists of a program input and a semantic trace; the
semantic trace in a sig-wo-slice signature is produced after applying the semantic
(αsem) and context (αe) simplifications to a simulation trace. Figure 5.11 on
page 132 shows a fragment of the semantic trace that is a part of the sig-wo-slice
signature of the Binom family.
5.5.2.2 Detection of In-The-Wild Variants
We used variants from ten malware families (groups of different malware). We used
five variants of Bho, three variants of Binom, Mobler and Rst, and two variants
of Echo, Grip, Lychan, Synk, Tefl and Xone. Each of them has many instances
in the wild, ranging in size from 8 kB to 4.4 MB. For each malware family we
calculated a single semantic signature from an early variant of the malware and
used the signature for detecting the malware variants. For instance, Binom.a is
the first instance of the virus Binom, thus, we considered it as a known malware
program and used it to generate the signature for the whole family and tested
other Binom variants against it.
We analysed each known malware program using our semantic simulator. We ap-
plied the same steps of the signature-generation process to generate the signatures
(i.e. pairs of a program input and a set of semantic traces) of all ten malware
families. We then applied the simulator with the program input, comparing the
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-- STATE 1 --
PUSH r7, (r7=21a)
-- STATE 2 --
r7 =r1, (r7=21a,r1=64)
-- STATE 3 --
r1 = r1 - 0x8, (r7=64,r1=64)
-- STATE 4 --
CALL 80482b4, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 5 --
PUSH r7, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 6 --
r7= r1, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 7 --
PUSH r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 8 --
CALL 80482bd, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
POP r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
r3 = r3 + 0x17b3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 11 --
PUSH r17, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120)
-- STATE 12 --
r17= *(r3-0x4), (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120,
0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 13 --
SKIP, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=1f4,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 14 --
...
(a) Step 1: A simulation trace t generated by Sem-
Sim.
-- STATE 1 --
PUSH r7, (r7=21a)
-- STATE 2 --
r7 =r1, (r7=21a,r1=64)
-- STATE 3 --
r1 = r1 - 0x8, (r7=64,r1=64)
-- STATE 5 --
PUSH r7, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 6 --
r7= r1, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 7 --
PUSH r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
POP r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
r3 = r3 + 0x17b3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 11 --
PUSH r17, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120)
-- STATE 12 --
r17= *(r3-0x4), (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120,
0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 13 --
SKIP, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=1f4,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 14 --
...
(b) Step 2: A trace produced after applying αsem
to t.
-- STATE 7 --
PUSH r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
POP r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
r3 = r3 + 0x17b3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 12 --
r17= *(r3-0x4), (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,
r17=120,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 13 --
SKIP, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=1f4,
0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 7 --
PUSH r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
POP r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
r3 = r3 + 0x17b3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 11 --
PUSH r17, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120)
-- STATE 3 --
r1 = r1 - 0x8, (r7=64,r1=64)
-- STATE 6 --
r7= r1, (r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 7 --
PUSH r3, (r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
(c) Step 3: Trace slices (from left to right) wrt r17, r3 and r7, respectively at state 13 in t.
-- STATE 7 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 12 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,
r17=120,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 13 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=1f4,
0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 7 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 11 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,
r17=120)
-- STATE 3 --
(r7=64,r1=64)
-- STATE 6 --
(r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 7 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
(d) Step 4: The set of semantic traces τ of Binom after abstracting the trace syntax.
Figure 5.10: The extraction process of a fragment of the semantic
traces (part of the signature) of the Binom family, where the randomly
generated program input x = (64, 20, 21a, 120, 1f4) for data manipulators
r1, r3, r7, r17 and 0x1813, respectively.
generated semantic trace t′ of each malware variant against the signature of the
known malware. In the comparison step, for each semantic trace t (slice) in the
set we applied the matching algorithm (TraceMapping in Figure 5.1 on page 112)
between t and t′, calculated the similarity percentage and determined if the pair
of the traces established a match. We observed that the similarity between two
matchable traces (i.e. traces that are generated from malware variants) is above
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-- STATE 1 --
(r7=21a)
-- STATE 2 --
(r7=21a,r1=64)
-- STATE 3 --
(r7=64,r1=64)
-- STATE 5 --
(r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 6 --
(r7=64,r1=5c)
-- STATE 7 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 9 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=20)
-- STATE 10 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=80482b9)
-- STATE 11 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120)
-- STATE 12 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=120,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 13 --
(r7=5c,r1=5c,r3=8049a6c,r17=1f4,0x1813=1f4)
-- STATE 14 --
...
Figure 5.11: A fragment of the semantic trace in the sig-wo-slice signature
of the Binom family from the simulation trace in Fig. 5.10(a).
70% while the similarity between two different traces (i.e. generated from two dif-
ferent programs) is below 45%. Therefore, we set the threshold (k) as 70% to
distinguish between matched and unmatched semantic traces. Finally, we consid-
ered a malware variant as detected if the similarity between each t and t′ exceeds
70%, i.e. if all semantic traces in the malware signature are matched with the se-
mantic trace of the variant. For nine out of the ten malware families, the detector
matched all of the variants to the correct family. One variant of the Bho family
did not match the family signature, so its signature was stored in the semantic
signature database as a different malware family. Nonetheless, we have shown that
our detector is able to match malware variants from the same family using one
semantic signature.
Running times for the different phases of the tool are shown in Table 5.6 on
page 134 and are reasonable for a prototype and suggest that real time improve-
ments can be achieved with an optimised implementation. We also used the sig-
wo-slice signatures of the malware families in our detector on the same variants
and measured the similarity and running time results in order to compare them
with the results obtained using the semantic signature.
Table 5.7 on page 134 shows a summarised comparison of the two sets of results.
The similarity results of both types of signatures have the same detection rates, i.e.
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File name Size Type Operating system
Binom.a 20 kB virus Linux
Binom.b 20 kB virus Linux
Binom.c 20 kB virus Linux
Bho.a 4.1 MB virus Windows
Bho.b 4.2 MB virus Windows
Bho.c 4.4 MB virus Windows
Bho.d 4.2 MB virus Windows
Bho.e 4.2 MB virus Windows
Echo.a 8.0 kB virus Windows
Echo.b 56.0 kB virus Windows
Grip.a 116 kB virus Windows
Grip.b 140 kB virus Windows
Lychan.a 12 kB virus Linux
Lychan.b 15 kB virus Linux
Mobler.h 1.1 MB worm Windows
Mobler.i 748 kB worm Windows
Mobler.g 836 kB worm Windows
Rst.a 314 kB virus Linux
Rst.b 314 kB virus Linux
Rst.c 314 kB virus Linux
Synk.a 8.0 kB virus Windows
Synk.b 8.0 kB virus Windows
Tefl.a 56.0 kB virus Linux
Tefl.e 48.0 kB virus Linux
Xone.a 12.0 kB virus Linux
Xone.c 12.0 kB virus Linux
Table 5.5: Malware variants in the wild.
the tested variants can be detected using either type of signature. Nonetheless, in
terms of the precision and accuracy of a detection outcome, the similarity results of
matching malware variants using semantic signatures are much more accurate than
when using sig-wo-slice signatures. For instance, for the Grip family, the similarity
rate for matching using the sig-wo-slice signatures of its variants is 45.7%, which is
very low. Whereas, with semantic signatures, Grip variants were detected with an
average similarity of over 85%. Overall, using semantic signatures, the detection
rates are 30% more accurate than with sig-wo-slice signatures. For the average
running time results, the cost of producing semantic signatures is longer due to
the slice computation. In this evaluation, the running time ratio of sig-wo-slice to
semantic signatures is approximately 5:7. However, the time of matching traces
in the semantic signatures case is faster by 26% (on average) compared to the
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Malware Running time (msec) Total Detection
Simulation Abst. and slicing Matching time
Bho 61232.5 234.9 158.9 61.63 s 80%
Binom 7534.2 460.0 170.0 8.16 s 100%
Echo 6029.0 685.1 204.9 6.92 s 100%
Grip 34621.3 430.0 302.1 35.35 s 100%
Lychan 6322.1 900.0 92.0 7.314 s 100%
Mobler 49549.6 394.9 2098 52.04 s 100%
Rst 82371.7 398.6 268.7 83.05 s 100%
Synk 2672.0 238.8 73.5 2.98 s 100%
Tefl 3412.0 190.0 260.0 8.16 s 100%
Xone 2894.0 311.0 310.0 8.16 s 100%
Table 5.6: Results of evaluating our detector on 26 real-world malware vari-
ants.
Malware sig-wo-slice signatures semantic signatures
Similarity Time1 Similarity Time1 Time2
Bho 64.6% 197.3 97.4% 158.9 393.8
Binom 67.3% 534.0 86.1% 170.0 630.0
Echo 72% 473.6 100% 204.9 890.0
Grip 45.7% 630.0 85.3% 302.1 732.1
Lychan 90% 930.0 89.7% 92.0 992.0
Mobler 65% 1230.0 93.3% 2098 2492.0
Rst 75.3% 289.3 98.3% 268.7 677.2
Synk 82.0% 293.7 91.5% 73.5 312.3
Telf 85% 358.0 98% 260.0 450.0
Xone 61% 421.7 81% 310.0 621.0
1Time to match the signatures. 2Time to abstract, slice and match.
Table 5.7: Comparison of the similarity and running time (in msec) for de-
tecting malware variants using semantic signatures and sig-wo-slice signatures.
running time for sig-wo-slice signatures. We believe that the cost of the slicing
computation is an up-front cost in the signature generation process and it does
not relate to the detection performance (cost).
Table 5.6 shows the results of our experiments comparing malware families against
their variants. From this experiment, we observed that the similarity rate of match-
ing a malware family’s semantic traces (in the signature) with its variants’ traces
varies between 70% and 100%. The average similarity between a malware family
and its variants is 92.7%. Also, for each malware variant, we achieved 100% detec-
tion (i.e. no false negatives) using the trace semantics signatures of the malware
family, with the exception of the Bho malware family where one out of the five
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code variants was not detected. We believe that this (false negative) occurred due
to the fact that the semantic signature contains a single program input, which
was ineffective in capturing parts of the semantics of this particular variant, and,
hence, the detector could not match the variant semantic trace against the seman-
tic traces in the signature.
5.5.2.3 Detection of Obfuscated Variants
For each malware family in Table 5.6 on the previous page, we created new code
variants by applying the following code obfuscation techniques (see Table 5.1 on
page 108): code reordering (cr), garbage code insertion (gi), equivalent command
replacement (ec), system call insertion (sc), simple command split (cs) of one in-
struction into two instructions and register renaming (rr). The code reordering
(cr) transformation was implemented by moving some parts of the code to a dif-
ferent location and using jump instructions to the new code locations. The code
insertion (gi) transformation inserts an irrelevant sequence of instructions into a
program. We considered two types of code insertion: first, adding a sequence of
SKIP instructions and second, adding simple sequences of operations. We con-
sidered three types of operations: arithmetic and bitwise operation commands,
assignment operation commands and adding a sequence of PUSH and POP instruc-
tions, which push a value onto the stack and then pop the same value into an
irrelevant register. For the equivalent command (ec) replacement transformation,
we replaced XOR instructions with MOV instructions whenever an operand is XOR-
ed with itself; a move command loads zero to the destination operand. Also, we
replaced INC and DEC instructions with ADD by one and SUB by one instructions,
respectively. For register renaming (rr) transformations, we replaced at most three
general-purpose registers in a program with different general-purpose registers that
did not already exist in the program, if possible. For the command split (cs) trans-
formation, we replaced a MOV instruction with ADD and SUB instructions where a
move command must load a constant value (const) into either a register (reg)
or a memory location (m). That is, mov reg/m, const is transformed into two
instructions: xor reg/m,reg/m and add reg/m,const. For system call insertion
(sc), we inserted API calls of the following types: file or device open (sys open)
and close (sys close) calls, make directory (sys mkdir) calls and file truncate
(sys ftruncate) calls.
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Malware Transformation type FN
cr gi ec rr sc cs all
Rst Y Y Y Y N Y Y 1
Bho Y Y Y Y N Y N 2
Synk Y Y Y Y N Y Y 1
Mobler Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 0
Table 5.8: The detection results of a set of obfuscated variants of four mal-
ware families. Y and N denote whether the detection was successful or unsuc-
cessful, respectively. FN (False Negative) denotes the number of undetected
variants.
Also, an instance of each piece of malware was generated using all of the techniques
together (we labelled it with all). To perform the evaluation, first, we applied
our semantic simulator tool to the set of new variants of each malware (seven
obfuscated variants) using the program input from the malware signature. Then
we used the detector to test the semantic traces of the new variants against the
database of existing malware family semantic traces. Table 5.8 shows the results of
the experiment for detecting obfuscated malware variants. Our detector identified
all of the new variants generated using the code obfuscations with the exception
of the system call insertion obfuscation. System call instructions, such as those
used in this evaluation, alter the environment of an executing program by writing
into particular special registers and, hence, altering the semantics of the malicious
code variant. Thus, this shows that our detector cannot deal with new malware
variants that contain different (altered) semantics from the known malware.
5.5.2.4 False Positives
We performed the same evaluation process with a set of benign executables. That
is, for each malware family signature in the database, the benign programs were
simulated using the program input from the signature and their semantic traces
were examined by our detector to measure the false positive rate. We used ten
programs, with sizes ranging from 10 kB to 2 MB, which are standard executable
programs for the Linux operating system. For each benign program, we computed
the matching similarity of the benign code against the whole database of malware
signatures created for the malware families in Section 5.5.2.2. Our detector pro-
duced no false positives, that is, our approach successfully identified all programs
as benign and none of their semantic traces matched the malware database.
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Malware Similarity
File1 File2 File3 File4
Bho 22.0% 17.0% 95.0% 0.0%
Binom 29.0% 16.1% 28.2% 38.3%
Echo 8.0% 100% 0.0% 15.0%
Grip 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 79.0%
Lychan 0.0% 9.0% 4.5% 44.0%
Mobler 4.6% 7.4% 32.0% 8.2%
Rst 100% 18.3% 5.3% 3.0%
Synk 0.0% 10.4% 45.0% 3.0%
Telf 23.0% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Xone 30.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0%
Table 5.9: The similarity rates of randomly selected variants (File1, File2,
File3 and File4) compared to the semantic traces (in signatures) of the malware
families. All four files were successfully classified by our tool to be variants of
Rst, Echo, Bho and Grip, respectively.
5.5.2.5 Classification of Malware Variants
We examined the general classification performance of our approach. We used
the signature database of malware families that were generated in Section 5.5.2.1.
Also, we randomly selected four different malware variants from the real-world
malware variants in Table 5.5 and labelled them as File1, File2, File3 and File4.
We then applied the detector to each of the four files and recorded the similarity
rates. Table 5.9 shows the percentage match for the semantic traces of the tested
files against the traces in the signatures of the malware families. For File1, the
highest similarity result is 100%, which means that File1 is a variant of the Rst
malware family. The highest similarity rate for File2 is 100% and it is classified
as a variant of the Echo malware family. File3 is classified as a variant of the Bho
family and its similarity rate is 95.0%. File4 is classified as a member of the Grip
family. Our tool correctly assigned all files to their malware families.
5.5.3 Prototype Limitations
We now discuss several potential approaches that may defeat and the limitations
of the current prototype that may limit its detection and classification effective-
ness. Because our tool simulates suspicious samples with program inputs from the
malware signature, it may be susceptible to a technique where irrelevant variables
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are introduced in the code. For instance, during the detection phase, inserting
instructions with irrelevant input variables (e.g. registers and memory references)
can consume the program input list (of the given malware signature) and hence,
shift the order of the input. The simulation of a variant with this technique can
be affected and the original program variables would be assigned to incorrect in-
put values. Also, because our technique relies on execution context updates (i.e.
value updates) to match semantic traces, changes to a few states in the traces,
such as inserting some garbage instructions that contain the same values later
in the trace are likely to influence the matching results. However, developing
new variants using such a technique of inserting operations with new input vari-
ables may alter the semantics of the program. That is, producing semantically
equivalent but syntactically significant different variants using this technique is a
difficult task for malware authors. In terms of the limitations of the tool, one way
to evade the current prototype’s detection is to prevent the tool from extracting
a malicious portion of the binary code by applying packers to the new malware
variants’ code. Our tool incorporates UPX as a tool to handle packed or hid-
den malware code; however, like most existing unpack tools, it is by no means
complete. One way to address this problem is to employ several dynamic unpack
tools, e.g. OllyBonE [Ste07] and Saffron [Val07]. Also, our tool rely on IDAPro to
identify function-start locations and data structure addresses. As a result when
the code is being simulated, if some computed values are used as indirect reference
by a jump command to a function (a portion of the code) or a data structure in
the memory, then the tool fails to determine the target instruction. In conclusion
and future work chapter (Chapter 7), we suggest a more thorough approach that
could mitigate this problem using a hybrid technique.
5.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a semantic trace-based approach for detecting variants of
malware that increasingly evade traditional signature- and heuristics-based ap-
proaches. AV tools must cope with various obfuscation techniques deployed in
generating new unknown malware variants. Effective semantic matching of mal-
ware is an important feature of today’s anti-malware tools. We have developed a
static-based semantic simulator that evaluates malicious low-level programs and
generates semantic signatures. That is, a semantic signature describes semantics
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for variants of a malware family including any new obfuscated variants. This en-
ables a malware detector to have a compact database of semantic signatures. We
have implemented the semantic matching on top of the simulator for computing
the similarity of semantic traces of a malware and its variants. In order to handle
obfuscation effects within the trace semantics, we used the semantic trace slicer to
produce small traces as candidate semantic signatures for the matching step. Our
evaluations of both malware samples and obfuscated variants of malware demon-
strated that our semantic signature approach to malware variant detection not
only produces very high detection rates but is also able to detect new variants of
malware using the existing signature sets in the database without generating false
positives.
Chapter 6
Test Data Generation for
Malware Executables
As we noticed in Chapter 3, preliminary research work [PCJD07, FG09, LJL10]
suggests that a semantic-based approach to malware detection has the potential
to overcome various weaknesses of current and traditional approaches in detecting
unknown malware variants.
The uniqueness and the quality of the semantic signatures depend on the cap-
tured simulation traces. That is, the behaviour of a program is determined from
simulation runs of the program paths. However, when the semantic signature of a
program is produced from a single simulation run, it is possible that much of the
semantic information cannot be observed. This might cause the semantic signa-
ture matcher to fail to detect a variant of a malware family. A possible solution to
this problem is to adapt the test coverage of the program under analysis. To this
end we seek a method of generating tests from program control flow paths. We
extend the test data generation method, proposed by Offutt et al. [OJP99], called
dynamic domain reduction (DDR). Our extended method automatically gener-
ates test data for input data manipulators of AAPL programs. This approach is a
promising method for computing test cases by generating a set of semantic signa-
tures for improving the detection of obfuscated malware variants. We present two
theoretical results for our method, a test data generation algorithm for low-level
code and a correctness notion of the algorithm.
To summarise, the contents of this chapter are as follows:
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• We develop an extended version of the DDR algorithm for AAPL that allows
us to produce test data cases for executable programs. The algorithm first
explores feasible program paths in the control flow graph (CFG) of an AAPL
program, driven by the DDR technique and a set of values of program inputs.
The algorithm then attempts to find a subset of values of program inputs
under which the feasible program paths in the CFG are executed.
• We prove the correctness for our extended DDR algorithm. Our conjecture
for the correctness property of the algorithm is that for a given program path
in the control flow graph of an AAPL program, the DDR analysis is correct
if it finds a subset of values of program inputs such that, when executing
the program for test data selected from the subset of program inputs in
this set, the set of output states at the end of the path is reached. The
set of output states is determined by the reachability semantics of an AAPL
program path language, which is based on Cousot’s semantics of reachable
states for transition systems [CC77].
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides an overview
of the dynamic domain reduction approach for executable code. Preliminary def-
initions, syntax and semantics of program paths are presented in Section 6.2. In
Section 6.3, the dynamic domain reduction method is reviewed. In Section 6.4,
the DDR algorithm is extended to handle AAPL programs. The correctness proof
of the new algorithm is presented in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 gives related work
of software testing in the area of malware analysis and detection. Section 6.7
concludes the chapter.
6.1 Overview
The objective of test coverage or the coverage-based testing technique is to cover
the code under investigation with test cases that satisfy some fixed coverage cri-
teria [CDH+03]. In software testing, a test case is a set of program input values
under which the testing criteria are met. There are several testing criteria used in
software testing which include: statement coverage or node coverage, branch cover-
age, condition coverage, multiple condition coverage and path coverage. The path
coverage or path-oriented approach [McM04] identifies a set of program control
flow paths that cover all program commands (and branches) in the program and
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then attempts to generate test data that executes every selected path. Test data
generation is the process of identifying program input data that satisfy selected
testing criteria.
Increasing test coverage for malicious executable programs could be done by ex-
isting test data generation methods [McM04, Har07], such as the random testing
method [GKS05], where hundreds of tests are randomly performed with each mal-
ware family in different operating environments in an attempt to cover different
paths in the program code. Unfortunately, performing and maintaining a large
set of random test cases can be a tedious and costly task. Also, testing a malware
sample in different operating environments cannot guarantee that certain feasible
branches in the code are covered by test cases. That is, many inputs provided by
the test cases may have no influence on the program run (e.g. operating system
changes). Also, some malware programs do not invoke their malicious commands
unless they receive some expected inputs (e.g. file size, date/time).
Symbolic evaluation-based methods [BEL75, VPK04, BCM04] could be used to
generate test data. Symbolic execution [Kin75, Kin76] evaluates program state-
ments along a control flow path and produces constraints (equalities or inequal-
ities) on symbolic input values under which a selected path is traversed. How-
ever, symbolic evaluation methods require complex algebraic manipulations of
intermediate algebraic expressions and have difficulty in dealing with the alias-
ing problem for pointer analysis [McM04]. Constraint Logic Programming (CLP)
techniques [GBR00, GzAP10] have been applied to test data generation (TDG). A
CLP technique dynamically builds a constraint system, which consists of program
input variables, domains and constraints. Existing test data generation methods
are mainly for programs in high-level languages and require modification for use
with low-level machine programs. While the existing test data generation meth-
ods are assumed to be correct in computing test data for program inputs, no
correctness proofs have been presented so far.
In this chapter, we propose a solution that addresses the problem of test data
generation of executable code. The solution computes test data for the path cov-
erage criterion. The basic idea is that we identify test data for program paths
in a machine-level (i.e., AAPL) program by extending the automated test data
generation method called the Dynamic Domain Reduction (DDR) technique pre-
sented in [OJP99]. More precisely, the DDR method computes test data using
the set of possible values of program input variables. The domain of a program
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P :
1 (r0 < 40) JMP L1
2 r1 := r0 × 2
3 L1: (r1 > 120) JMP L2
4 r2 := r1 × 4








Figure 6.1: A sample of AAPL code and its control flow graph. The dotted
regions represent basic blocks of the code.
input variable is the set of values that the variable can hold. This approach is
based on the domain of program input variables, a set of control flow graph paths
and a domain minimisation method. The domain minimisation method evaluates
branch expressions (constraints) in the path by reducing the set of values of pro-
gram input variables such that the reduced domain of program variables satisfies
a path constraint for the path traversed. The minimisation method incorporates a
search process to find suitable points for reducing the domain. Thus, the method
starts with the domain of initial values of program input variables and attempts
to evaluate each constraint along the selected path and reduces the domain of
program input variables until the end of the path is reached. Then, the method
outputs the domain of program input variables and test data can be selected from
this domain that guarantees the execution of the selected path.
6.2 Preliminaries
This section introduces basic concepts used in the rest of the chapter.
The syntax and semantics of the AAPL language are given in Chapter 4. Figure 6.1
shows a sample of AAPL code and its corresponding control flow graph.
Control Flow Graph (CFG). The standard compiler techniques for converting
a list of assembly program instructions to a list of basic blocks is a straightforward
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Syntactic Categories:
s ∈ S (AAPL path statements) pi ∈ Π (finite CFG paths)
aop ∈ {+,−, ∗, /} bop ∈ {& , | , ⊕ ,  , }
rop ∈ {==, 6=,≤,≥, <,>} r ∈ R (AAPL registers)
Val, n ∈ Z
e ∈ E (Expressions) b ∈ B (Boolean Expressions)
dm ∈ DM (data manipulators) r ∈ R (AAPL registers)
Syntax:
DM ::= r | *r | *n
Lexpr ::= DM Rexpr ::= DM | n
BE ::= DM bop n | ¬DM (Bitwise expressions)
AE ::= DM aop n (Arithmetic expressions)
E ::= n | DM | AE | BE (Expressions)
B ::= Lexpr rop Rexpr (Branch predicate)
Path Statements: CFG Paths:
S ::= dm := e | PUSH e | POP dm
| JMP e | CALL e | RTN e | SKIP
| B (where B JMP E )
pi ::=< s1, . . . , sk > where s1 and sk
are the entry and an exit nodes,
respectively and ∀i, (1 ≤ i < k),
∃e ∈ CFG, e = (si, si+1)
Figure 6.2: Syntactic categories and Syntax of the AAPL path language.
algorithmic process [Muc97]. A basic block consists of one or more instructions in
which there is at most one entry point and one exit point. An entry point is an
instruction which accepts control from another basic block. An exit point is an
instruction which transfers control to another code in another basic block. The
execution of program instructions within a basic block is by definition sequential.
The first instruction of each basic block is called the leader. The leader instruction
may be the start instruction of the program, a target of a branch or an instruction
immediately following a branch instruction. To identify the basic blocks that
build an AAPL program, we first determine all the leaders, then we include in each
leader’s basic block all the instructions from it to the next leader. The control
flow graph of an AAPL program is CFG(P ) = (V,E, s) where V is the set of basic
blocks, and E (a subset of V × V ) is the set of control flow transitions between
basic blocks. A CFG has one entry node s and at least one exit node.
A Program Path. A program path in a CFG is a sequence of nodes <
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Collecting Semantics:
V k⊥ (the set of bit strings of length k ∈ N, k > 0)
σ : DM → V k⊥ (a state)
Σ : 2DM→V
k
⊥ (sets of states (Domains))
=[[E ]] : Σ→ ℘(V k⊥)
=[[B ]] : Σ→ Σ
=[[S ]] : Σ→ Σ
Semantics of E: Semantics of B:
fe = =[[· ]] fb = =[[·]]
fe [[n]]Σ = {n} fb[[b]]Σ = {σ ∈ Σ | σ ` b ⇒ True}
fe [[dm]]Σ = {v | ∃σ ∈ Σ, σ ` dm⇒ v}
fe [[¬dm]]Σ = ¬fe[[dm]]Σ
fe [[dm bop n]]Σ = fe[[dm]]Σ bop fe [[n]]Σ
fe [[AE]]Σ = fe [[dm aop n]]Σ = fe[[dm]]Σ aop fe [[n]]Σ
Semantics of S:
fs = =[[S]]
fs [[dm := e]]Σ = Σ
′ where Σ′ = {σ[dm 7→ {v}] | σ ∈ Σ, {v ∈ fe[[e]]Σ}}
fs [[PUSH e]]Σ = Σ
′ where Σ′ = {σ[dm 7→ {v}] | σ ∈ Σ, SP 7→ SP − 1,
dm = SP, {v ∈ fe[[e]]Σ}}
fs [[POP dm]]Σ = Σ
′ where Σ′ = {σ[dm 7→ {v}] | σ ∈ Σ, {v ∈ fe[[SP ]]Σ},
SP 7→ SP + 1}
fs [[JMP e]]Σ = Σ
fs [[CALL e]]Σ = Σ
fs [[RTN e]]Σ = Σ
fs [[B]]Σ = Σ
′ where Σ′ = fb[[B]]Σ ∩ Σ
Figure 6.3: Semantics of the AAPL path language.
n1, n2, . . . , nk >, such that n1 = s, nk is an exit node in a program CFG and
∀i, 1 ≤ i < k, (ni, ni+1) ∈ E. A path is executable (or feasible) if there exists a
program input for which the path is traversed during program execution, otherwise
the path is unexecutable (or infeasible). A finite program path that begins with
the entry node s and ends with an exit node is called a complete path. Otherwise,
it is called an incomplete path. For instance, the path < 1, 2, 3, 5 > is a complete
(finite) path in the CFG of Figure 6.1 on page 143; however, the path < 1, 2, 3, 4 >
is an incomplete path.
Program Input Variables. Program registers and direct memory locations
(i.e, addressing memory locations with an immediate offset, a register or a register
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with an offset) are used to perform data manipulations during execution, such
as retrieving and storing data from memory. We use the term data manipulators
(Definition 4.3 on page 71) to denote registers and memory locations that are used
to process the program inputs. Thus, a data manipulator is a program register
or memory location used to perform data definition and manipulation operations.
A program input variable of a program P is a data manipulator that appears in
an instruction in P . Throughout the chapter, we use these terms interchangeably,
namely: data manipulators and input variables. Also, we allow input data ma-
nipulators to be of type unsigned integer (and can be represented as a set of bits
(i.e. unsigned binary integer)). Each input data manipulator is initially assigned
a domain of as large a set of possible values as the data manipulator can hold. We
let a data manipulator be a 32-bit unsigned integer (i.e. 232 possible values).
The Syntax and Collecting Semantics for Program Paths. The syntax
and semantics of AAPL program path constructs are shown in Figs 6.2 on page 144
and 6.3 on the previous page, respectively. The semantics are useful when con-
structing our correctness proof for the extended DDR algorithm. Since we are
interested to compute the domains of program input variables (data manipula-
tors) and produce a test data in which a path is exercised, we consider a subset
of AAPL syntax and semantics (in Chapter 4) which affects the values of data
manipulators in a particular program path. For instance, from AAPL action com-
mands, we consider the assignment commands, PUSH and POP in the program path
semantics. However, other action commands such as CALL E, JMP E and SKIP do
not change the values of program input variables within a path execution. The
program path syntax contains a statement of type branch predicate B, where B is
part of conditional command in AAPL language, i.e. CB := B JMP E . The branch
predicate statement may update the sets of states of a program path such that
the outcome of the predicate is true.
A bitwise expression BE is created using a bitwise operator (bop ∈ {& , | , ⊕ , 
, }) (i.e. AND, OR, XOR, logical shift left and logical shift right, respectively)
with two operands (i.e. a data manipulator and a constant). Also, a bitwise
expression can have one operand (i.e. DM) in the case of the unary operation, i.e.
the bitwise NOT that performs logical negation on each bit of a data manipulator
(e.g. ¬DM), computing the ones’ complement of the given binary value. The
bitwise operators work on the binary representation of operands’ values and change
individual bits of a destination data manipulator. An arithmetic expression AE
can contain any of the arithmetic operators (aop ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}) and a pair of
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operands (i.e. DM and n operands). An expression E, in this path language,
can represent a constant value, a data manipulator, a bitwise or an arithmetic
expression. A relational operator forms what we refer to as a branch predicate
expression B. A branch predicate involves exactly two operands (i.e. Lexpr and
Rexpr operands). Note that an operand on the left is always a data manipulator
and an operand on the right can either be a data manipulator or a constant value.
Figure 6.3 on page 145 shows the collecting semantics [CC76] of arithmetic and
Boolean expressions and path statements. We let V k be the set of bit strings of
length k ∈ N, k > 0. Also, we let a state to have type DM → V k, i.e. is a map from
the set of data manipulators DM to the set of bit strings of length k, including
⊥ (which is undefined). Thus, we use σ0, σ1, σi, . . . , σ′, σ′′ ∈ DM → V k to denote
states which represent the information collected about the bindings of program




⊥ to represent the set of states. The semantics of an expression defines
the possible values that the expression can evaluate to in a given set of states
(environments). The semantics of a Boolean expression B defines the subset of
possible states for which the Boolean expression may evaluate to true. During the
evaluation of an assignment statement in a path pi, a new state can be constructed
and included to the set of states Σ′ = σ ∪ Σ, where σ is the newly created store.
We let ΣP be the set of all possible states of a program P . Also, we let [[pi]] be the
path semantics for a finite program path pi. Then the set of all reachable states
for pi according to the semantics is then [[pi]]ΣP = {σ′ | ∀σ ∈ ΣP , σ′ = [[pi]]σ}.
Branch Predicates. An edge corresponds to a possible transfer of control from
one basic block to another basic block. A branch is an outgoing edge of a con-
ditional jump instruction (i.e. CB := B JMP E). A branch predicate is a label of
a branch that describes the condition (constraint) on which that branch is tra-
versed. We let F denote a filtering function that describes the branch predicate
of a conditional jump instruction. For instance, in the program of Figure 6.1 on
page 143 branch (1,2) is labelled F[r0≥40], which means that in order to traverse the
branch, the constraint r0 ≥ 40 must be satisfied; similarly, for traversing branch
(3,5), which has the label F[r1>120], the constraint r1 > 120 must be satisfied. Note
that for the CFG in Figure 6.1 on page 143, node 1 is the entry statement of the
program.
Domain of Program Inputs. Let I = (dm1, dm2, dmi . . . , dmn) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a
vector of input variables (i.e. data manipulators) of program P . The domain  Ddmi
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of input variable dmi is the set of all values which dmi can hold. By the domain  D
of the program P we mean a cross product,  D =  Ddm1×  Ddm2×  Ddm3× . . .×  Ddmn ,
where each  Ddmi is the domain for input variable dmi. Also, a program input is a
single point x in the n-dimensional input space, such that x = (d1, d2, di, . . . , dn),
di ∈  Ddmi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and x ∈  D. The collecting semantics that we have defined
for the AAPL path language represents the behaviours of AAPL code and allows
to specify the domains of program input variables. We could consider a program
P as a function, P :  D →  D′, where  D ⊆ ΣP as it maps the set of all possible
inputs to the set of all possible outputs  D′. Also,  D′ can be better described as a
reachable set of program outputs of a given path as follows:
Reachable Output States R. Let pi be a finite path in the CFG of a program,
P , and  D ⊆ ΣP be the set of possible initial states of P . Rpi = [[pi]] D represents
all possible reachable output states of program data manipulators that could be
produced when executing the path pi with initial program input  D. We use the
collecting semantics of the path language to describe how the evaluation of possible
reachable states Rpi can be produced for an initial domain of a program and any
given path pi.
6.3 A Test Data Generation Problem: DDR Ap-
proach
At this point let us define the goal of the path-oriented automatic test data gen-
eration problem: given a path pi =< n1, n2, . . . , nk >, which is a finite path in
the CFG of a program, find a program input x ∈  D on which pi will be traversed
(executed). The dynamic domain reduction approach reduces this problem to a
solution where a minimisation search process, referred to as the domain reduction
method, applied to the initial domain of the program to compute a subset  Dpi
of the domain from which any program input x is selected, will execute pi. If pi
is traversed (and, hence, it is a feasible path), the subset,  Dpi, that is computed
by the DDR method is the solution to the test data generation problem; if not,
we consider the method to be unsuccessful in finding a solution for pi. Thus, we
assume that there exists a path generator that takes the CFG of an AAPL program
as an input and produces a set of finite paths of interest. Then, given an initial
domain for the program, we apply the extended DDR approach to compute a test
data solution.
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Dynamic domain reduction was developed to handle most problems that exist
with constraint-based test (CBT) data generation and the symbolic evaluation
technique, such as those associated with handling arrays, loops and nested ex-
pressions. The DDR approach incorporates parts of previously existing testing
techniques: CBT [DO91, DO93], dynamic testing [Kor90] and symbolic evalua-
tion [Kin75]. The main development of the DDR approach is that it uses a do-
main reduction method for deriving a subset of program inputs, which represent
conditions under which a path will be executed. Also, the DDR approach uses a
new backtracking search method to discover other possible values of inputs when a
condition is not met. We provide an overview of the DDR approach, and describe
the original algorithm in Section 6.3.1. Section 6.3.2 provides an overview of the
main procedures of DDR. Details of the algorithm can be obtained from [OJP99],
which was developed for high-level programs (e.g. Java and C/C++ code) with
basic arithmetic expressions and numerical data types.
6.3.1 Description of DDR Analysis
The original DDR analysis uses constraints derived from the path to progressively
reduce domains of program input variables until test data that satisfy these con-
straints are identified. The method automatically finds values by walking through
the path, using one branch predicate at a time and reducing the domain of the
program step by step. The method introduces two new techniques for generating
path-oriented test data. The techniques are implemented in different procedures
in the DDR algorithm. Figure 6.4 on page 151 shows the flow diagram of the
DDR method. In the diagram, circles represent inputs and outputs of the DDR
analysis, rectangles are the DDR steps and diamonds are branches during a path
evaluation process.
Domain-based Symbolic Execution. This technique evaluates the path sym-
bolically, and as it processes the constraints along the path, the domains of pro-
gram input variables are modified (i.e. the domains may be reduced for branch
predicates and updated for assignments) to reflect conditions and assignments.
Program instructions such as assignments are evaluated by creating special sym-
bolic variables and expressions rather than actual values. DDR analysis maintains
a symbolic state to track and update the symbolic expressions for a program path.
When a new expression is encountered, the analysis creates a domain of possible
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values for the expression. A new domain of an expression is computed from the do-
mains of program input variables involved in the expression. Initially, the domain
of a program input variable may be assigned minimum and maximum possible val-
ues for the host machine, or limited to a reasonable input specification range. The
method represents the domain,  Ddm of a program input variable dm by a top and
bottom limits (e.g. [ldm, udm], where ldm and udm are the minimum and maximum
values in the domain, respectively). A domain may consist of sub-domains where
each sub-domain represents a set of contiguous values. For instance, the domain
{1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8} is represented in two sub-domains as < [1, 3], [6, 8] >. The method
uses a domain reduction process to select a point in the domain of a program
input variable at which the domain is split. Also, whenever each constraint has
been satisfied, the method updates the domains of program input variables such
that their current values are consistent with the path conditions taken so far. The
following example demonstrates how the method finds test data input using the
domain splitting, reduction and update techniques:
Example 6.1. To illustrate the DDR method. Consider a path in the control flow
graph of the program in Figure 6.5 on page 152, pi =< 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 >. The goal
of the DDR method is to find a program input x (i.e. values for the input data
manipulators (variables) I = {r0, r1, r2}) which causes pi to be traversed. We
assume that all input variables receive initial values for their domains; suppose the
following values have been assigned: l = 1 and u = 100. Thus, the initial domains
of the program input variables are as follows:
 Dr0 = [1, 100],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100]
Since nodes 1 and 3 are conditional jump instructions in the program, the con-
straints on edges (1,2) and (3,4) (labelled by F[r0≥40] and F[r1≤120] in the CFG,
respectively) are included in the path. The method starts with the first constraint
in the path and attempts to satisfy it, such that all possible values of r0 must
be greater than or equal to the value 40. To find a solution for this constraint,
the method performs a search process to determine a point in  Dr0 such that a
subdomain could be found in which all values in that subdomain agree with the
constraint. The domain of r0 is split at 50 (the split is referred to as the split
point), and the subdomain [50, 100] becomes the current input domain of r0. The
new domain of r0 contains all possible values that are greater than or equal to
50. Note that this reduction process also discards some of the valid values of r0
from its domain (i.e. [40, 49]). The method proceeds to the assignment node 2.
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Figure 6.4: The flow diagram for the DDR algorithm.
For the expression 2× r0, the method uses the domain of r0 to symbolically eval-
uate the expression and create a domain for the expression. The new domain for
the expression 2 × r0 is [100, 200] =< [100, 100], [102, 102], . . . , [200, 200] >, i.e.
 D2×r0 = {2× 50, 2× 51, . . . , 2× 100} = {100, 102, . . . , 200}.
Next, the method evaluates the constraint r1 ≤ 120 on edge (3,4). To satisfy
this constraint, the domain of the expression 2× r0 must be reduced and the split
point 110 is selected. After the reduction process, the domain of the expression
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P :
1 (r0 < 40) JMP L1
2 r1 := r0 × 2
3 L1: (r1 > 120) JMP L2
4 r2 := r1 × 4








Figure 6.5: A sample of AAPL code and its control flow graph revisited in
Example 6.1.
 D2×r0 becomes [100, 110]. Once the constraint is satisfied by the computed domain,
the method updates the current domain of r0 (as r1 is symbolically assigned the
expression 2×r0 from the previous step) to reflect the new values of the expression.
Thus, the domain  Dr0 becomes [50, 55]. Note that after this step,  Dr1 is not changed
due to the domain-based symbolic execution performed for node 2. The method
evaluates the remaining instructions on nodes 4 and 5 where a new domain is
created for the expression, r1 × 4. At node 4, the symbolic expression r1 × 4 is
assigned to r2 in the symbolic state. The statements at Nodes 4 and 5 do not affect
the domains of the program data manipulators. Thus, the output of the method at
the end of the path is the set of domains of I. The evaluation steps of the DDR
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method on pi are shown below:
 Dr0 = [1, 100],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100]
1 r0 ≥ 40 (split point for r0 selected is 50)
 Dr0 = [50, 100],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100]
2 r1 := r0 × 2
 Dr0 = [50, 100],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100],
 Dr0×2 =< [100, 100], . . . , [200, 200] >
3 r1 ≤ 120 (split point for r0× 2 selected is 110)
 Dr0 = [50, 55],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100],
 Dr0×2 =< [100, 100], . . . , [110, 110] >
4 r2 := r1 × 4
 Dr0 = [50, 55],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100],
 Dr0×2 =< [100, 100], . . . , [110, 110] >,
 Dr1×4 = [4, 400]
5 JMP Exit
 Dr0 = [50, 55],  Dr1 = [1, 100],  Dr2 = [1, 100],  Dr0×2 = [100, 110],
 Dr1×4 = [4, 400]
A program input can be selected from the domains of program input data manip-
ulators such as x = (r0 = 50, r1 = 1, r2 = 100), which will execute the path
pi.
As we have noticed in Example 6.1, when the DDR method starts processing a
given path in the control flow of a program, the initial domain of the program
may contain some program inputs that will execute the path. The method takes
a conservative approach in producing a safe solution for the test data generation
problem. A safe solution means that the method finds a subset of the program
input domain such that the path will be taken for every program input x in this
subset. In Section 6.5 we prove that for every solution the DDR method generates,
the method is correct with respect to this property.
A Backtrack Search-based Process. The method introduces a second tech-
nique, called a backtrack search process, to handle cases when a program input
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P :
1 (r0 > r1) JMP L1
2 r2 := 26
3 L1: (r0 ≥ r2) JMP L2
4 r1 := r1 + 1
5 JMP Exit1









Figure 6.6: A sample of AAPL code and its control flow graph for Example 6.2.
that will traverse a path is not included in the resulting domains of the program
input variables. That is, as the method reduces the domains of program input
variables to satisfy current constraints along the path, there may be situations
where later constraints cannot be satisfied by the current domain of the program
input variables but different, previous choices of split points may produce a suit-
able domain. The backtrack search-based process undoes the previous steps of the
domain reduction for former constraints and computes a different split point to
give a new reduction decision on the domains of program input variables.
Example 6.2. Consider a path pi =< 1, 2, 3, 6 > in the control flow graph of the
program in Figure 6.6. Let us assume that the initial domains of the program input
variables are:
 Dr0 = [10, 30],  Dr1 = [20, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100]
The first node in the path corresponds to a jump instruction with the constraint
r0 ≤ r1 on the edge (1, 2). The method generates a split point to reduce the
domains of r0 and r1 in an attempt to satisfy the constraint. The split point
calculated is 25 and the domains are reduced to  Dr0 = [10, 25] and  Dr1 = [26, 50].
At node 2, the assignment instruction r2 := 26 is evaluated symbolically such that a
domain for the new expression (a constant) 26 is created,  D26 = [26, 26]. Note that
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the domain of r2 is not modified at this step. Next, the constraint r0 ≥ r2 from
node 3 is handled in an attempt to reduce  Dr0 and  Dr2. However, the possible values
of r0 in its domain are less than all possible values of r2 = 26 (i.e. contains a single
value,  D26 = [26, 26]). Therefore, the method cannot find a suitable split point and
it has to go back to the previous split-point step and re-compute a different split
point value. The method automatically resets the domains of the program input
variables to their initial values and a new split point is calculated for the constraint
at node 1. The new split point is 13 and the domains are reduced as  Dr0 = [10, 13]
and  Dr1 = [14, 50]. However,  Dr0 = [10, 13] is still less than  D26 = [26, 26], and the
method performs another backtrack step to node 1 and resets the domains again.
A third split point is computed to be 28 for the constraint r0 ≤ r1, which results
in reducing the domains for r0 and r1 to  Dr0 = [10, 28] and  Dr1 = [29, 50]. The
method proceeds to node 2 and  D26 = [26, 26]. Then at node 3, the domains of
r0 and 26 allow the constraint r0 ≥ r2 to be satisfied. A split point is computed
to be 26 such that  Dr0 = [27, 28] and  D26 remains as [26, 26]. The domain of r2
remains the same as the constant value 26 is assigned (symbolically) to r2 as an
expression. The method reaches the end of the path and all constraints of the path
were successfully satisfied. Below are the steps taken to reduce the domains of
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program input variables:
 Dr0 = [10, 30],  Dr1 = [2, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100]
1 r0 ≤ r1 (split point for r0 and r1 selected is 25)
 Dr0 = [10, 25],  Dr1 = [26, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100]
2 r2 := 26
 Dr0 = [10, 25],  Dr1 = [26, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100],  D26 = [26, 26]
3 r0 ≥ r2
- no split point can be computed, backtrack to Node 1
1 r0 ≤ r1 (split point for r0 and r1 selected is 13)
 Dr0 = [10, 13],  Dr1 = [14, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100]
2 r2 := 26
 Dr0 = [10, 13],  Dr1 = [14, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100],  D26 = [26, 26]
3 r0 ≥ r2
- no split point can be computed, backtrack to Node 1
1 r0 ≤ r1 (split point for r0 and r1 selected is 28)
 Dr0 = [10, 28],  Dr1 = [29, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100]
2 r2 := 26
 Dr0 = [10, 28],  Dr1 = [29, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100],  D26 = [26, 26]
3 r0 ≥ r2 (split point for r0 selected is 26)
 Dr0 = [27, 28],  Dr1 = [29, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100],  D26 = [26, 26]
6 JMP Exit
 Dr0 = [27, 28],  Dr1 = [29, 50],  Dr2 = [0, 100],  D26 = [26, 26]
A program input can be arbitrarily selected from the domains of the program input
data manipulators  D (=  Dr0 ×  Dr1 ×  Dr2), which was produced by the method.
Thus, a program input x = (r0 = 27, r1 = 35, r2 = 0) will traverse pi.
6.3.2 DDR Procedures
From the previous examples, we observe that the DDR analysis uses a backtracking
search process to find a different split point for reducing input domains whenever a
later constraint in the path cannot be satisfied. Also, when an update is required,
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Algorithm 6.1: Sketch of the DDR algorithm.
for each complete path in the CFG of a program under test:
for each node in the path:
if the node corresponds to a conditional instruction:
read the constraint on the edge.
evaluate the left and right sub-expressions,
ExprDomain()






apply the backtrack process.
else the node corresponds to an assignment instruction:
apply domain-based symbolic execution.
if the path is traversed and constraints are satisfied:
the path is feasible.
generate test data from the domain of the program.
else
the path may not be feasible.
the analysis propagates the update values of an expression back to the domains of
program input variables in the left- and right-hand sides of the expression.






A sketch of the DDR algorithm with its main procedures is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
The full detailed description of the algorithm is available in [OJP94].
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FoundSuitableDom. For a given constraint (branch predicate) in a CFG path,
the procedure finds suitable domains for program input variables that satisfy the
constraint. The input to this procedure is a branch predicate expression B and the
current domains of the Lexpr and Rexpr sub-expressions of the branch predicate.
If the constraint is satisfied by the current domains then the procedure returns
the value True and the domains of the program input variables that are used in
the sub-expressions are updated. If the procedure returns the value False, then
the constraint is not satisfied by the current domains. The procedure passes the
constraint and a copy of the current domains of the program input variables and
expressions to procedure DomFitCnst to find a suitable subset of current domains
that satisfy the constraint.
DomFitCnst. This procedure takes a constraint as an input and determines
if the current domains of the sub-expressions in the constraint satisfy it. The
constraint is of the form Lexpr rop Rexpr where Lexpr and Rexpr are the left
and right sub-expressions, respectively, and rop is a relational operator. The
procedure handles two different constraint types: DM rop n (and n rop DM)
and DM rop DM . If the domains of the two sub-expressions do not satisfy the
constraint then the procedure attempts to modify and to update the domains.
The procedure returns the value True when the update of the domains of both
expressions is successful. To modify program input domains and to update changes
on domains, the procedure calls the procedures GetSplit and Update, respectively.
GetSplit. This procedure accepts the domains of two expressions (e.g. expres-
sions x, y) and returns a split point. A split point is a value in two given domains
that is used to reduce the domains such that the modified domains satisfies the con-
straint. Each domain is represented by its bottom and top values i.e.  Dx = [lx, ux]
and  Dy = [ly, uy], where l and u are the minimum and the maximum values in
a domain, respectively. The procedure computes a split point sp for two given
domains under one of four cases:
• if (lx ≥ ly) ∧ (ux ≤ uy) then sp = (ux − lx) ∗ i+ lx
• if (lx ≤ ly) ∧ (ux ≥ uy) then sp = (uy − ly) ∗ i+ ly
• if (lx ≥ ly) ∧ (ux ≥ uy) ∧ (uy ≥ lx) then sp = (ux − ly) ∗ i+ ly
• if (lx ≤ ly) ∧ (ux ≤ uy) ∧ (ly ≤ ux) then sp = (uy − lx) ∗ i+ lx
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Note that in the last two cases, a third condition after the second ∧ clause is added
to ensure that the domains overlap, but neither is contained in the other. GetSplit
uses the index i (0 < i < 1) as a search point for a split between two domains
(i.e. i ∈ {1/2, 1/4, 3/4, 1/8, . . .}) where i is initialised to 1/2. The split point is
moved halfway in one direction then the other till a successful split point is found,
allowing domains to be reduced or a predetermined maximum number of search
choices have been made.
Update. This procedure takes an expression e and its current domain [le, ue] and
updates the domains of the program input variables, which are used in the expres-
sion. The procedure propagates back the new values of the expression’s domain
to its sub-expressions. The domain of a program input variable is reduced if the
new bottom and top values are contained within the current domain of the vari-
able, otherwise the current domain is not modified. Also, if there are any changes
that are necessitated after satisfying a constraint (a branch predicate expression),
the procedure recursively updates the domains of program input variables in the
expression. When all domains are reduced successfully, i.e. a domain update is
feasible, the procedure returns True to function DomFitCnst.
ExprDomain. This procedure computes a possible domain for a new expression
encountered in the path analysis. The procedure accepts a new expression and the
current domains of the program input variables and expressions. A new domain
of the expression is evaluated from its sub-expressions’ domains.
6.4 Description of the Extended DDR Algorithm
Our extended version of the DDR algorithm contains additional modules, which
handle the syntax and semantics of AAPL program paths shown in Figure 6.2 on
page 144. In particular, the expressions in AAPL are evaluated by two different
expression evaluation modules depending on the type of expression, i.e., arithmetic
and bitwise expressions. In this section, we first explain the new modules (i.e. the
refinements of Algorithm 6.1 on page 157) and then present pseudocode for the
algorithms.
The extended version of the DDR algorithm includes the following modules (within
ExprDomain and Update procedures):
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1. Domain evaluation module:
• Data manipulator evaluation.
• Arithmetic expression evaluation.
• Bitwise expression evaluation.
2. Domain update module for:
• Program input data manipulators’ domains.
• Bitwise expressions’ domains.
6.4.1 Expression Domain Evaluation Procedure
The procedure in Algorithm 6.2 on the next page computes a possible domain
for a given expression. The set of current domains TDom of program inputs and
the expression E are passed to the function as inputs. A new domain of the
expression E is computed from the domains of operands and the operator used
in the expression. When E is a data manipulator DM (in Algorithm 6.2 on the
following page, line 11), the procedure computes the top and bottom values of the
domain,  DDM of DM by finding the upper and the lower subdomains in  DDM , i.e.,
 Dn =USubDom( DDM) and  D1 =LSubDom( DDM), respectively. The top and bottom
values of the domain of DM are then determined by taking the maximum and
minimum values in these subdomains, i.e. uDM = max( Dn) and lDM = min( D1),
respectively. Thus, the domain of E is created with top and bottom values, uE =
uDM and lE = lDM . This procedure handles arithmetic and bitwise expressions
(in Algorithm 6.2 on the next page, line 17 and line 19, respectively) using two
functions GetAExprDom (in Algorithm 6.3 on page 163), and GetBExprDom (in
Algorithm 6.4 on page 165), respectively. Notice that when the expression is a
constant, the procedure assigns a new domain of values from n. At the end of
the procedure, the new domain of a given expression is created in TDom of the
program and it is passed to the caller procedure, which checks if the new computed
domain of the expression fits a constraint in the program.
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Algorithm 6.2: ExpDomEval(E) evaluates the domain of a program expression.
1: Input: an expression E to be evaluated, where E ::= n | DM | AE | BE and the
set of domains of program expressions and inputs in TDom.
2: Output: evaluates the domain of E and stores it in TDom.
3: procedure GetAExprDom(AE,TDom) is presented in Algorithm 6.3 on page 163
4: procedure GetBExprDom(BE,TDom) is presented in Algorithm 6.4 on page 165
5: USubDom( DDM ) finds the upper subdomain in a given domain
6: LSubDom( DDM ) finds the lower subdomain in a given domain
7: begin ExpDomEval(E)
8: if E is n then
9: uE = n and lE = n
10:  DE = [uE , lE ]
11: else if E is DM then
12: uDM = max( Dn) where  Dn = USubDom( DDM ),
13: lDM = min( D1) where  D1 = LSubDom( DDM )
14: uE = uDM
15: lE = lDM
16:  DE = [uE , lE ]
17: else if E is AE then
18:  DE = GetAExprDom(AE,TDom)
19: else if E is BE then
20:  DE = GetBExprDom(BE,TDom)
21: end if
22: TDom→ TDom ∪  DE
23: return  DE
24: end ExpDomEval(E)
1. Evaluating Domains of Arithmetic Expressions
The function GetAExprDom uses the domain of program inputs to symbolically
evaluate arithmetic expressions and produces a new domain of a given expres-
sion. This function is similar to the ExprDomain algorithm presented in [OJP99]
except that ExprDomain evaluates expressions recursively by finding the domains
of operands at the leaves of the expression and propagating these domains up to
compute the domain of the expression. GetAExprDom finds the domain of the ex-
pression by applying the arithmetic operation to the domains of the operands (i.e.
a data manipulator and a constant).
2. Evaluating Domains of Bitwise Expressions
The function GetBExprDom finds a possible domain for a bitwise expression. The
inputs to this function are a bitwise expression BE and the set of current domains
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of program input variables and expressions, TDom. Five bitwise operations are
considered for AAPL statements in this function: bitwise NOT (¬), AND (&), OR
(|), XOR (⊕), shift left (<<) and shift right (>>). The bitwise NOT is a unary
operation that performs bitwise negation on each bit of the operand. A bitwise
expression could be constructed from other bitwise operations consisting of a data
manipulator and a constant as operands in the expression.
The bitwise operations, AND, OR and XOR, require a pair of operands of equal
length and produce a result of the same length by performing the bitwise operation
on each pair of corresponding bits. The left and right shift operators are logical
shifts. Bitwise expressions of shift operations consist of a data manipulator and
a constant (repeat) value, which determines the number of times the single bit
shift operation is repeated. The shifts operate on the binary representation of
an unsigned integer number such that when the bits are shifted, some bits will be
discarded and zeros are shifted in (at the appropriate end). Since a bitwise left shift
(i.e. a left shift by one) is equivalent to multiplication by 2 and a bitwise right shift
(a right shift by one) is equivalent to division by 2, the function makes use of the
procedure GetAExprDom to compute the result. The function evaluates the domain
of a given bitwise expression by determining the domains of the program input
(data manipulator) and the constant, n, and computing the bitwise operations
with these domains.
6.4.2 Update Domains Procedure
1. Updating Domain Values for Bitwise Expressions
The function UpdateBEDomVal accepts three input parameters from the main pro-
cedure UpdateDomVal in Algorithm 6.5 on page 166: a bitwise expression BE, the
top and bottom values u, l of the new domain of values of BE and the set of cur-
rent input domains of program variables and expressions, TDom. Given a bitwise
expression BE, the function finds possible domain limits (u′DM , l
′
DM) of the data
manipulator DM involved in BE using the domain of BE and the constant value
used (if any) in the expression BE. At the end of the function, the new possible do-
main limits of DM are passed to the main function so the function UpdateDomVal
is called after UpdateBEDomVal to update the changes back to the current domain
of DM . The function handles all types of bitwise expression defined in the syntax
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Algorithm 6.3: GetAExprDom(AE,TDom) evaluates a new domain for an arith-
metic expression AE.
1: Input: an arithmetic expression, AE := L aop n and the set of current domains of
program expressions and inputs in TDom.
2: Output: computes a new domain for the arithmetic expression AE.
3: getOpDom(TDom,DM) returns the current domain of the data manipulator operand
DM from TDom.
4: getaop(AE) returns the arithmetic operator in AE.
5: getop1(AE) and getop2(AE) return the first and second operands in expression
AE, respectively.
6: begin GetAExprDom(AE,TDom)
7: a = getaop(BE)
8: DM = getop1(AE)
9: n = getop2(AE)
10:  DDM = getOpDom(TDom,DM), where
11:  DDM =< subdomVal1, . . . , subdomValm >
12:  Dn = getOpDom(TDom,n), where  Dn = [n, n]
13: if a is + or − then
14: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
15: if a is + then
16:  DE =  DE ∪ [li + n, ui + n]
17: else
18:  DE =  DE ∪ [li − n, ui − n]
19: end if
20: end for
21: else if a is ∗ then
22: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
23: u = ui ∗ n
24: l = li ∗ n
25: if l > u then
26:  DE =  DE ∪ [u, l]
27: else
28:  DE =  DE ∪ [l, u]
29: end if
30: end for
31: else if a is / then
32: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
33: if n == 0 then
34:  Dn = [ln, un] = [1,−1]
35: end if
36: u = ui / un
37: l = li / ln
38: if l > u then
39:  DE =  DE ∪ [u, l]
40: else
41:  DE =  DE ∪ [l, u]





45: return  DE
46: end GetAExprDom(AE,TDom)
of the AAPL program paths, see Figure 6.2 on page 144, in which a domain of a
data manipulator is computed.
For bitwise expressions using the bitwise AND, OR and XOR operations, the
function examines lBE and uBE of the expression and the constant value associated
with the expression to determine the limits of the new domain of DM . For each of
these three bitwise operations, an update evaluation technique is used to compute
possible values of the operand’s domain. The values of bits within the elements in
the domain of the expression and the constant number are examined to compute
the possible domain of the data manipulator. For instance, in the case of AND
evaluation (in Algorithm 6.6 on page 168, lines 13-37), when the value of a bit
for an element (e.g. lE) in the domain of the expression, E, is equal to 1, the
corresponding bit in the element lDM for the domain of DM is set to 1; however,
if the bit in lE for the domain of the expression, E domain is equal to 0 then the
function checks the value of the corresponding bit in the constant n and sets lDM
to 0 or x if n is 1 or 0, respectively, where x is a do-not-care value (i.e. x = 0 or 1).
In the case of OR evaluation (in Algorithm 6.6 on page 168, lines 38-48), the bit
values of the constant n are only examined to determine the value of each bit of
an element in the domain of DM . That is, when the value of a bit in n is 0 or
1, the value of the corresponding bit of the element (e.g. lDM or uDM) in DM
is either equal to the value of that corresponding bit in the element (i.e. lBE or
uBE) of E, or x, respectively. Note that if changes are required by decisions made
when evaluating the constraints, UpdateDMDomVal (in Algorithm 6.7 on page 170)
is called to find suitable values for bits that are set to x.
The update evaluation technique for handling XOR operations and computing the




¬n(i) if e(i) = 1
n(i) otherwise
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Algorithm 6.4: GetBExprDom(BE) evaluate a new domain for a bitwise expres-
sion BE.
1: Input: a bitwise expression, BE := DM bop n | ¬DM and the set of domains of
program expressions and inputs in TDom.
2: Output: computes a new domain for the bitwise expression BE.
3: procedure GetAExprDom(AE,TDom) is presented in Algorithm 6.3 on page 163
4: getOpDom(TDom,DM) returns the current domain of the data manipulator operand
DM from TDom.
5: getop1(E) and getop2(E) return the first and second operands in expression E,
respectively.
6: getbop(BE) returns the bitwise operator (including ¬) in BE.
7: max and min return the greater and the smaller of two values, respectively.
8: begin GetBExprDom(BE)
9: b = getbop(BE)
10: DM = getop1(BE)
11:  DDM = getOpDom(TDom,DM)
12: if b is ¬ then
13: uBE = max(¬(uDM ),¬(lDM ))
14: lBE = min(¬(uDM ),¬(lDM ))
15: else
16: n = getop2(BE)
17: if b is & then
18: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
19: for all element k in subdomVali do
20:  DBE =  DBE ∪ {k & n}
21: end for
22: end for
23: else if b is | then
24: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
25: for all element k in subdomVali do
26:  DBE =  DBE ∪ {k | n}
27: end for
28: end for
29: else if b is ⊕ then
30: for all subdomVali ∈  DDM where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and subdomVali = [li, ui] do
31: for all element k in subdomVali do
32:  DBE =  DBE ∪ {k ⊕ n}
33: end for
34: end for
35: else if b is  then
36: to perform a bitwise shift left, multiply DM by 2∗n, then compute the domain
of the expression:
37: k = n ∗ 2
38: return GetAExprDom(DM ∗ k,TDom)
39: else if b is  then
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Continued Algorithm 6.4
40: to perform a bitwise shift right, divide DM by 2 ∗ n, then compute the domain
of the expression:




45:  DBE = [lBE , uBE ]
46: return  DBE
47: end GetBExprDom(BE)
Algorithm 6.5: UpdateDomVal(E, l, u, TDom) updates the domains of program
input variables (data manipulators).
1: Input: an expression, E := n | DM | BE | AE, its new domain bottom, l, and
top, u, values and the set of current domains of program expressions and inputs in
TDom.
2: Output: True, if the procedure successfully modifies the domains of program inputs
or False, otherwise.
3: procedure UpdateDMDomVal in Algorithm 6.7 on page 170.
4: procedure UpdateBEDomVal in Algorithm 6.6 on page 168.
5: begin UpdateDomVal(E, l, u, TDom)
6: if E is n then
7: return True
8: else if E is DM then
9: return UpdateDMDomVal(DM, l, u, TDom)
10: else if E is BE then
11: return UpdateBEDomVal(BE, l, u, TDom)
12: else if E is AE then
13: This is part of the procedure Update in [OJP99].
14: end if
15: end UpdateDomVal(E, l, u, TDom)
Observe that the above evaluation technique is applied for both top, uDM , and bot-
tom, lDM , limits of the domain of the operand DM (in Algorithm 6.6 on page 168,
lines 49-67). Thus, d and e represent uDM and uBE in the case of computing the
top limit for the domain of DM using the top limit for the domain of BE, re-
spectively, and represent lDM and lBE in the case of computing the bottom limit
for the domain of DM using the bottom limit for the domain of BE, respectively.
The evaluation walks through each bit, d(i) (in lDM and uDM), in the domain of
the data manipulator, DM , and computes the bit value based on the value of the
corresponding bit, e(i) (in lBE and uBE), in the domain limit of the expression,
BE.
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The update evaluation techniques for bitwise left and right shift operations (<<,
>>) (in Algorithm 6.6 on the next page, lines 68 and 71, are similar to the evalu-
ation techniques for the division and multiplication operations. Thus, these two
cases are handled by the update technique of the arithmetic operations presented
in [OJP99], see case AE in Algorithm 6.5 on the preceding page.
2. Updating Domain Values for Data Manipulators
The function UpdateDMDomVal (in Algorithm 6.7 on page 170) updates the domain
of a program data manipulator based on the new values of the domain passed to
the function. The function takes as inputs a data manipulator DM , and the top
and bottom values (u and l, respectively), of the new domain and the temporary
current input domains of the program input variables and expressions.
The function consists of three main steps. The first step (Algorithm 6.7 on
page 170, lines 11-16) examines the limits u and l of the new domain and as-
signs appropriate values to bits that are labelled as do-not-care (i.e. x) – meaning
that these bits can hold either the value 1 or 0. Thus, the function assigns zeros
to do-not-care bits in l (the bottom value) and assigns ones to do-not-care bits in
u (the top value) of the new domain. This step helps to reduce the new domain
values of the data manipulator so that it contains the correct values computed
from the ExpDomEval procedure.
After all do-not-care bits (in the new top and bottom values) are replaced with
appropriate one and zero, in the second step (lines 18-23), the function handles
domains of program inputs that are involved in bitwise expressions with AND and
OR operations (if any). For the l and u of new domains that contain do-not-care
bits, the function discards a subdomain in the domain of the program input where
some of its values are not consistent with the new limits l and u. Note that lTmp
and uTmp hold the values of l and u, respectively, of the new domain, which is
passed to the function. For instance, assume that the new limits of the domain
are lTmp = uTmp = 1x1x, and that the limits of the domain of values of a data
manipulator are u = 1111 and l = 1010 before step 2. Thus, the function discards
subdomains between u and l when their values do not agree with lTmp in ones
values, e.g. 1100 and 1101 are discarded from the domain of values since the value
of the second bit is not 1. Note that this step checks all individual values in the
domain of lTmp and uTmp consistent with bit
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Algorithm 6.6: UpdateBEDomVal(BE,l,u,TDom) updates the domain of a pro-
gram data manipulator in a bitwise expression.
1: Input: a bitwise expression, BE := DM bop n | ¬DM , its new domain bottom, l,
and top, u, values and the set of current domains of program expressions and inputs
in TDom.
2: Output: True, if the procedure successfully modifies the domains of DM or False,
otherwise.
3: procedure UpdateDMDomVal in Algorithm 6.7 on page 170.
4: getbop(BE) returns the bitwise operator in BE.
5: getop1(BE) and getop2(BE) return the first and second operands in expression
BE, respectively.
6: begin UpdateBEDomVal(BE,l,u,TDom)
7: bop = getbop(BE), DM = getop1(BE) and n = getop2(BE)
8: if bop is ¬ then
9: l′DM = ¬lBE ; u′DM = ¬uBE







13: else if bop is & then
14: check each bit in lBE and compute the values of the corresponding bits in lDM :
15: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
16: if lBE(k) is 1 then
17: l′DM (k) = 1
18: else if n(k) is 0 then
19: the value of bit k in lDM could be set to 0 or 1:
20: l′DM (k) = x
21: else
22: this is the case when lBE(k) = 0 and n(k) = 1:
23: l′DM (k) = 0
24: end if
25: end for
26: now check each bit in uBE and compute the values of the corresponding bits in
uDM :
27: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
28: if uBE(k) is 1 then
29: u′DM (k) = 1
30: else if n(k) is 0 then
31: the value of bit k in uDM could be set to 0 or 1:
32: u′DM (k) = x
33: else
34: this is the case when uBE(k) = 0 and n(k) = 1:
35: u′DM (k) = 0
36: end if
37: end for
38: else if bop is | then
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Continued Algorithm 6.6
39: for each element in the domain of BE: ∀valBE ∈ [lBE, uBE]:
40: check the value of each bit i in n and compute the corresponding bit value in
valDM ∈ [l′, u′ of DM :
41: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
42: if n(k) is 0 then
43: valDM (k) = valBE(k)
44: else
45: this is the case when the value of bit k is set to x
46: valDM (k) = x
47: end if
48: end for
49: else if bop is ⊕ then
50: for each element in the domain of BE: ∀valBE ∈ [lBE, uBE] do:
51: check each bit in lBE and uBE of the expression domain and compute the corre-
sponding bit value in DM , where valDM ∈ [l′, u′]:
52: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
53: if valBE(k) is 1 then
54: valDM (k) = ¬n(k)
55: else
56: this is the case when the value of bit i in valDM is set to n(k):
57: valDM (k) = n(k)
58: end if
59: end for
60: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
61: if valBE(k) is 1 then
62: valDM (k) = ¬n(k)
63: else
64: this is the case when the value of bit k in valDM is set to n(k):
65: valDM (k) = n(k)
66: end if
67: end for
68: else if bop is << then
69: k = 2 ∗ n
70: return UpdateDMDomVal(DM*k, l, u, TDom)
71: else if bop is >> then
72: k = 2 ∗ n
73: return UpdateDMDomVal(DM/k, l, u, TDom)
74: end if




The third step attempts to reduce the current domain of DM using the new domain
values. This step is similar to the Update function presented in [OJP99] in the
sense that it discards any subdomain from the current domain of a program input
that is not contained within the limits of the new domain.
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Algorithm 6.7: UpdateDMDomVal(DM, l, u, TDom) updates the domain of a pro-
gram data manipulator.
1: Input: a data manipulator, DM := r | ∗ r | ∗ n, its new domain bottom, l, and
top, u, values and the set of current domains of program expressions and inputs in
TDom.
2: Output: True, if the procedure successfully modifies the domains of program inputs
or False, otherwise.
3: procedure remove: deletes a subdomain from the domain of DM and shifts the sub
domains of DM (i.e.renumber the labels of the subdomains).
4: procedure replace: replaces the current bottom and top values of a subdomain
with new top and bottom values and shifts the subdomains in DM ’s domain.
5: begin UpdateDMDomVal(DM, l, u, TDom)
6: the current domain of DM is  DDM =< subdomVal1, . . . , subdomValn >.
7: where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and subdomVali = [li, ui] ∈  DDM .
8: let lTmp→ l and uTmp→ u
9: step 1: check if any do-not-care bit values x exist in new l and u.
10: for all bits k in l and u, replace each bit value x with 0 and 1 in l and u, respectively.
11: for k → 0; k < 32; k++ do
12: if l(k) is x and u(k) is x then
13: l(k) = 0
14: u(k) = 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: step 2: check bit values of the bottom, li, of each subdomain in  DDM , and discard
any subdomain which its, li, does not agree with the new bit values in lTmp, note
this case applies for logic AND and OR operations only:
18: for i = 1, i ≤ n, i++ do
19: where subdomVali = [li, ui] ∈  DDM and ∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 32:




24: step 3: reduce the domain by removing any subdomains that are not contained
within the new domain range.
25: if l ≤ l1 and u ≥ un then
26: return True
27: else if l > un or u < ln then
28: return False
29: else
30: handle top value of domain first:
31: if u ≥ un then
32: no need to update the current top value of the domain, un, as it is within the
new top value, u.
33: else
34: now search (from un to u1) for a new top value and modify the domain of DM :
35: for i = n, i ≥ 1, i- - do
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Continued Algorithm 6.7
36: subdomain subdomVali = [li, ui] ∈  DDM
37: if u ≥ li and u ≤ ui then
38: discard subdomains < [u+ 1, ui], . . . , [li, ui] > from  DDM .
39: for all subdomVal ∈< [u+ 1, ui], . . . , [li, ui] > do
40: remove(TDom,DM,subdomVal)
41: end for
42: replace subdomain [li, ui] with [li, u]:
43: replace(TDom,DM,[li, u],[li, ui])
44: break()
45: else if u > ui and u < li + 1 then
46: discard subdomains < [li + 1, ui + 1], . . . , [ln, un] > from  DDM :







54: now at this point the domain of DM might be modified (i.e. reduced with a new
top value m)  DDM =< [l1, u1] . . . [lm, um]> where m ≤ n:
55: handle bottom value of domain first:
56: if l ≤ li then
57: return True
58: else
59: now search (from l1 to ln) for a new bottom value and modify the domain of
DM :
60: for i = 1, i ≤ n, i++ do
61: subdomain subdomVali = [li, ui] ∈  DDM
62: if l ≥ li and l ≤ ui then
63: replace subdomain < [li, ui] with [l, ui] >:
64: replace(TDom,DM,[l, ui],[li, ui])
65: remove < [l1, u1], . . . , [li − 1, ui − 1]> from  DDM and shift the domain (ith
subdomain becomes the 1st subdomain):
66: for subdomVal ∈< [l1, u1], . . . , [li − 1, ui − 1] > do
67: remove(TDom,DM,subdomVal)
68: end for
69: now at this point the domain of DM (both the top and bottom values)
may have been reduced.
70: return True
71: else if l > ui and l < li + 1 then
72: discard subdomains < [l1, u1], . . . , [li, ui] > from  DDM and shift the domain
such that the ith subdomain becomes the 1st subdomain:
73: for subdomVal ∈< [l1, u1], . . . , [li, ui] > do
74: remove(TDom,DM,subdomVal)
75: end for






80: at this point the new value [l, u] is not contained within the domain of DM :
81: return False
82: end if
83: end UpdateDMDomVal(DM, l, u, TDom)
6.4.3 Examples
This section provides two examples to show how the extended DDR algorithm
handles AAPL program inputs and generates test data.
Example 6.3. Given a program and its control flow graph, as shown in Figure 6.7
on the following page, let the program inputs ( data manipulators) be r0, r1 and
*129. The program fetches the memory location pointed to by *129 and updates the
values of data manipulators r1 and *129 based on the values of program inputs
r0 and *129. Assume that the initial domains  Dr0,  Dr1,  D*129 of the input data
manipulators are as follows:
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7]
To generate a test case for the program, let the path pi =< 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 >
be the input path for the algorithm. Note that the selected path consists of four
assignment statements, two conditional and two unconditional jump statements.
The first statement in the path is handled and the expression in the statement is
symbolically evaluated by the procedure ExprDomEval (Algorithm 6.2 on page 161)
where r3 is evaluated to the expression r0 & 5. The expression r0 & 5 is assigned
a new domain where the bottom and the top values of the domain,  Dr0 & 5, are
lr0 & 5 = 0 and ur0 & 5 = 5, respectively. Note that Algorithm 6.4 on page 165 in
lines 17-22 computes the domain of the expression as  Dr0 & 5 = {0, 1, 4, 5} (i.e.
there are two subdomains,  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 5] >). The next statement to be
handled in pi is statement 2 (a conditional statement) and the constraint associated
with the edge (2, 3) in the control flow graph (Figure 6.7 on the next page) is
r3 ≤ 4. Since r3 is evaluated to the expression r0 & 5, the algorithm needs to
find a suitable subdomain of values for r0 & 5 using  Dr0 & 5 such that it satisfies
the current constraint. The domain of r0 & 5 satisfies case 2 in the GetSplit
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P :
1 START: r3:=r0 & 5
2 (r3 > 4) JMP ELSE
3 r1:=4
4 r3:=r3+1
5 (r0>*129) JMP ELSE


















Figure 6.7: A code fragment in AAPL and its control flow graph for Exam-
ple 6.3.
procedure, where (lr0 & 5 ≤ 4) and (ur0 & 5 ≥ 4); thus, the split point is computed
as sp = (u4− l4) ∗ 1/2 + l4 = 4 where 4 is the right hand side sub-expression of the
boolean expression and  D4 = [4, 4]. The domain of the expression r0 & 5 is reduced
to  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] > and procedure UpdateDMDomVal (in Algorithm 6.7
on page 170, lines 18-23) propagates the changes down to the program input r0.
Note that procedure UpdateBEDomVal in Algorithm 6.6 on page 168 (lines 13-
37) computes the corresponding bit values of the bottom and top values of each
subdomain of r0 domain. For each subdomain in  Dr0 & 5, the procedure computes
the top and bottom of the subdomain of r0 domain, yielding  Dr0 =< [0, 4], [6, 6] >
(i.e.  Dr0 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6}). The current domain of program inputs becomes as
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follows:
 Dr0 =< [0, 4], [6, 6] >,  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7]
The next two statements in the path are statements 3 and 4, which are assign-
ment commands. These statements are symbolically evaluated where r1 and r3
are evaluated to expressions 4 and (r0 & 5) + 1, respectively. A new domain for
the expression r3+1 is created by adding one to the bottom and top values of the
domain of the expression r0 & 5, yielding  Dr3+1 =< [1, 2], [5, 5] >. Note that at
this point, the domain of the program input data manipulators r0 and r1 are not
changed. Then statement 5 is handled and since it is a conditional jump com-
mand the constraint (r0 ≤ *129) associated with the edge (5, 6) in the control
flow graph is evaluated. Examining the domains of data manipulators involved in
the constraint, case 1 in the GetSplit procedure is satisfied and the split point is
sp = (ur0− lr0)∗1/2+ lr0 = 3 (where lr0 = 0 and ur0 = 6). The domains of r0 and
*129 are only reduced by the UpdateDMDomVal procedure and the current domain
values of the program input becomes:
 Dr0 = [0, 3],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [3, 7]
Finally, the algorithm reaches statement 6 in the selected path where the symbolic
expression *129 ⊕ 3 is assigned to *129 and a new domain for the expression
is created  D*129 ⊕ 3 =< [0, 0], [4, 7] >. Statement 7 is an unconditional jump
command, which moves the control flow to statement 9 and exits the path. At this
point, the final domains of program inputs r0, r1 and *129 are:
 Dr0 = [0, 3],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [3, 7]
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Below are the steps taken to reduce the domains of program input data manipula-
tors and expressions:
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7]
1 r3:=r0 & 5
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 5] >
2 r3 ≤ 4 (split point for r0 & 5 selected is 4)
 Dr0 =< [0, 4], [6, 6] >,  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] >
3 r1:=4
 Dr0 =< [0, 4], [6, 6] >,  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] >,
 D4 = [4, 4]
4 r3:=r3+1
 Dr0 =< [0, 4], [6, 6] >,  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [0, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] >,
 Dr3+1 =< [1, 2], [5, 5]
2 r0 ≤ *129 (split point for r0 and *129 selected is 3)
 Dr0 = [0, 3],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [3, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] >,
 Dr3+1 =< [1, 2], [5, 5]
3 *129:= *129⊕ 3
 Dr0 = [0, 3],  Dr1 = [0, 7],  D∗129 = [3, 7],  Dr0 & 5 =< [0, 1], [4, 4] >,
 Dr3+1 =< [1, 2], [5, 5],  D*129 ⊕ 3 =< [0, 0], [4, 7] >
Test data input can be selected randomly from within the values of the domains of
the program inputs, r0, r1 and *129. Any selected test case should exercise the
selected path and satisfy all the constraints on the path. For example, the test case
< 3, 4, 3 > is produced by randomly selecting one value for each data manipulator
from their domains  Dr0,  Dr1 and  D*129, respectively. When the program is executed
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using this test case the following path statements are exercised:
test case: < r0 = 3, r1 = 4, *129 = 3 >
node statement path constraint
1 START: r3:=r0 & 5 (r3 = 1)
2 (r3 ≤ 4) (1 ≤ 4)
3 r1:=4 (r1 = 4)
4 r3:=r3+1 (r3 = 2)
5 (r0 ≤ *129) (3 ≤ 3)
6 *129:= *129⊕ r1 (*129 = 7)
7 JMP END
9 END: RTN
Example 6.4. Given a program and its control flow graph, as shown in Figure 6.8
on the following page, which contains a loop, assume the program inputs ( data
manipulators) are r0, r1 and r2. The program updates the memory location *r1
pointed to by the value of r1 in a given state inside the loop at instructions in lines
2, 5, 7 and 9. There are three branching destinations, LOOP, ELSE and END, in the
CFG where the program control flow may go. In this example, the algorithm will
compute for the path pi =< 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 1, 9, 10 > a test case that exercises the
loop only once. Assume that the initial domains of the input data manipulators
are as follows:
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [6, 15]
Note that the selected path consists of four assignment statements, three conditional
and two unconditional jump statements. The first statement in pi is a conditional
jump command and constraint associated with the edge (1, 2) in the control flow
graph (Figure 6.8 on the next page) (i.e. r0 < r2). The algorithm needs to find
a suitable subdomain of values for r0 and r2 such that they satisfy the current
constraint. The domains of r0 and r2 satisfy case 4 in the GetSplit procedure,
where (lr0 ≤ lr2) and (ur0 ≤ ur2) and (lr2 ≤ ur0), thus, the split point is computed
as sp = (ur2 − lr0) ∗ 1/2 + lr0 = 8. The domain of r2 is reduced to  Dr2 = [8, 15].
The current domain of program inputs becomes as follows:
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [8, 15]
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P :
1 LOOP: (r0 ≥ r2) JMP END
2 *r1:=r2 + 1
3 r0:=r0 << 1
4 (r0 < r1) JMP ELSE




















Figure 6.8: A code fragment in AAPL and its control flow graph for Exam-
ple 6.4.
The next two statements in the path are statements 2 and 3, which are assignment
commands. These statements are symbolically evaluated and the domains of pro-
gram data manipulators *r1 and r0 are not changed. The method creates a new do-
main for the expressions r2+1 and r0<<1. Then we have,  Dr2+1 = [lr2+1, ur2+1] =
[9, 16] and  Dr0 << 1=[l(r0<<1),u(r0<<1)] where l(r0<<1) = lr0<<1 and u(r0<<1) = ur0<<1.
Thus,  Dr0<<1 consists of even values where  Dr0<<1 =<subdomVal1, . . . , subdomValn>
(where subdomValn is a sub-domain of contiguous values) and n ≥ 1, i.e.  Dr0<<1 =<
[0, 0], [2, 2], [4, 4], . . . , [14, 14] > (Algorithm 6.4 on page 165 lines 35-38). Then
statement 4 is handled and since it is a conditional jump command the constraint
(r0 ≥ r1) associated with the edge (4, 7) in the control flow graph is evaluated and
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r0 is expressed by the symbolic value r0<<1. In the GetSplit procedure, case 2 is
satisfied between  Dr0<<1 and  Dr1; the split point is calculated as sp = (ur1 − lr1) ∗
1/2 + lr1 = 3. Then the procedure UpdateDMDomVal takes sp and reduces the do-
mains of r0<<1 and r1 and produces  Dr0<<1 =< [4, 4], [6, 6], [8, 8] . . . , [14, 14] > and
 Dr1 = [1, 3]. Since the expression, r0<<1, is symbolically assigned to r0 at node
3, the reduced domain values of expression r0<<1 are propagated back by procedure
UpdateBEDomVal (Algorithm 6.6 on page 168 lines 68-70) to compute the current
domain of r0 right before statement 3. Now, the current domains of the program
inputs are:
 Dr0 = [2, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 15]
Statement 7 is the next statement in the path and since it is an assignment com-
mand, it is evaluated symbolically where *r1 is expressed by r0 (i.e. *r1 = r0).
Then statement 8, which is an unconditional jump statement, transfers the con-
trol flow to the beginning of the loop. Statement 1 is re-evaluated such that the
edge (1,9) has to be traversed. The constraint r0 ≥ r2 is evaluated; note that
at this point r0 is still expressed by the symbolic value r0<<1 where  Dr0<<1 =<
[4, 4], [6, 6], . . . , [14, 14] >. In procedure GetSplit, case 4 is satisfied where (lr0<<1 ≤
lr2) and (ur0<<1 ≤ ur2) and (lr2 ≤ ur0<<1). The split point in this case is 10. The new
domains of r0<<1 and r2 after splitting are  Dr0<<1 =< [10, 10], [12, 12], [14, 14] >
and  Dr2 = [8, 9]. To propagate the changes to the current input domain of r0, the
procedure UpdateBEDomVal takes the computed domain  Dr0<<1 and updates  Dr0.
Now the current domains of the program input data manipulators after statement
1 become:
 Dr0 = [5, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 10]
Finally, statements 9 and 10 are reached, where statement 9 is an assignment
command and statement 10 is an unconditional jump command. Both commands
have no effect on the current domain values of the program input and thus, the
algorithm terminates, and the set of domains of program inputs is computed.
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Below are the steps taken to reduce the domains of program input data manipula-
tors and expressions:
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [6, 15]
1 r0 < r2 (split point for r0 and r2 selected is 8)
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [8, 15]
2 *r1:=r2 + 1
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [8, 15],  Dr2+1 = [9, 16]
3 r0:=r0 << 1
 Dr0 = [0, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 4],  Dr2 = [8, 15],  Dr2+1 = [9, 16],
 Dr0<<1 =< [0, 0], [2, 2], . . . , [14, 14] >
4 r0 ≥ r1 (split point for r0<<1 and r1 selected is 3)
 Dr0 = [2, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 15],  Dr2+1 = [9, 16],
 Dr0<<1 =< [4, 4], [6, 6], [8, 8] . . . , [14, 14] >
7 *r1:=r0
 Dr0 = [2, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 15],  Dr2+1 = [9, 16],
 Dr0<<1 =< [4, 4], [6, 6], [8, 8] . . . , [14, 14] >
8 JMP LOOP
 Dr0 = [2, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 15],  Dr2+1 = [9, 16],
 Dr0<<1 =< [4, 4], [6, 6], [8, 8] . . . , [14, 14] >
1 r0 ≥ r2 (split point for r0<<1 and r2 selected is 10)
 Dr0 = [5, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 10],  Dr2+1 = [9, 11],
 Dr0<<1 =< [10, 10], [12, 12], [14, 14] >
9 *r1:=0
 Dr0 = [5, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 10],  Dr2+1 = [9, 11],
 Dr0<<1 =< [10, 10], [12, 12], [14, 14] >,  D0 = [0, 0]
10 RTN
 Dr0 = [5, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3],  Dr2 = [8, 10],  Dr2+1 = [9, 11],
 Dr0<<1 =< [10, 10], [12, 12], [14, 14] >,  D0 = [0, 0]
Test data input can be selected randomly from within the values of the domains
of the program inputs. Any selected test case should exercise the selected path
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and satisfy all the constraints on the path. For example, the test case < 5, 2, 8>
is produced by randomly selecting one value for each data manipulator from its
domain,  Dr0 = [5, 7],  Dr1 = [1, 3] and  Dr2 = [8, 9], respectively. When the program
is executed using this test case the following path statements are exercised:
test case: < r0 = 5, r1 = 2, r2 = 8 >
node statement path constraint
1 LOOP: (r0<r2) (5 < 8)
2 *r1:=r2+1 (*2 = 9)
3 r0:=r0<<1 (r0 = 10)
4 (r0 ≥ r1) (10 ≥ 2)
7 ELSE: *r1:=r0 (∗2 = 10)
8 JMP LOOP
1 LOOP: (r0 ≥ r2) JMP END (10 ≥ 8)
9 END: *r1:=0 (*2 = 0)
10 RTN
6.5 The Correctness Proof of Extended DDR
The semantic evaluations of the DDR analysis for a CFG path are phrased
in terms of successive approximations of the set of all possible states, ΣP , of a
program P and the symbolic evaluation of expressions at every program path
statement S. For the rest of this chapter we use ddrAlg to refer to the DDR
algorithm. Let pi be a finite path in the CFG of an AAPL program P and ΣP be
the set of all possible states of P . We let  Dpi ⊆ ΣP be the domains of program
input data manipulators calculated by applying DDR to pi, i.e.  Dpi = ddrAlg(pi).
For the set of all possible initial states of a program P , ΣP , each program data
manipulator input dm is initially assigned a domain (i.e. a set of possible input
values for dm). Then, as ddrAlg evaluates the statements in pi, the domains of
the program input data manipulators may be dynamically reduced to satisfy the
constraints in the path. Thus, after each constraint is evaluated, the domains of
the program input data manipulators are modified and may be reduced to smaller
domains than the initial domains. Thus, the output of ddrAlg for a finite CFG
path pi of P is  Dpi = { Ddm1 × . . . ×  Ddmk}, a cross product of all k input data
manipulators of P .
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Our conjecture for the correctness property of the DDR analysis is that ddrAlg is
correct if ∀σ ∈ ΣP and we have  Dpi ⊆ ΣP . That is, the algorithm finds a subset
of initial domains of program input data manipulators such that when executing
the program using test data, x, selected from  Dpi, the set of output states at the
end of the path is reached (Theorem 6.1). The set of output (reachable) states is
represented by the reachability semantics of AAPL path in Figure 6.2 on page 144.
From Section 6.3, we observe that ddrAlg uses two main procedures, GetSplit
and Update, to find a solution that is a subset of the initial domains of the pro-
gram input data manipulators. Thus, it is important to show that ∀σ ∈ ΣP (the
set of initial states) and ∀dm (program input variables), GetSplit and Update
modify the data manipulators’ domains such that the computed domains are con-
tained within the initial domains of the data manipulators. Lemma 6.1 covers the
correctness of GetSplit and Lemma 6.2 presents the correctness of Update. In
Lemma 6.3, we show that whenever ddrAlg produces a solution  Dpi for a given
path, pi, it is always contained within the given set of initial states of program
input data manipulators. In Theorem 6.1, we prove that ddrAlg is correct with
respect to the reachability semantics of AAPL path such that the set of reachable
states for pi given by the domain  Dpi is a subset of the set of all possible reachable
states for pi according to the semantics of AAPL.
The Correctness of Procedure GetSplit:
Given a pair of domain values of two program input variables, the procedure
GetSplit attempts to find a split point whenever there is an overlap between the
pair of domains. In Lemma 6.1, we show that the procedure always finds a split
point value which is an element of both given domains of program input variables.
We let Π denote a set of finite paths in the CFG of an AAPL program. Also,
let dm be a data manipulator in a program P , and for a given state σ ∈ ΣP ,
the domain of dm denoted by DomValΣdm represents the set of values that dm can
have in σ, i.e. DomValΣdm = {v | ∃σ ∈ ΣP , σ[dm 7→ v]}. Furthermore, we let





dm) and udm = max(DomVal
Σ
dm).
Lemma 6.1. For a program P , let dm1, dm2 be program input variables of P and
∃pi ∈ Π of the CFG of P , and .
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Whenever
DomValΣdm1 ∩DomValΣdm2 6= {∅},
the function GetSplit always produces a split point sp such that
sp ∈ DomValΣdm1 ∩ DomValΣdm2
Proof Assume that there exists a non-empty set, DomValΣdm1∩ DomValΣdm2. There
are four cases to consider for the GetSplit function when computing sp. These







), udm1 = max(DomVal
Σ
dm1




max(DomValΣdm2) and the search point index 0 ≤ i ≤ 1.
1. When (ldm1 ≥ ldm2)∧(udm1 ≥ udm2). We note that DomValΣdm1∩ DomValΣdm2 =
DomValΣdm1. Then to compute the split point for this case, we use the equation
sp = (udm1 − ldm1) ∗ i+ ldm1 (by GetSplit)
and ∀i 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 we get ldm1 ≤ sp ≤ udm1. It follows that we have sp ∈
DomValΣdm1.
2. When (ldm1 ≤ ldm2) ∧ (udm1 ≥ udm2), we have the same result as step 1 (by
symmetry).
3. When (ldm1 ≥ ldm2)∧(udm1 ≥ udm2)∧(udm2 ≥ ldm1). We note that DomValΣdm1∩
DomValΣdm2 = W = {ldm1 , . . . , udm2}. Then to compute the split point for this
case, we use the equation
sp = (udm2 − ldm1) ∗ i+ ldm1 (by GetSplit)
and ∀i 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 we get ldm1 ≤ sp ≤ udm2. It follows that we have sp ∈ W .
4. When (ldm1 ≤ ldm2)∧(udm1 ≤ udm2)∧(udm1 ≤ ldm2). We note that DomValΣdm1∩
DomValΣdm2 = W = {ldm2 , . . . , udm1}. Then to compute the split point for this
case, we use the equation
sp = (udm1 − ldm2) ∗ i+ ldm2 (by GetSplit)
and ∀i 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 we get ldm2 ≤ sp ≤ udm1. It follows that we have sp ∈ W .
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This completes the proof.
Lemma 6.1 shows that when the function GetSplit computes a split point between
a pair of intersecting domains of two program input variables, the split point is
chosen to be a value contained within the overlapping region of the two domains
so that the dynamic domain reduction algorithm safely reduces the two domains.
The domain of a program input variable is then modified (reduced) by procedure
Update, using the calculated split point. Next we present a lemma that proves
Update always reduces a given domain of a program input variable DomVal by
including a subset of values of the program input variables that is part of the
ddrAlg solution.
The Correctness of Procedure Update:
Let us assume that for the set of states of a program P , a domain of the program
input variable, dm, is a set of sub-domains, i.e.
DomValΣdm =< [l1, u1], . . . , [ln, un] >
where ldm = l1 = min(DomVal
Σ
dm) and udm = un = max(DomVal
Σ
dm). The function
Update takes the domain of dm as an input and updates the domain such that the






Lemma 6.2. Given the set of possible states Σ of a program P , ∃pi ∈ Π of the










Proof (Proof by Contradiction) We let l and u be the new minimum and maxi-
mum values of the domain of dm. Assume to the contrary that the function Update
is feasible and the computed new domain values DomVal
Σ
dm are not contained in
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Then we have ∃s ∈ DomValΣdm such that s /∈ DomValΣdm. There are two cases in
which the function Update is feasible and DomVal
Σ
dm is produced.
• When l ≤ l1∧u ≥ un, we note that the current DomValΣdm is contained within





dm, which contradicts our assumption.
• When DomValΣdm is not fully contained within the given limits, the function
Update attempts to reduce DomValΣdm. Let k be a set of domain values in
DomValΣdm where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, n = |DomValΣdm| and
DomValΣdm =< [l1, u1], . . . , [ln, . . . , un] >,
the function modifies the domain of dm via the value limits udm and ldm in
two steps:
1. udm is handled, and for each set k in the domain, the function proceeds in
three cases:
• When u ≤ un the function does not need to change udm.
• When u ≥ lk ∧ u ≤ uk, the function removes the subdomains D =<
[lk+1, uk], . . . , [ln, un] > and produces the modified domain DomVal
Σ
dm =
DomValΣdm \D. It follows that we have DomVal
Σ
dm ⊆ DomValΣdm, which
is the same contradiction.
• When u > uk ∧ u < lk + 1, the function removes the subdomains





dm \D. It follows that we have DomVal
Σ
dm ⊆
DomValΣdm and we get the same contradiction.
2. At this point, the domain of dm may be updated by one of the cases in the
previous step, thus, we let
DomValΣdm =< [l1, u1], . . . , [lm, . . . , um] >
where m ≤ n. Then for each set k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, in the domain, the function
modifies ldm in one of the following three cases:
• When l ≤ l1 the function does not need to change ldm.
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• When l ≥ lk ∧ l ≤ uk, the function replaces the subdomain [lk, uk] with
[l, uk], and removes the subdomains
D =< [lk, uk], . . . , [lk − 1, uk − 1] > from DomValΣdm. Then, the mod-




dm \ D. It follows that we have
DomVal
Σ
dm ⊆ DomValΣdm, which is the same contradiction.
• When l > uk ∧ l < lk + 1, the function removes the subdomains D =<
[l1, u1], . . . , [lk, uk] > from the variable domain, shifts the domain list
where the i + 1th subdomain becomes the first subdomain and produces




dm \ D. It follows that we
have the same contradiction that DomVal
Σ
dm ⊆ DomValΣdm.
3. This step is only applied when the algorithm handles bitwise expressions of
type AND and OR, and where the values of some bits of the new domain limit
l and u may be set to “x” (i.e., do-not-care values) meaning that the bits
are allowed to be assigned values 0 or 1. These do-not-care bits are not con-
sidered during the update procedure; however, the bits with 1 values are used
to determine which values in DomValΣdm should be discarded and to reduce
the domain. In this case, the domain of dm is modified such that it only
contains values that agree with the new limits, i.e. l and u of the domain.
Therefore, the domain of dm might be reduced further by removing some
subdomains that contain irrelevant values. Assume that there exists some
subdomain subdomVal ∈ DomValΣdm, and ∃val ∈ subdomVal s.t. val /∈ [l, u]
(the new domain of dm), then when function Update checks that the bits
of val do not match with 1′s bits in l and u (Step 2, lines 18-23 in Algo-
rithm 6.7 on page 170), subdomVal is removed from the domain. Eventually,
this step walks through all subdomains and whenever it finds incorrect values
the domain of dm is reduced and computes a domain DomVal
Σ
dm which is a
contradiction.
This completes the proof.
The Correctness of ddrAlg:
Next we show that for any given complete path pi, whenever ddrAlg computes
a solution  Dpi for the test data, the computed domains of the program input
variables in  Dpi are always contained within the initial domains of the program
input variables.
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Lemma 6.3. ∀pi ∈ Π of the CFG of a program P , ∀s ∈ pi,∀σ ∈ Σ let  Dpi =
ddrAlg(pi) where pi =< s1, . . . , sk > and k ≥ 1. Also, let pi′ = pi.s where s
is a path statement in the CFG such that pi′ is produced by extending pi with
an adjacent statement, s, of the statement sk in the program CFG. Whenever
 Dpi′ = ddrAlg(pi
′), it holds that
 Dpi′ ⊆  Dpi
Proof (By induction on the length of pi) Assume that for path pi the algorithm
produces  Dpi = ddrAlg(pi). Next we add one more path statement sk+1 to pi such
that pi′ =< s1, . . . , sk, sk+1 >. In order to compute  Dpi′ = ddrAlg(pi′) it is sufficient
to apply the algorithm on the new added statement sk+1 with the current domain
of input variables  Dpi. To this end, there are two cases to consider for sk+1:
• If sk+1 is an action statement, e.g., sk+1 = dm := e, PUSH e, POP dm, . . .
etc., then the algorithm ddrAlg symbolically evaluates the statement, creates a
new domain for the expression in the statement and the domain of inputs  Dpi
is not affected in this case. Thus, the new domain is  Dpi′ =  Dpi = ddrAlg(pi
′).
• If sk+1 is a Boolean statement, i.e., sk+1 = B, then the algorithm checks
that the current domains of the inputs satisfy the Boolean expression B, and
it makes use of the functions GetSplit and Update in order to reduce the
domains of sub-expressions involved if B was not satisfied. Two cases for
the outcome of the Boolean expression B need to be considered:
– When B = True the constraint is satisfied by the current domain, i.e.,
 Dpi and the algorithm does not need to modify the domains. Thus,
 Dpi′ =  Dpi = ddrAlg(pi
′).
– When B = False, the constraint is not satisfied and the algorithm
attempts to modify  Dpi to satisfy the constraint. Thus, the algorithm
uses the functions GetSplit and Update to reduce the current do-
main. By Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, we infer that whenever the function
GetSplit finds a split point sp and the function Update is feasible w.r.t.
to sp, the produced domain is contained within the original domain,
i.e.  Dpi′ ⊆  Dpi.
This completes the proof.
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Now we are in the position to establish the desired correctness result of the dynamic
domain reduction algorithm.
Theorem 6.1. Given an AAPL program P , ∀pi ∈ Π of the CFG of P , we denote by
[[· ]]′ the reachability semantics function for computing the reachable output states
R for pi. If  Dpi = ddrAlg(pi), then ∀σ ∈  Dpi, we have
[[pi]]σ ∈ [[pi]]′Σ
Proof Assume ∀σ ∈  Dpi, [[pi]]σ ∈ [[pi]]′Σ (IH).
Let  Dpi.s = ddrAlg(pi.s), and by Lemma 6.3 and by IH, we infer that ∀σ ∈  Dpi.s,
and we have σ ∈  Dpi and [[pi]]σ ∈ [[pi]]′Σ. Therefore, our proof must show that
[[pi.s]]σ ∈ [[pi.s]]′Σ. Also, we know that [[pi.s]]σ = [[s]]([[pi]]σ), thus, there are four
cases for statement s to be considered:
• Case s = dm := e. Here we consider the case where the data manipulator,
dm, is equal to some expression e. Assume that expression e is equal to
some value v in the reachability semantics rule fe[[e]]Σ = v. We know that
dm is assigned to some outcome of the evaluation of expression e. We apply
the reachability semantics rule [[dm := e]]′Σ = {[[pi]]σ[dm 7→ {v}] | [[pi]]σ ∈
Σ∧{v ∈ fe[[e]]([[pi]]σ)}}, which produces a final state where ([[pi]]σ)[dm 7→ {v}].
We know that < dm, ([[pi]]σ) > →E < v, ([[pi]]σ) > holds using the small-
step semantics axiom of a data manipulator. So, we can conclude that
[[dm := e]]([[pi]]σ) ∈ [[dm := e]]′Σ.
• Case s = PUSH e. Here we consider the case where a memory location (a data
manipulator, dm) defined by the stack,SP , is assigned a value (the outcome
of the evaluation of expression e). We apply the reachability semantics rule of
the command: [[PUSH e]]′Σ = Σ′ = {σ[dm 7→ {v}] | σ ∈ Σ, SP 7→ SP−1, dm =
SP, {v ∈ fe[[e]]Σ}}, and a final state is produced where ([[pi]]σ)[dm 7→ {v}].
We know that < dm, ([[pi]]σ) > →E < v, ([[pi]]σ) > holds using the small-
step semantics axiom of a data manipulator. So, we can conclude that
[[PUSH e]]([[pi]]σ) ∈ [[PUSH e]]′Σ.
• Case s = POP dm. Here we consider the case where the data manipulator, dm
is assigned to a value from the stack (i.e. pointed to by the stack register SP ).
Assume that the stack register is evaluated to some value v in the reacha-
bility semantics rule fe[[SP ]]Σ = v. We apply the reachability semantics rule
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[[POP dm]]′Σ = {[[pi]]σ[dm 7→ {v}] | [[pi]]σ ∈ Σ ∧ {v ∈ fe[[SP ]]([[pi]]σ)}} ∪ Σ,
which produces a final state where ([[pi]]σ)[dm 7→ {v}]. We know that <
dm, ([[pi]]σ)>→E <v, ([[pi]]σ)> holds using the small-step semantics axiom of
a data manipulator. So, we can conclude that [[POP dm]]([[pi]]σ) ∈ [[POP dm]]′Σ.
• Case s = B. Here we consider the case when the statement is a Boolean
expression. Assume that the evaluation of B is true and fb[[B]]Σ = Σ
′,
then the one rule in the reachability semantics whose outcome looks like
this is fb[[B]]Σ = {([[pi]]σ) ∈ Σ | ([[pi]]σ) ` B ⇒ True} ∪ Σ. This rule
requires B = True in ([[pi]]σ). Since B = True in ([[pi]]σ), we know that
< B > →BExp < True, ([[pi]]σ) > holds by using the inference rule of small-
step semantics. So we conclude that [[B]]([[pi]]σ) ∈ [[B]]′Σ.
6.6 Related Work
The goal of our work is to extend the dynamic domain reduction technique to
a low-level programming language, namely AAPL. The extended technique allows
us to generate input test cases for all possible feasible execution paths. A more
complete picture of the trace semantics of a (malicious) code sample can be pro-
duced using test cases. This is similar to software testing where many test input
generation techniques [BJS+06, DO91, GBR98, GMS98] have been developed to
analyse programs in an attempt to find inputs that trigger bugs. They differ from
our extension of the DDR technique because the goal of these approaches is to
reach a certain node in the control flow of a program, and not to capture the
complete program execution trace semantics. Other testing techniques have been
proposed that cover multiple paths of a program to detect program errors. For
example, [CGP+06] and [MKK07a] presented systems that can explore multiple
program execution paths that depend on interesting input. Both systems use
a similar symbolic execution technique to handle specific inputs. However, the
main differences from the extended dynamic domain reduction approach are that,
first, in [CGP+06] the goal is to search for execution paths that lead to program
bugs, and second, in [MKK07a] the goal is to record comprehensive behavioural
profiles of malicious code by saving snapshots of the program environment and,
thus, explore alternative execution paths. While the objective of the DDR ap-
proach is to create a set of test data in which all feasible program paths can be
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exercised. The system that is closest to the extended DDR approach is [ARJ07].
The system allows automatically generated input sequences to exercise a high
coverage of a low-level program code and is based on static binary analysis and
symbolic propagation. That is, symbolic formulas are generated, which represent
input constraints at input-dependent program instructions, and these depend on
the symbolically propagated program input values. Then the system can identify
different input-dependent paths. Similar to our approach, the system can oper-
ate on low-level binary programs and it covers all possible program paths in the
program control flow graph. The system produces an input sequence, which trig-
gers the execution of a new path. The method of generating test data in their
system is similar to that in the DDR extension for AAPL. The difference is that
their approach requires the translation of input-dependent instructions into a set
of Simple Theorem Prover (STP) [Gan07] conditional formulas in order to validate
path conditions and generate test data. Also, none of the above testing techniques
have been proved to be correct with respect to their computed test input values,
while we show that the extended DDR method for low-level programs produces
a subset of the value domains of the program inputs, which can be used as test
cases to traverse the feasible program paths.
Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) techniques have been applied to test data
generation. For solving a TDG problem, a CLP technique dynamically builds a
constraint system, which consists of program input variables, domains and con-
straints. The process of solving a constraint system has three main components:
1) a constraint propagation method, which makes use of the constraints to reduce
the search space, 2) a constraint entailment method, which tries to produce new
constraints from existing ones, 3) a labelling procedure. Unlike symbolic-based
approaches to test data generation, the CLP approach integrates path selection
and constraint-solving steps into a single step. That is, symbolic execution of the
CLP-translated program can be performed by relying on the standard evaluation
mechanism of CLP, which provides backtracking and handling of symbolic expres-
sions for free. A CLP-based method, which tackles the problem of automatic test
data generation, is described in Gotlieb et al. [GBR00]. A CLP system is given to
find program test data. A constraint system over CLP is generated and solved to
check whether at least one feasible control flow path passing through the selected
point exists, and to generate test data automatically, which correspond to one of
these paths. The main idea of the approach is the use of constraint entailment
techniques to reduce the search space efficiently. In the proposed CLP framework,
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test data can be generated without following a path through the program. Also,
the approach proposed in [GzAP10] presents a whole test data generation frame-
work for an object-oriented (OO) imperative language using CLP. The approach
has two steps: first, the imperative program is compiled into an equivalent CLP
program and, second, the test data generation process is performed on the CLP
program by relying only on CLP’s evaluation mechanisms. This approach has
one main advantage in that the whole test data generation process is formulated
using CLP only. That is, their method translates the program into a constraint
logic program for which symbolic execution is performed (without the need to
define specific constraint operators). However, our method for finding test data
was developed to consider low-level programming language features, incorporating
backtracking and domain-splitting mechanisms.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed an extended version of the Dynamic Domain Re-
duction method (DDR) for AAPL programs. The goal of the DDR technique is to
automatically find a domain of program inputs that can be used to produce test
data for feasible program paths. To adapt this method for low-level executable
malware programs, first, we developed an extension of the DDR algorithm for
analysing executable malware programs (low-level code). Then we showed that
the DDR method is correct in producing an under-approximation solution (a sub-
set) from the initial domains of the program input variables. With automated test
data generation using the extended DDR technique, comprehensive analysis of
feasible program paths can be performed. In addition, the method automatically
provides safe under-approximation program inputs, which can be used by mal-
ware detection systems to trigger and capture malicious behaviour. In particular,
this method can improve our semantic signature generation by simulating more
feasible paths with test cases, and, hence, extracting new semantic traces. The
examples provided in this chapter demonstrate that the extended DDR algorithm
for low-level programs computes a subset of values for program input variables as
test data for a feasible path.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Malware has become a profitable business model for cybercriminals. Today, more
than ever before, malware constantly poses a greater threat to individuals, busi-
nesses and government infrastructures. To overwhelm the power of existing AV
tools, malware writers have increasingly used polymorphism and metamorphism
techniques for increasing the production of stealthy variants of known malware.
In this dissertation, we presented new methods for the analysis and detection of
(possibly obfuscated) new malware variants. The main idea of our approach is
that (part of) the semantics of malware code, preserved across successive vari-
ants of the malware, can be used as a signature for detecting code variants. As a
step towards tackling the malware variant detection problem using this idea, we
introduced program trace semantics, or semantic signatures, as an abstraction of
code semantics for identifying new instances of the malware. In Chapter 4, we
described a trace-slicing method and showed that the method produces a correct
trace slice with respect to given trace-slicing criteria for executables. The slicing
step in the signature generation phase helps in tackling the effects of a class of ob-
fuscating techniques in subsequent code variants and allows for improved efficiency
of detection.
Our malware variant detection system in Chapter 5 is based on matching the
semantics of traces of simulated malware code. A semantic simulator is devel-
oped for the system to simulate malware executable files and to capture semantic
traces. That is, the semantic simulator is a static program analyser for simulat-
ing the execution of abstract machine code. We developed a matching algorithm
for identifying malicious code instances. We demonstrated how the trace-slicing
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method for generating semantic signatures produces an improvement in detection
times and detection accuracy compared with detection without the trace-slicing
method.
We proposed a testing analysis technique, and in Chapter 6 we proved it to be a
correct analysis for approximating the semantics of malicious executables through
identifying a set of test inputs for a set of feasible program paths. A test input
is part of the semantic signature of the malicious program, which can be used to
identify some of the malicious behaviour in new variants of the program.
Our proposed approach cannot solve the problem of malware detection, but it
provides an important step towards incorporating program trace semantics for
detection of malicious code instances and, thus, raising the bar for malware writers.
We believe that current malware detection tools can be amended with our method
to tackle new, unrecognised variants of an existing malware. Our method can be
utilised in much the same way that signatures are currently used to detect malware,
however, we can clearly enhance and decentralise the phases of distributing new
semantic signatures and recognising new malware variants. Also, a possibility, as
a particular use of our tool, is the use of the approach as a classification tool for
analysing variants of malware samples at AV laboratories.
We envision that our approach will pave the way and inspire researchers in this
area to arrive at more systematic methods for tackling some issues related to the
semantics-based approach in the following areas:
1. Discover hidden abstract traces. This dissertation only presents semantics-
based techniques for detecting malicious executables but does not explore the
solution space of handling malware variants with dynamic code generation
capabilities. We are interested in dealing with dynamic code obfuscation
techniques via deploying a hybrid technique to malware variant detection.
In this case, we may apply virtualisation techniques [VMw, Ora] to par-
tially allow malware, possibly with dynamic code obfuscation, to generate
its code such that other malicious program paths (abstract traces) can be
decoded on-the-fly. Our testing method could benefit from a hybrid tech-
nique by covering more aspects of the malware code and capture more of its
semantics.
2. Reasoning about program semantics approximation. Another possi-
bility for future work is to investigate a framework for determining the set of
Chapter 7. Conclusion and Future Work 193
approximate semantic traces with respect to possible program paths in the
control flow graph of a malicious program. As a first step in this direction,
we observe that for each (unique) feasible program path in a program CFG,
there may exist a set of simulation (concrete) traces that might have similar
semantics. Hence, for future work, an abstraction method could be devel-
oped to characterise the relation between the abstract environment, i.e. the
control flow graph, and the concrete environment, i.e. semantic traces. This
method may be described as a Galois relation between two domains and may
help us in reasoning about how to minimise the number of false negatives in
matching trace slices of program variants.
3. Detection performance improvements. Parallel implementations of the
detection algorithm may help to improve the efficiency of a semantics-based
malware detector when extracting and matching malware signatures. Cur-
rently, our techniques, proposed in this dissertation, for analysing a known
malware program and generating a signature, perform slowly because they
only handle one malware sample at a time. One area we believe major im-
provements can be made is by using General-Purpose computing on Graph-
ics Processing Units (GPGPU) [LHK+04, SC07]. GPGPU has drastically
evolved in recent years and provides software developers with the inex-
pensive, massive computation power available in Graphics Processing Units
(GPUs). This power can be used to code and run data-intensive algorithms
that up till now were traditionally accommodated by the central processing
unit (CPU). This technique may enhance the malware detection phase; in
particular, it could speed up the matching process by handling a large set of
suspicious programs simultaneously, quickly determine if a malicious code is
not a variant of an existing malware, and, hence, a new semantic signature
can be extracted automatically for the new malware.
We believe that the semantics-based approach to malware detection has the po-
tential to strengthen AV scanners on clients’ machines with semantics-enabled
malware detectors. Future solutions to the above mentioned issues will improve
the contributions of this dissertation in developing stronger malware detection
tools.
Bibliography
[ADS91a] Hiralal Agrawal, Richard A. DeMillo, and Eugene H. Spafford.
Dynamic slicing in the presence of unconstrained pointers. In
Proceedings of the symposium on Testing, analysis, and verifica-
tion, TAV4, pages 60–73, New York, NY, USA, 1991. ACM.
[ADS91b] Hiralal Agrawal, Richard A. DeMillo, and Eugene H. Spafford.
An execution-backtracking approach to debugging. IEEE Soft-
ware, 8:21–26, May 1991.
[AH90] Hiralal Agrawal and Joseph R. Horgan. Dynamic program slic-
ing. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1990 Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI ’90,
pages 246–256. ACM, 1990.
[AHJD10] S. S. Anju, P. Harmya, Noopa Jagadeesh, and R. Darsana. Mal-
ware detection using assembly code and control flow graph opti-
mization. In Proceedings of the 1st Amrita ACM-W Celebration
on Women in Computing in India, A2CWiC ’10, pages 65:1–65:4,
New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[AIP04] Tankut Akgul, Vincent J. Mooney III, and Santosh Pande. A
fast assembly level reverse execution method via dynamic slicing.
In Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on Software
Engineering, ICSE ’04, pages 522–531. IEEE Computer Society,
2004.
[Alz10a] Khalid Alzarooni. asm2aapl: Assembly programming lan-
guage translator for abstract machine code (AAPL), August




[Alz10b] Khalid Alzarooni. TSAlgo: Trace-slicing algortihm for binary
executable code, August 2010. Published online at http://www.
cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/K.Alzarooni/projfiles/TSAlgo.
[Alz11] Khalid Alzarooni. A prototype detector for malware variant de-
tection, May 2011. Published online at http://www.cs.ucl.ac.
uk/staff/K.Alzarooni/projfiles/semsim.
[ARJ07] N. Aaraj, A. Raghunathan, and N.K. Jha. Virtualization-assisted
framework for prevention of software vulnerability based security
attacks. Technical Report CE-J07-001, Dept. of Electrical Engi-
neering, Princeton University, December 2007.
[ARJ08] Najwa Aaraj, Anand Raghunathan, and Niraj K. Jha. Dynamic
binary instrumentation-based framework for malware defense. In
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Detection of
Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA
’08, pages 64–87, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[BCM04] Dirk Beyer, Adam J. Chlipala, and Rupak Majumdar. Generat-
ing tests from counterexamples. In Proceedings of the 26th In-
ternational Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’04, pages
326–335. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
[BDEK99] J. Bergeron, Mourad Debbabi, M. M. Erhioui, and Be´chir Ktari.
Static analysis of binary code to isolate malicious behaviors. In
Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Enabling Technologies on
Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises, WETICE ’99, pages
184–189. IEEE Computer Society, 1999.
[BEL75] Robert S. Boyer, Bernard Elspas, and Karl N. Levitt. SELECT–
a formal system for testing and debugging programs by symbolic
execution. SIGPLAN Not., 10:234–245, April 1975.
[BGA03] Derek Bruening, Timothy Garnett, and Saman Amarasinghe. An
infrastructure for adaptive dynamic optimization. In Proceedings
of the international symposium on Code generation and optimiza-
tion: feedback-directed and runtime optimization, CGO ’03, pages
265–275, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer Society.
Bibliography 196
[BGM10] Philippe Beaucamps, Isabelle Gnaedig, and Jean-Yves Marion.
Behavior abstraction in malware analysis. In Proceedings of the
First International Conference on Runtime Verification, RV’10,
pages 168–182, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
[BGS+01] A´rpa´d Beszedes, Tama´s Gergely, Zsolt Miha´ly Szabo´, Janos
Csirik, and Tibor Gyimothy. Dynamic slicing method for mainte-
nance of large C programs. In Proceedings of the Fifth European
Conference on Software Maintenance and Reengineering, CSMR
’01. IEEE Computer Society, 2001.
[BHSP08] Abhijit Bose, Xin Hu, Kang G. Shin, and Taejoon Park. Behav-
ioral detection of malware on mobile handsets. In MobiSys ’08:
Proceeding of the 6th international conference on Mobile systems,
applications, and services, pages 225–238, New York, NY, USA,
2008. ACM.
[BJS+06] David Brumley, Newso James, Dawn Song, Hao Wang, and
Somesh Jha. Towards automatic generation of vulnerability-
based signatures. In Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 2–16, Washington, DC, USA, 2006.
IEEE Computer Society.
[BKK06] Ulrich Bayer, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. TTAnalyze:
A tool for analyzing malware. In Proceedings of the 15th European
Institute for Computer Antivirus Research Annual Conference,
EICAR’06, 2006.
[BM09] Philippe Beaucamps and Jean-Yves Marion. On behavioral de-
tection. In Proceedings of the 18th European Institute for Com-
puter Antivirus Research Annual Conference, EICAR’09, 2009.
[BMM07] Danilo Bruschi, Lorenzo Martignoni, and Mattia Monga. Code
normalization for self-mutating malware. IEEE Security and Pri-
vacy, 5(2):46–54, 2007.
[BOA+07] Michael Bailey, Jon Oberheide, Jon Andersen, Z. Morley Mao,
Farnam Jahanian, and Jose Nazario. Automated classification
and analysis of internet malware. In Proceedings of the 10th Inter-
national Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection,
Bibliography 197
RAID’07, pages 178–197, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer-
Verlag.
[CC76] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Static determination of dynamic
properties of programs. In Proceedings of the Second Inter-
national Symposium on Programming, pages 106–130. Dunod,
Paris, France, 1976.
[CC77] Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a
unified lattice model for static analysis of programs by construc-
tion or approximation of fixpoints. In Proceedings of the 4th
ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Program-
ming Languages, POPL ’77, pages 238–252, New York, NY, USA,
1977. ACM.
[CC02] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Systematic design of program trans-
formation frameworks by abstract interpretation. In Conference
Record of the Twentyninth Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 178–
190, Portland, Oregon, Jan. 2002. ACM Press, New York, NY.
[CDH+03] J. Clarke, J.J. Dolado, M. Harman, R. Hierons, B. Jones,
M. Lumkin, B. Mitchell, S. Mancoridis, K. Rees, M. Roper, and
M. Shepperd. Reformulating software engineering as a search
problem. IEE Proceedings Software, 150(3):161 – 175, June 2003.
[CF97] Cristina Cifuentes and Antoine Fraboulet. Intraprocedural static
slicing of binary executables. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Software Maintenance, ICSM ’97, page 188. IEEE
Computer Society, 1997.
[CGP+06] Cristian Cadar, Vijay Ganesh, Peter M. Pawlowski, David L. Dill,
and Dawson R. Engler. EXE: automatically generating inputs of
death. In CCS ’06: Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, pages 322–335, New
York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[CHY11] Patrick Chan, Lucas Hui, and S. Yiu. Dynamic software birth-
mark for java based on heap memory analysis. In Communica-
tions and Multimedia Security, volume 7025 of Lecture Notes in
Bibliography 198
Computer Science, pages 94–107. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2011.
[CJ04] M. Christodorescu and S. Jha. Testing malware detectors. In
Proceedings of the ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on
Software Testing and Analysis 2004 (ISSTA’04), pages 34–44,
Boston, MA, USA, July 2004. ACM.
[CJS+05] Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha, Sanjit A. Seshia, Dawn Song,
and Randal E. Bryant. Semantics-aware malware detection. In
Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, SP ’05, pages 32–46, Washington, DC, USA, 2005. IEEE
Computer Society.
[CL06] Mohamed R. Chouchane and Arun Lakhotia. Using engine sig-
nature to detect metamorphic malware. In Proceedings of the 4th
ACM workshop on Recurring malcode, WORM ’06, pages 73–78,
New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[CMJ+10] Sang Kil Cha, Iulian Moraru, Jiyong Jang, John Truelove, David
Brumley, and David G. Andersen. SplitScreen: enabling effi-
cient, distributed malware detection. In Proceedings of the 7th
USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implemen-
tation, NSDI’10, pages 25–25, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010. USENIX
Association.
[Coh87] F. Cohen. Computer viruses: theory and experiments. Computers
and Security, 6:22–35, February 1987.
[Col08] Michael Collins. A Protocol Graph Based Anomaly Detection
System. PhD thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 2008.
[CTL97] Christian Collberg, Clark Thomborson, and Douglas Low. A
taxonomy of obfuscating transformations. Technical Report 148,
The University of Auckland, July 1997.
[CTL98] Christian Collberg, Clark Thomborson, and Douglas Low. Man-
ufacturing cheap, resilient, and stealthy opaque constructs. In
Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on
Principles of Programming Languages, POPL ’98, pages 184–196,
New York, NY, USA, 1998. ACM.
Bibliography 199
[CW00] David M. Chess and Steve R. White. An undetectable com-
puter virus. In Proceedings of the 2000 Virus Bulletin Conference,
VB2000, 2000.
[CWZ90] David R. Chase, Mark Wegman, and F. Kenneth Zadeck. Anal-
ysis of pointers and structures. In Proceedings of the ACM SIG-
PLAN 1990 conference on Programming language design and im-
plementation, PLDI ’90, pages 296–310, New York, NY, USA,
1990. ACM.
[DEMDS00] Saumya K. Debray, William Evans, Robert Muth, and Bjorn
De Sutter. Compiler techniques for code compaction. ACM
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 22:378–
415, March 2000.
[DO91] Richard A. DeMillo and A. Jefferson Offutt. Constraint-based
automatic test data generation. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 17:900–910, September 1991.
[DO93] Richard A. DeMillo and A. Jefferson Offutt. Experimental results
from an automatic test case generator. ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering and Methodology, 2:109–127, April 1993.
[Far02] Csaba Farago´. Union slices for program maintenance. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Software Maintenance,
ICSM’02, Washington, DC, USA, 2002. IEEE Computer Society.
[FDJ09] Zhang FuYong, Qi DeYu, and Hu JingLin. MBMAS: A system for
malware behavior monitor and analysis. In International Sympo-
sium on Computer Network and Multimedia Technology, CNMT
2009, pages 1–4, January 2009.
[FG09] Min Feng and R. Gupta. Detecting virus mutations via dynamic
matching. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Con-
ference on Software Maintenance, ICSM ’09, pages 105 –114,
September 2009.
[fsg] Fast Small Good (FSG) - a malware packer. Published online
at http://in4k.untergrund.net/index.php?title=Exe_
Tweakers_and_Linkers#EXE_Packers_.28and_Linkers.29.
Last accessed on 10 May 2010.
Bibliography 200
[FSR09] M. Feily, A. Shahrestani, and S. Ramadass. A survey of botnet
and botnet detection. In Emerging Security Information, Systems
and Technologies, 2009. SECURWARE ’09. Third International
Conference on, pages 268 –273, June 2009.
[Gan07] Vijay Ganesh. Decision procedures for bit-vectors, arrays and
integers. PhD thesis, Stanford, CA, USA, 2007.
[GBMKJYM07] Guillaume Bonfante, Matthieu Kaczmarek, and Jean-Yves Mar-
ion. Control flow to detect malware. In Proceedings of the Inter-
Regional Workshop on Rigorous System Development and Anal-
ysis, Nancy France, 2007.
[GBR98] Arnaud Gotlieb, Bernard Botella, and Michel Rueher. Auto-
matic test data generation using constraint solving techniques.
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 23(2):53–62, 1998.
[GBR00] Arnaud Gotlieb, Bernard Botella, and Michel Rueher. A CLP
framework for computing structural test data. In Proceedings of
the First International Conference on Computational Logic, CL
’00, pages 399–413, London, UK, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
[GJ90] Michael R. Garey and David S. Johnson. Computers and In-
tractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W. H.
Freeman & Co., New York, NY, USA, 1990.
[GKS05] Patrice Godefroid, Nils Klarlund, and Koushik Sen. DART: di-
rected automated random testing. In Proceedings of the 2005
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation, PLDI ’05, pages 213–223, New York, NY,
USA, 2005. ACM.
[GMS98] Neelam Gupta, Aditya P. Mathur, and Mary Lou Soffa. Auto-
mated test data generation using an iterative relaxation method.
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 23(6):231–244, 1998.
[GSHC09] Kent Griffin, Scott Schneider, Xin Hu, and Tzi-Cker Chiueh. Au-
tomatic generation of string signatures for malware detection. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Recent Ad-
vances in Intrusion Detection, RAID ’09, pages 101–120, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-Verlag.
Bibliography 201
[GzAP10] Miguel GO´mez-zamalloa, Elvira Albert, and GermA´n Puebla.
Test case generation for object-oriented imperative languages in
CLP. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 10:659–674,
July 2010.
[Har07] Mark Harman. Automated test data generation using search
based software engineering. In Proceedings of the Second Inter-
national Workshop on Automation of Software Test, AST ’07,
pages 2–, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[Hea] VX Heavens. Published online at http://vx.netlux.org/. Last
accessed on 17 January 2011.
[HKV07] Andreas Holzer, Johannes Kinder, and Helmut Veith. Using ver-
ification technology to specify and detect malware. In Proceed-
ings of the 11th International Conference on Computer Aided
Systems Theory, EUROCAST’07, pages 497–504, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2007. Springer-Verlag.
[HMK06] Christian Hammer, Grim Martin, and Jens Krinke. Dynamic
path conditions in dependence graphs. In Proceedings of the
2006 ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Partial Evaluation and
Semantics-based Mrogram Manipulation, PEPM ’06, pages 58–
67, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[HPR89] S. Horwitz, P. Pfeiffer, and T. Reps. Dependence analysis for
pointer variables. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 24(7):28–40, 1989.
[IM07] N. Idika and A. P. Mathur. A survey of malware detection tech-
niques. SERC Technical Reports, (SERC-TR-286), March 2007.
[Int] Intel. IA-32 architectures software developer’s manuals.
Published online at http://developer.intel.com/products/
processor/manuals/index.htm. Last accessed on 11 December
2010.
[Int90] CORPORATE Intel Corp. i486 microprocessor programmer’s ref-
erence manual. Osborne/McGraw-Hill, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1990.
[JDF08] Gre´goire Jacob, Herve´ Debar, and Eric Filiol. Behavioral detec-
tion of malware: from a survey towards an established taxonomy.
Bibliography 202
Journal in Computer Virology, 4:251–266, 2008. 10.1007/s11416-
008-0086-0.
[JM08] Daniel Jurafsky and James H. Martin. Speech and Language Pro-
cessing. Prentice Hall, 2nd edition, 2008.
[KGG07] Abhishek Karnik, Suchandra Goswami, and Ratan Guha. De-
tecting obfuscated viruses using cosine similarity analysis. In
Proceedings of the First Asia International Conference on Mod-
elling and Simulation, AMS ’07, pages 165–170, Washington, DC,
USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[Kin75] James C. King. A new approach to program testing. ACM SIG-
PLAN Notes, 10:228–233, April 1975.
[Kin76] James C. King. Symbolic execution and program testing. Com-
munications of the ACM, 19:385–394, July 1976.
[KJLG03] A´kos Kiss, Judit Ja´sz, Ga´bor Lehotai, and Tibor Gyimo´thy. In-
terprocedural static slicing of binary executables. In Proceedings
of the 3rd IEEE International Workshop on Source Code Anal-
ysis and Manipulation, SCAM ’03, pages 118–127, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, September 2003. IEEE Computer Society.
[KKB+06] Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, Greg Banks, Giovanni Vigna,
and Richard A. Kemmerer. Behavior-based spyware detection. In
Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Sympo-
sium, volume 15, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006. USENIX Association.
[KKSV05] Johannes Kinder, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christian Schallhart, and
Helmut Veith. Detecting malicious code by model checking. In
Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnera-
bility Assessment (DIMVA’05), volume 3548 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 174–187. Springer, July 2005.
[KKSV10] Johannes Kinder, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christian Schallhart, and
Helmut Veith. Proactive detection of computer worms using
model checking. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 7:424–438, October 2010.
Bibliography 203
[KL88] B. Korel and J. Laski. Dynamic program slicing. Information
Processing Letters, 29(3):155–163, 1988.
[KL90] Bogdan Korel and Janusz Laski. Dynamic slicing of computer
programs. Journal of Systems and Software, 13(3):187–195, 1990.
[Kor90] Bogdan Korel. Automated software test data generation. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 16(8):870–879, 1990.
[KRT10] P. K. Kerr, John Rollins, and C. A. Theohary. The stuxnet com-
puter worm: Harbinger of an emerging warfare capability. Tech-
nical Report R41524, Congressional Research Service, December
2010.
[Kuz07] On the Concept of Software Obfuscation in Computer Security,
volume 4779 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer,
2007.
[KY94] Bogdan Korel and Satish Yalamanchili. Forward computation of
dynamic program slices. In Proceedings of the 1994 ACM SIG-
SOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analy-
sis, ISSTA ’94, pages 66–79, New York, NY, USA, 1994. ACM.
[LB97] James R. Lyle and David Binkley. Program slicing in the presence
of pointers (extended abstract), 1997. Published online at http:
//hissa.nist.gov/unravel/papers/serf.ps. Last accessed on
12 July 2008.
[LCM+05] Chi-Keung Luk, Robert Cohn, Robert Muth, Harish Patil, Ar-
tur Klauser, Geoff Lowney, Steven Wallace, Vijay Janapa Reddi,
and Kim Hazelwood. Pin: building customized program analysis
tools with dynamic instrumentation. In Proceedings of the 2005
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation, PLDI ’05, pages 190–200, New York, NY,
USA, 2005. ACM.
[LD03] Cullen Linn and Saumya Debray. Obfuscation of executable code
to improve resistance to static disassembly. In Proceedings of
the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS ’03, pages 290–299, New York, NY, USA, 2003.
ACM.
Bibliography 204
[LHK+04] David Luebke, Mark Harris, Jens Kru¨ger, Tim Purcell, Naga
Govindaraju, Ian Buck, Cliff Woolley, and Aaron Lefohn. Gpgpu:
general purpose computation on graphics hardware. In ACM
SIGGRAPH 2004 Course Notes, SIGGRAPH ’04, New York,
NY, USA, 2004. ACM.
[LJL10] Jusuk Lee, Kyoochang Jeong, and Heejo Lee. Detecting meta-
morphic malwares using code graphs. In Proceedings of the 2010
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC ’10, pages 1970–
1977, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[LRHK10] Mu-Woong Lee, Jong-Won Roh, Seung-won Hwang, and Sunghun
Kim. Instant code clone search. In Proceedings of the eighteenth
ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of soft-
ware engineering, FSE ’10, pages 167–176, New York, NY, USA,
2010. ACM.
[MC04] Ginger Myles and Christian S. Collberg. Detecting software theft
via whole program path birthmarks. In Kan Zhang and Yuliang
Zheng, editors, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference
on Information Security (ISC ’04), volume 3225 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 404–415, Palo Alto, CA, USA, 2004.
Springer.
[McG] Paul McGuire. The pyparsing module. Published online at
http://pyparsing.wikispaces.com/. Last accessed on 21 Jan-
uary 2011.
[McM04] Phil McMinn. Search-based software test data generation: a sur-
vey: Research articles. Software Testing, Verification and Relia-
bility, 14:105–156, June 2004.
[MDT07] Anirban Majumdar, Stephen J. Drape, and Clark D. Thombor-
son. Slicing obfuscations: design, correctness, and evaluation. In
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Digital Rights Man-
agement, DRM ’07, pages 70–81. ACM, 2007.
[MFT+08] Robert Moskovitch, Clint Feher, Nir Tzachar, Eugene Berger,
Marina Gitelman, Shlomi Dolev, and Yuval Elovici. Unknown
malcode detection using opcode representation. In Proceedings
Bibliography 205
of the 1st European Conference on Intelligence and Security In-
formatics, EuroISI ’08, pages 204–215, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008.
Springer-Verlag.
[MKK07a] Andreas Moser, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. Explor-
ing multiple execution paths for malware analysis. In Proceedings
of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’07,
pages 231–245, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer
Society.
[MKK07b] Andreas Moser, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. Limits
of static analysis for malware detection. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Third Annual Computer Security Applications Confer-
ence, ACSAC ’07, pages 421–430, 2007.
[MKM+06] Durga P. Mohapatra, Rajeev Kumar, Rajib Mall, D. S. Kumar,
and Mayank Bhasin. Distributed dynamic slicing of Java pro-
grams. Journal of Systems and Software, 79:1661–1678, Decem-
ber 2006.
[MM06] G. B. Mund and Rajib Mall. An efficient interprocedural dynamic
slicing method. Journal of Systems and Software, 79:791–806,
June 2006.
[MME+07] Shinsuke Miwa, Toshiyuki Miyachi, Masashi Eto, Masashi
Yoshizumi, and Yoichi Shinoda. Design and implementation of
an isolated sandbox with mimetic internet used to analyze mal-
wares. In Proceedings of the DETER Community Workshop on
Cyber Security Experimentation and Test, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2007. USENIX Association.
[MMS02] G. B. Mund, Rajib Mall, and S. Sarkar. An efficient dynamic
program slicing technique. Information and Software Technology,
44(2):123–132, 2002.
[MMS03] G. B. Mund, R. Mall, and S. Sarkar. Computation of intraproce-
dural dynamic program slices. Information and Software Tech-
nology, 45(8):499–512, 2003.
[Mor01] P. Morley. Processing virus collections. In Proceedings of the
2001 Virus Bulletin Conference, VB ’01, 2001.
Bibliography 206
[MRD02] Jonas Maebe, Michiel Ronsse, and Koen De Bosschere. DIOTA:
Dynamic Instrumentation, Optimization and Transformation of
Applications. In Proceedings of the 12th International Confer-
ence on Parallel Architectures and Compilation Techniques 2002,
PACT 02, Charlottesville, Virginia, September 2002.
[Muc97] Steven S. Muchnick. Advanced compiler design and implementa-
tion. Morgan Kaufmann, 1st edition, August 1997.
[Nac97] Carey Nachenberg. Computer virus-antivirus coevolution. Com-
munications of the ACM, 40:46–51, January 1997.
[Nac10] Carey Nachenberg. All about computer viruses with
software installing, February 2010. Published online
at http://www.articlesbase.com/software-articles/
all-about-computer-viruses-with-software-installing-/
1830222.html. Last accessed on 17 July 2010.
[Net04] N. Nethercote. Dynamic Binary Analysis and Instrumentation.
PhD thesis, United Kingdom, 2004.
[OJP94] A. Jefferson Offutt, Zhenyi Jin, and Jie Pan. The dynamic do-
main reduction procedure for test data generation: design and al-
gorithms. Technical Report ISSE-TR-94-110, ISSE Department,
George Mason University, August 1994.
[OJP99] A. Jefferson Offutt, Zhenyi Jin, and Jie Pan. The dynamic do-
main reduction procedure for test data generation. Software:
Practice and Experience, 29(2):167–193, 1999.
[Ora] Oracle. VM Virtualbox 4.0. Published online at
http://www.oracle.com/us/technologies/virtualization/
oraclevm/061976.html. Last accessed on 20 March 2011.
[OSH01] A. Orso, S. Sinha, and M.J. Harrold. Effects of pointers on data
dependences. In Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop
on Program Comprehension, 2001.
[Pan08] PandaLab. The amount of new malware that appeared in
2007 increased tenfold with respect to the previous year,




accessed on 17 November 2008.
[Pan10] PandaLabs. Pandalabs annual malware report 2009, January
2010. Published online at http://www.pandasecurity.com/
img/enc/Annual_Report_PandaLabs_2009.pdf. Last accessed
on 23 April 2010.
[PCJD07] Mila Dalla Preda, Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha, and
Saumya Debray. A semantics-based approach to malware detec-
tion. In Proceedings of the 34th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL ’07,
pages 377–388. ACM Press, 2007.
[PCJD08] Mila Dalla Preda, Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha, and
Saumya Debray. A semantics-based approach to malware detec-
tion. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Sys-
tems, 30:25:1–25:54, September 2008.
[PP07] Animesh Patcha and Jung-Min Park. An overview of anomaly
detection techniques: Existing solutions and latest technological
trends. Comput. Netw., 51(12):3448–3470, 2007.
[PTK11] Jeremy Pate, Robert Tairas, and Nicholas Kraft. Clone Evolu-
tion: A Systematic Review. Journal of Software Maintenance
and Evolution: Research and Practice, September 2011.
[QL09] Daniel Quist and Lorie Liebrock. Visualizing compiled executa-
bles for malware analysis. In Proceedings of the 6th International
Workshop on Visualization for Cyber Security, VizSec ’09, pages
27–32, Atlantic City, NJ, October 2009. IEEE.
[RC07] Chanchal Kumar Roy and James R. Cordy. A survey on software
clone detection research. TR 2007-541, School of Computing,
Queen’s University, 2007.
[Res] Data Rescure. IDA Pro disassembler: Multi-processor, windows
hosted disassembler and debugger. Published online at http://
www.datarescue.com/idabase/. Last accessed on 5 March 2008.
Bibliography 208
[Res08] Panda Research. Packer (r)evolution. March 2008.
Published online at http://research.pandasecurity.com/
packer-revolution/. Last accessed on 22 May 2008.
[RHW+08] Konrad Rieck, Thorsten Holz, Carsten Willems, Patrick Du¨ssel,
and Pavel Laskov. Learning and classification of malware behav-
ior. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Detec-
tion of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment,
DIMVA ’08, pages 108–125, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-
Verlag.
[RKLC03] Jesse C. Rabek, Roger I. Khazan, Scott M. Lewandowski, and
Robert K. Cunningham. Detection of injected, dynamically gen-
erated, and obfuscated malicious code. In Proceedings of the 2003
ACM Workshop on Rapid Malcode, WORM ’03, pages 76–82,
New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[RLG02] Juergen Rilling, Hon F. Li, and Dhrubajyoti Goswami. Predicate-
based dynamic slicing of message passing programs. In Proceed-
ings of the Second IEEE International Workshop on Source Code
Analysis and Manipulation, SCAM ’02, Washington, DC, USA,
2002. IEEE Computer Society.
[RM10] Kevin A. Roundy and Barton P. Miller. Hybrid analysis and con-
trol of malware. In Proceedings of the 13th international confer-
ence on Recent advances in intrusion detection, RAID’10, pages
317–338, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
[RRZ+09] Y. Robiah, S. Siti Rahayu, M. Mohd Zaki, S. Shahrin, M. A.
Faizal, and R. Marliza. A new generic taxonomy on hybrid mal-
ware detection technique. International Journal of Computer Sci-
ence and Information Security, 5, 2009.
[SC07] Jay Steele and Robert Cochran. Introduction to GPGPU pro-
gramming. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Southeast Regional
Conference, ACM-SE 45, pages 508–508, New York, NY, USA,
2007. ACM.
[SF01] Pe´ter Szo¨r and Peter Ferrie. Hunting for metamorphic. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2001 Virus Bulletin Conference, VB ’01, pages
Bibliography 209
123–144, Prague, Czech Republic, September 2001. Virus Bul-
letin.
[SL03] P.K. Singh and A. Lakhotia. Static verification of worm and
virus behavior in binary executables using model checking. In
Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics So-
ciety Information Assurance Workshop, IAW ’03, pages 298–300,
2003.
[SMEG09] Asaf Shabtai, Robert Moskovitch, Yuval Elovici, and Chanan
Glezer. Detection of malicious code by applying machine learning
classifiers on static features: A state-of-the-art survey. Informa-
tion Security Technical Report, 14(1):16–29, 2009.
[Sop09] Sophos. MMX gives FakeAVs a new trick, April 2009. Pub-
lished online at http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2009/04/
12/mmx-fakeav-clothes/. Last accessed on 21 June 2009.
[Sop10] Sophos. Security threat report 2010, January 2010.
Published online at www.sophos.com/security/topic/
security-report-2010.html. Last accessed on 17 July
2010.
[Sop11] Sophos. Security threat report 2011, January 2011. Pub-
lished online at http://www.sophos.com/security/topic/
security-threat-report-2011.html. Last accessed on 23
April 2011.
[Ste07] Joe Stewart. Ollybone, January 2007. Published online at
http://www.joestewart.org/ollybone/. Last accessed on 10
September 2010.
[STMF09] M. Zubair Shafiq, S. Momina Tabish, Fauzan Mirza, and Mud-
dassar Farooq. Pe-miner: Mining structural information to de-
tect malicious executables in realtime. In Proceedings of the
12th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection, RAID ’09, pages 121–141, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009.
Springer-Verlag.
Bibliography 210
[SVBY10] Li Sun, Steven Versteeg, Serdar Boztas¸, and Trevor Yann. Pat-
tern recognition techniques for the classification of malware pack-
ers. In Information Security and Privacy, volume 6168 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 370–390. Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg, 2010.
[SWL08] Muazzam Siddiqui, Morgan C. Wang, and Joohan Lee. A sur-
vey of data mining techniques for malware detection using file
features. In Proceedings of the 46th Annual Southeast Regional
Conference on XX, ACM-SE 46, pages 509–510, New York, NY,
USA, 2008. ACM.
[Sym03] Symantec. Internet security threat report, 2003. Pub-
lished online at http://www.securitystats.com/reports/
Symantec-Internet_Security_Threat_Report_vIII.
20030201.pdf. Last accessed on 12 October 2007.
[Sym10] Symantec. Global internet security threat report trends for
2009, April 2010. Published online at http://eval.symantec.
com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_
internet_security_threat_report_xv_04-2010.en-us.pdf.
Last accessed on 17 July 2010.
[Szo¨05] Pe´ter Szo¨r. The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, USA, 2005.
[Tip94] Frank Tip. A survey of program slicing techniques. Technical
report, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amster-
dam, The Netherlands, 1994.
[TONM04] H. Tamada, K. Okamoto, M. Nakamura, and A. Monden. Dy-
namic software birthmarks to detect the theft of windows appli-
cations. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on
Future Software Technology, ISFST ’04, Xian, China, 2004. SEA.
[upx10] Ultimate packer for executables (upx) disassembler, 2010. Pub-
lished online at http://upx.sourceforge.net/. Last accessed
on 10 May 2010.
[Val07] Danny Quist Valsmith. Covert debugging: Circumventing soft-
ware armoring techniques. In Black Hat Briefings, USA, 2007.
Bibliography 211
[VMw] VMware. Virtualization via hypervisor, virtual machine and
server consolidation. Published online at http://www.vmware.
com/virtualization/virtual-machine.html. Last accessed on
15 August 2010.
[VPK04] Willem Visser, Corina S. Paˇsaˇreanu, and Sarfraz Khurshid. Test
input generation with java pathfinder. ACM SIGSOFT Software
Engineering Notes, 29:97–107, July 2004.
[Wei81] Mark Weiser. Program slicing. In Proceedings of the 5th Inter-
national Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’81, pages
439–449, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 1981. IEEE Press.
[WHF07] Carsten Willems, Thorsten Holz, and Felix Freiling. Toward au-
tomated dynamic malware analysis using CWSandbox. IEEE
Security and Privacy, 5(2):32–39, 2007.
[WJZL09a] Xinran Wang, Yoon-Chan Jhi, Sencun Zhu, and Peng Liu. Be-
havior based software theft detection. In Proceedings of the
16th ACM conference on Computer and communications secu-
rity, CCS ’09, pages 280–290, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[WJZL09b] Xinran Wang, Yoon-Chan Jhi, Sencun Zhu, and Peng Liu. De-
tecting software theft via system call based birthmarks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 25th Annual Computer Security Applications Con-
ference, ACSAC ’09, pages 149–158, Honolulu, Hawaii, December
2009. IEEE Computer Society.
[WR07] Tao Wang and Abhik Roychoudhury. Hierarchical dynamic slic-
ing. In Proceedings of the 2007 International Symposium on Soft-
ware Testing and Analysis, ISSTA ’07, pages 228–238, New York,
NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[XQZ+05] Baowen Xu, Ju Qian, Xiaofang Zhang, Zhongqiang Wu, and Lin
Chen. A brief survey of program slicing. ACM SIGSOFT Soft-
ware Engineering Notes, 30(2):1–36, 2005.
[YHR89] Wuu Yang, Susan Horwitz, and Thomas Reps. Detecting pro-
gram components with equivalent behaviors. Technical Report
840, Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, WI, USA, April 1989.
Bibliography 212
[Yus] Oleh Yuschuk. OllyDbg debugger. Published online at http:
//www.ollydbg.de/. Last accessed on 14 December 2010.
[YY10] I. Yim and K. You. Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief
survey. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on
Broadband, Wireless Computing Communication and Applica-
tions, BWCCA ’10, pages 297–300, 2010.
[ZGZ03] Xiangyu Zhang, Rajiv Gupta, and Youtao Zhang. Precise dy-
namic slicing algorithms. In Proceedings of the 25th International
Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’03, pages 319–329.
IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[ZGZ05] Xiangyu Zhang, Rajiv Gupta, and Youtao Zhang. Cost and preci-
sion tradeoffs of dynamic data slicing algorithms. ACM Transac-
tions on Programming Languages and Systems, 27:631–661, July
2005.
[ZSSY08] Xiaoming Zhou, Xingming Sun, Guang Sun, and Ying Yang. A
combined static and dynamic software birthmark based on com-
ponent dependence graph. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia
Signal Processing, IIHMSP ’08, pages 1416 –1421, August 2008.
[ZYH+07] Boyun Zhang, Jianping Yin, Jingbo Hao, Dingxing Zhang, and
Shulin Wang. Malicious codes detection based on ensemble learn-
ing. In Autonomic and Trusted Computing, volume 4610 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 468–477. Springer Berlin
/ Heidelberg, 2007.
